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COUNTRY EVALUATION

**EUROPEAN UNION COOPERATION WITH
SOMALIA (2014-2021)**

Volume 1

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Evaluation of the European Union cooperation with Somalia (2014-2021)

Final Report

The report consists of three volumes:

VOLUME I – MAIN REPORT

1. Introduction
2. Methodological approach
3. Findings
4. Overall assessment and conclusions
5. Recommendations

VOLUME II – ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference
2. List of interventions
3. List of stakeholders consulted
4. List of documents consulted
5. Evaluation matrix
6. Details on methodological approach
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8. eSurvey analysis
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10. A review of the political, economic, social and security situation of Somalia

VOLUME III – COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AT INDICATOR LEVEL

- EQ1 Responsiveness of the design
- EQ2 Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities
- EQ3 Efficiency and Flexibility
- EQ4 Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors
- EQ5 Cross-cutting issues
- EQ6 Strategic outcomes
- EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability)

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Acronyms/Abbreviations

Acronym	Meaning
AfDB	African Development Bank
AfDB SIF	African Development Bank Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APF	African Peace Facility
ASWJ	Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a – Somalia-based paramilitary groups
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BRCiS	Building Resilient Communities in Somalia Programme
BRIDGES	TVET and Higher Education for Boosting Road Infrastructure Development and Growth of Energy Services Project
CBDS	Capacity Building Assistance to Military Actors in Support of Development and Security for Development
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CRATES	Customs Reform and Trade Enhancement in Somalia Project
CRIS database	Cross-Regional Information System database from the EC
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civil society organisation
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DEVCO	Former DG INTPA, DG International Cooperation and Development
DFI	Development Finance Institution
DG ECHO	DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DG INTPA	DG for International Partnerships
DG MARE	DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFSD+	European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus
EIB	European Investment Bank
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
EPF	European Peace Facility
EQ	Evaluation Question
ESDP	Education Sector Development Programme
ESOLT	Enhancing the Somali Livestock Trade
EU	European Union
EU MS	EU Member State
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUD	Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
EUGS	EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of 2016
EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EUR	Euro
EUSR	EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa
EUTF	EU Trust Fund for Africa
EUTM	EU Training Mission to Somalia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCA	Finnish Church Aid
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom
FDG	Focus Group Discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
GAP	Gender Action Plan

Acronym	Meaning
GIZ	German International Cooperation Agency
HDP nexus	Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HoD	Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Somalia
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFI	International Financial Institution
IFU	Investment Fund for Developing Countries
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
IL	Intervention Logic
ILED	Inclusive Local and Economic Development Programme
ILWRM	Integrated Land and Water Resources Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International NGO
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JC	Judgement Criteria
JJP	Joint Justice Programme
JPP	Joint Police Programme
KfW	German Credit Institute for Reconstruction
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework
MIA	Mogadishu International Airport
MIP	Multiannual Indicative Programme
MTR	Mid-Term Review
NDICI-GE	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIP	National Indicative Programme
NPM	New Policing Model
NPS	New Partnership for Somalia for peace, stability and prosperity: a framework for mutual accountability and accelerated progress.
NSA	Non-State Actor
OECD/DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PFM	Public Financial Management
PREMIS	Public Resource Management in Somalia Programme
PSG	Peace- and Statebuilding Goals
PUNSAA	Puntland Non-State Actors Association
RAHS	Reinforcing Animal Health Services Project
RoL	Rule of Law
RTVET	Rehabilitation of TVET project
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
SONSA	Somalia Non-State Actors, formerly known as SOSSENSA
SESSP	Somalia Education Sector Support Programme
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
SNAF	Somali National Armed Forces
SNDP	Somalia National Development Plan
Somaseed	Improving genetic quality of seeds in Somalia Project
SomReP	Somalia Resilience Program
SONSAF	Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum
SPF	Somalia Partnership Forum
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STRIVE	Global EU Programme to counter violent extremism
SWALIM	Somali Water and Land Information Management
SWAP	Sector Wide Approach
TA	Technical Assistance

Acronym	Meaning
TEI	Team Europe Initiative
TPME	Third-Party Monitoring and Evaluation
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UN MPTF	UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN-OCHA	United Nations – Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WB MPF	World Bank Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia

Executive Summary

Introduction

This report presents the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the strategic evaluation of the European Union's (EU) cooperation with Somalia (2014 to 2021). The evaluation was commissioned by the Unit D4 (Performance, Results and Evaluation; Internal Communication, Knowledge Management and Collaborative Methods) of the European Commission's Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA). The evaluation focusses on Somalia, including Somaliland. Its **main objectives** are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EU and the wider public with **an overall independent assessment** of the EU's past and current cooperation with the Federal Republic of Somalia (hereafter 'Somalia');
- to identify key lessons and to produce **recommendations** in order to inform the responsible decision-makers, notably in the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG INTPA, on **how to improve** the current and future EU's strategies, programmes and actions.

The evaluation covers the EU's international development cooperation with Somalia, including EU-funded regional interventions benefitting Somalia. It reviews how this assistance connects with the support of all EU services active in Somalia, including the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa (EUSR), the EU Training Mission to Somalia (EUTM), the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) and the European Union Naval Force Somalia. Moreover, it assesses the EU's linkages with the work of EU Member States (EU MS), including Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy, and various international actors, as well as its alignment with the development priorities of the respective governments of Somalia.

A timely evaluation

The **evaluation is timely** in view of unfolding international and national challenges and a new Government in place that is committed to reforms and who can make use of the recommendations. These challenges include Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the change of government in some European countries, ongoing political and constitutional tensions between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Federal Member States (FMS) and Somaliland, and uncertainty about the likelihood to defeat Al-Shabaab. At EU level, European actors are investing in making optimal use of the funding available under the new financing instrument **Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation instrument – Global Europe** (NDICI-GE) for the programming period 2021-2027, and opportunities arising from the recently developed **Team Europe approach**.

During the evaluation period, **Somalia has gone through various political developments, periods of conflict and instability, natural disasters and limited economic growth**. A departure-point for the international support to Somalia as of 2012 has been the New Deal's peacebuilding and statebuilding goals, which translated into the Somali Compact (2013) and framed the objectives of the EU's programming for 2014-2020. Being located in the Horn of Africa, Somalia has also been influenced by regional political developments, civil wars and the growth of Al-Shabaab, which originates from Somalia but with multiple contacts in the region and beyond. More recently, the country was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, which caused a rise in food prices. In 2023, the country continues to present a high dependency on imported food¹ while climate change brought about Somalia's fifth major drought period since 2012, resulting in widespread starvation and high numbers of people being displaced.

After nearly **EUR 1.6 billion of EU cooperation funding spent in Somalia** from 2014 to 2021,² there is an interest to know what has been realised with it and which lessons can be drawn for future EU engagement in Somalia. In this evaluation, a number of **key issues** were identified and are reflected throughout the report findings.

- **The high complexity of engagement in such a fragile and conflict prone environment:** this complexity has put massive pressures on all stakeholders; there has been a general acceptance that success can only be piecemeal and achieved over a longer period of time.
- **The need to work together, comprehensively and via integrated approaches:** without this perspective and attitude, the likelihood to use well available financial resources and achieve results in the extreme contexts of Somalia is reduced. Collaborative approaches are practiced in different constellations, comprising the interaction of EU services, their collaboration with EU MS and other international partners, national government and different civil society stakeholders.

¹ International Monetary Fund (2022): Country Report 22/376. December 2022.

² This includes humanitarian assistance, but excludes security-related support via EU missions/operations under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the funding to the African Union (AU) for its peacekeeping missions African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

- **The necessity to look at the EU’s international development cooperation from a broader perspective:** the engagement of all EU services needs to be considered and judged against the background of a wider geopolitical and continuously changing context in the Horn of Africa. An assessment needs to take into account experiences at the operational level, policy dimensions and the wider political context, which is also in line with the EU’s own policy commitments to comprehensive and integrated approaches.
- **The promotion of the New Deal’s peacebuilding and statebuilding goals:** in this context, the potential of working with innovative approaches – in particular, budget support in combination with sector-wide programmes and projects – is of key interest to inform the EU’s learning about how fragile countries can be assisted. Learning about such approaches are of particular importance as the fragility of the context demands for interventions which touch on the very core functions of a partner country, including constitutional and security issues.

Looking ahead, experiences and lessons learnt by EU actors at headquarters and field level may help to: i) further tailor EU support to the dynamic and very diverse Somali context, ii) develop more effective and strategic engagements together with the FGS, FMS and international partners, iii) further innovate approaches in support of particular sectors and mainstream them across different intervention areas, and iv) seek ways to further strengthen the EU’s engagement with EU MS in this strategically located region of the world.

Overall assessment

Considering all elements of this highly complex engagement of the EU in Somalia, the overall assessment of the EU’s international development cooperation and its linkages with the actions of other EU services, EU MS and international partners is positive. Four more specific messages emerge in relation to this assessment:

- The EU, despite having worked with Somalia before, had to proceed via a ‘learning by doing’ approach to navigate its way during the early years of the evaluation period. The EU’s engagement in Somalia, with the programming for 2014-2020 being largely based on the statebuilding ambitions and objectives of the Somali Compact, became a prominent EU test-case for putting the New Deal into practice.
- The period 2017/2018, following the London Somalia Conference 2017 and preceded by the launch of the EU’s Global Strategy (2016), made the EU’s cooperation more comprehensive and strategic in its engagement with Somalia. The EU increasingly promoted an integrated approach to cooperation and became one of the five key strategic international partners for political and policy dialogue with Somali authorities. The other key partners are the World Bank (WB), United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA) and United Nations (UN).
- Considering that nearly EUR 1.6 billion of EU international cooperation funding and EU humanitarian assistance was channelled into Somalia between 2014 and 2021, the outcome and impact of its investment has however been considerably less than expected according to the ambitions laid out in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020. This can be attributed to the complexity of the context, characterised by political and clan conflicts, unsolved constitutional issues, the conflict with Al-Shabaab and Islamic State in the northern part of the country, persisting capacity challenges within FGS and FMS institutions, and the humanitarian crises caused by a combination of natural and man-made disasters, compounded by the effects of climate change.
- Considering the central place of Somalia in the geopolitically relevant Horn of Africa and the need to promote regional stability – which is also in the wider interest of the EU and EU MS – there is a need to further rank Somalia as a priority area of international development cooperation and keep a high level of investment. The EU needs to further upgrade its support, refine its collaboration with EU MS and ensure that it remains at the strategic forefront of policy and political dialogue with Somali authorities, in concert with other key international partners.

Conclusions

Main conclusions

Justification

C1 – A responsive programming, but with a need for updates

- EU support to Somalia was broadly aligned with country priorities, adapted to local context and responded to the policies and strategies set for its engagement at global, regional and country levels, including its guidance for working in fragile contexts.
- The EU manoeuvred well through the difficult period 2020-2022, characterised by the international community’s (including the EU) interruption of the political and policy dialogue with the Farmajo’s government (except for the dialogue around the electoral process), the related postponement of budget support until the political/constitutional crisis was resolved and the COVID-19 outbreak.
- The EU’s Council Conclusions for Somalia (2016) are outdated and do not sufficiently clarify the EU’s engagement at country level and its linkages with the strategic goals of the EU’s Regional Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2021).
- Strategic guidance on civil-military coordination for Somalia – relevant for the EU’s promotion of the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus, but under the

	<p>responsibility of United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) – is considered outdated.</p>
<p><i>C2 – An appropriate set of instruments and modalities was used</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU successfully developed and deployed its support via a variety of financing instruments, modalities, channels and the promotion of cross-cutting issues. • Despite the difficult country context and comparatively few capable organisations available to work with in Somalia, the EU managed to find workable solutions that functioned without compromising the very nature of the EU’s engagement. • The EU worked mainly via the project modality, but also implemented general budget support as of 2017/2018. The use of budget support considerably enhanced the EU’s role as a strategic partner, providing opportunities to leverage macro-reform policy dialogue in key areas as constitutional reform, security, Public Financial Management (PFM) and the education sector. • The support to resilience and food security via the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and sizable Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) consortia was overall well set up; however, strategic dialogue with FGS and FMS on how to engage more effectively was limited due to insufficient Somali capacity and priority setting. • Despite doubts about the value added of a new budget support programme, such a programme appears essential to provide an entry point for leveraging reforms.
<p><i>C3 – A progressively integrated approach was promoted and implemented</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU adapted its support as of 2017 based on a recognition that all EU services had to work much more closely together and advanced its comprehensive EU integrated approach with success. • Evidence of successful collaboration is strong for the cooperation and the political sections of the Delegation of the European Union to Somalia (EUD) with FPI and DG ECHO, and between headquarters and the field. • Collaboration between the EU services and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions (EUTM and EUCAP) has slowly improved during the recent years with more regular coordination meetings. • The EU-internal and EU/EU MS dialogue on the postponement of general budget support was lengthy and difficult due to different views on stopping, postponing, modifying or continuing with this support.
<p><i>C4 – Institutional arrangements display several dilemmas</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU’s current institutional set-up is the outcome of a generally successful monitoring, evaluation and learning process, resulting in more attention given to flexibility, location, human resources and synergy between the different EUD sections. • But, considering the scope of the EU’s engagement in this complex environment, there is room to improve on the timely mobilisation and fielding of staff, working conditions and the number of staff. • Operational delays were not uncommon and COVID-19 has created additional obstacles to implementation in the years 2020 and 2021; however, overall, programmed funds were eventually disbursed. • Due to difficulties with recruiting qualified staff for the political section, cooperation staff where increasingly drawn into political and security related matters at the expense of time for cooperation-related work. • The EU’s attention to visibility has been noticeable, but EU’s visibility has not fully reflected the prominent role the EU plays in Somalia.
<p><i>C5 – Effective synergies have been developed with other forms of cooperation and other donors</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Besides working closely with Somalia, the EU collaborated and coordinated successfully with different multilateral organisations, bilateral partners, and international and national NGOs. • The EU’s collaboration and coordination with EU MS were broadly satisfactory and the EU showed added value and complemented the work of EU MS. However, the EU put comparatively more energy into its partnership with the other four big players in Somalia, the WB, USA, UK and the UN (also in the political domain), partially due to the EU’s strong engagement on macro-reform issues and the delivery of social services, and partially due to constraints on the staffing levels at the EUD. • The Team Europe approach launched in 2021 has created a new momentum for enhanced EU/EU MS collaboration, with a focus on the Green Deal. • Partnerships with non-traditional partners of Somalia, like the Gulf states or China, were difficult to establish due to the exclusive bilateral character of their engagement.
<p><i>C6 – Overall effective support was delivered to civil society and cross-cutting issues were, with some variations, well addressed</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU paid considerable attention to working with NGOs and other civil society organisations (CSOs) to strengthen civil society; civil society actors highly appreciated the support provided by the EU for promoting local governance and the development of a social contract. • The EUD’s attention to the “localisation agenda” via Calls for Proposals tailored to local NGOs and NGO-platform organisations was highly appreciated and contributed to strengthening the capacities of these CSOs and platforms.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil society support also paid attention to the civil society/local government interface, though mostly from the angle of CSOs and their communities. Attention to local governments, and their role in local governance processes, was more limited. • The cross-cutting issues of gender, youth, human rights and attention to vulnerability were strongly promoted via projects strengthening CSO capacities and other projects across sectors, though with some variations. • Conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm principles were taken on board in projects, although in a less explicit way; they were rather organically included by organisations used to work in areas of conflict and protracted crises.
<p><i>C7 – Results are positive though insufficient to trigger systemic change</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU support was truly relevant for Somalia – considering the country situation – and the EU proved a relatively effective supporter of peace and security, (local) governance, PFM and the education sector in which some reforms were achieved over the years. • But development progress in Somalia has been slow, piecemeal and not visible in all regions and sectors of the country, due to the unresolved constitutional crisis, conflict, capacity deficits throughout institutions and natural and man-made disasters. Somalia is today still extremely far from being a state which could function on its own. • Support in the domains of justice sector reform, resilience, food security and (local) economic development is appreciated, although it has brought mixed results – among others due to a lack of governance, capacity and national resources. • For the same reasons, the resilience and livelihoods of vulnerable communities, including women, young people, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnees, remains extremely low. • Puntland and Somaliland have made comparatively good use of the assistance provided by the EU which was underpinned by a relatively stable security situation and comparatively better governance in the two regions.
<p><i>C8 – Overall engagement of the EU is positive but a further strategic engagement is required</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The EU has been dealing with a very volatile and complex context that has required a flexible way of engagement. In particular, during the early years of the evaluation period, the EU had to go through a learning curve about what it means to work in Somalia. The EU then gradually evolved into a strategic partner in concert with several other international supporters producing positive results – in as far as the country situation allowed for it. • Generally, the EU performed more positively with regard to its interventions for macro-reform issues and key statebuilding sectors. In other sectors less progress is noted, in particular, those where assistance took place via a multitude of projects spread across different areas in a context of low capacity and lack of governance, such as food security support. • Despite practicing a more strategic approach, the EU is still drawn into a wide variety of areas – partially as a result of expectations by a range of EU and non-EU stakeholders, and partially as a result of the significant challenges persisting in all domains. As such, focusing and targeting the EU's support remained a challenge. • The EU has started to work as of 2019 with European Development Finance Institutions (DFI), including the European Investment Bank (EIB), to promote responsible and sustainable investments in the country, whereby some progress was made, in particular regarding the support to private sector operations. But, without adequate infrastructure, favourable investment climate and business environment, EU's actions towards incentivising DFIs investments remain challenged.

Main recommendations

1. Clarify the role of the EU's international development cooperation within the overall strategic EU approach to Somalia through updated EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusion

Continue to frame EU support to Somalia under the broad peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal, but, to make the EU's international development cooperation more effective, clarify the strategy politically via updated EU Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions. Specific attention should be given to: i) inviting additional EU MS and their implementing organisations to take up a more active role in Somalia, ii) the political implications of specific instruments and modalities such as budget support and European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+); and iii) strengthening linkages between bilateral and regional engagements.

2. Formulate a Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus guidance and an updated civil-military guidance for Somalia

Formulate an HDP nexus guidance for cooperation with Somalia to clarify the division of labour between the different EU services and their type of engagement in view of the EU's strong support to both stabilisation and humanitarian assistance. The guidance should be produced by EU institutions but take note of the work of EU MS on the HDP nexus. Insights from the recently conducted EU study on the implementation of the HDP nexus (2022) should be taken on board.

Promote progress to achieving an UN-OCHA update of the civil-military cooperation guidance for Somalia.

3. Promote the successful mix of instruments and modalities across the EU's cooperation

Enhance learning from EU's overall successful and innovative combination of instruments and channels of support in areas such as education, and explore how this can be replicated in other sectors and subsectors.

Continue providing general budget support as long as it provides opportunities to leverage macro-policy and sector-policy reform, and access to policy dialogue.

Continue testing and learning from new programme approaches such as Inclusive Local and Economic Development (ILED) in support of territorial development.

4. Deepen and widen the EU's integrated approach in Somalia

Build on EU's positive experiences gained from promoting and implementing an integrated approach involving DG INTPA, EEAS, FPI and other DGs, and reinforce efforts to deepen this integration with regard to the EU's missions and operations under the CFSP.

As for the EU missions operating under the CFSP, efforts should focus on a better use of – mostly human – resources and a regular update of mandates and division of labour in a rapidly changing environment.

5. Improve on recruitment of staff, review staff numbers, working hours and assess the effects of a split EUD between Nairobi and Mogadishu in 2025/2026

Undertake efforts to improve on the timely recruitment and fielding of EUD staff for the cooperation section and the political section of the EUD.

Review the number of available EUD cooperation staff so as to ensure an adequate technical accompaniment of different sectors and ensure that working hours and staff leave are in line with the EU-internal recommendations made in 2017.

Assess the split of the EUD between Nairobi and Mogadishu towards the end of the current funding period (2025/2026) to form an opinion about the pros and cons of a full move of the EUD to Mogadishu, in view of a possible improvement of the situation of the country.

6. Foster the overall flexible cooperation approach but improve on visibility

Continue to nourish EU's overall flexible cooperation approach in view of Somalia's ongoing politically fragile, conflict affected and generally unpredictable country, regional and global situation.

Invest more in the quality of EU visibility and outreach to the Somali public via more sophisticated and communication-savvy approaches, including actions to counter fake-news and hate-speech via social media, high-level visits of EU representatives and their engagement with the media.

7. Continue successful cooperation with international partners and use opportunities of TEI

Cherish the EU's positive and successful partnerships with key international strategic players, the WB, USA, and UK in particular, and improve its collaboration with the UN where necessary.

Extend the quality and intensity of exchanges with EU MS engaged in Somalia and seize opportunities for enhanced collaboration provided via the more recently designed Team Europe Approach and specific Team Europe Initiatives (TEI) as well as the Global Gateway.

8. Enhance bottom-up development support and widen the "localisation agenda"

Further intensify and widen support for bottom-up development processes, in particular, via interventions to strengthen the linkages between civil society and local governments.

Extend the "localisation agenda" by funding more local NGOs and CSOs, potentially also via bigger contracts, to further strengthen ownership and effectiveness of interventions.

Draw up a roadmap, similar to the civil society roadmap, on how to support local governments in the country in as far as they are available.

9. Explore opportunities to expand and mainstream cross-cutting issues

Do more to foster the promotion of conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, attention to vulnerability and human rights as cross-cutting issues where relevant, and pay attention to transformative approaches and intersectionality, in particular, when dealing with gender in line with orientations provided under the Gender Action Plan III.

Explore opportunities to better mainstream youth and human rights and formulate do-no-harm approaches more explicitly.

10. Keep peacebuilding and statebuilding goals central to cooperation efforts

Further support statebuilding via constitutional reform and interventions to strengthen the rule of law, but with adaptations to pay more attention to traditional legal and justice systems.

Build on EU's significant investment for peace and security to further act as a strategic partner engaging with Somali and international stakeholders with a common and clearer approach. This should include the development of a more comprehensive approach to also address Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Somalia.

Build also on the successes achieved in PFM and the education sector by remaining engaged and expanding on the sustainability of interventions and outcomes. In this regard, continue with general budget support to leverage political and sectoral change, to move towards more direct funding modalities in the education sector and to ensure the EU has a voice at the dialogue table.

11. Work towards an improved EU support to resilience and the productive sectors

Invest in institutional and individual capacity strengthening to improve food and nutrition security to mainstream these objectives in its programming, and to further build the evidence of its impact across the HDP continuum of action.

In this regard, a better monitoring of the EU contribution to food and nutrition security objectives should be applied more systematically, e.g., by integrating relevant food and nutrition security indicators in the design of future programming.

Develop and implement this approach in the framework defined by the EU Green Deal and related Farm to Fork Strategy, whereby programming should take on the recommendations of the recently completed EU Assessment on Sustainable Agriculture Food Systems.

12. Uphold efforts to mobilise resources beyond international cooperation funding

Continue to mobilise substantial resources to meet needs and demands for assistance, also reflecting Somalia's geopolitical relevance for the EU, but carefully consider EU's capacities on the ground to respond to expectations expressed by EU MS and other international partners.

Given the need for substantial resources to develop the country, enhance efforts – in as far as possible given the country's situation – to mobilise resources through development finance (EFSD+) and by teaming up with EU MS, leveraging risk-sharing mechanisms.

In view of substantial EU MS contributions via development agencies and DFIs, ensure that close coordination between EU and EU MS is upheld, so that development expertise can be shared, and investment portfolios (in which DFIs can invest) can be prepared using their own instruments.

Figure 1 Political map of Somalia



Source: Political Map of Somalia. Map based on UN Cartographic Section.
<https://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/somalia-political-map.htm>

1 Introduction

1.1 Objectives and scope of the evaluation

This is the final deliverable of the Evaluation of the European Union's (EU) cooperation with Somalia 2014-2021. The main *objectives* of the evaluation are:

- to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the EU and the wider public with an overall independent assessment of the EU's past and current cooperation with the Federal Republic of Somalia (hereafter 'Somalia');
- to identify key lessons and to produce recommendations in order to inform the responsible decision makers, notably in the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG for International Partnerships (DG INTPA), on how to improve the current and future EU's strategies, programmes and actions.

The evaluation can play a significant role not only in the discussions on the future of EU-Somalia cooperation, but also in the ones related to the EU's overall strategy in the Horn of Africa. At a broader level, it can also feed into discussions on the use of aid modalities, including budget support, and how to support fragile and crisis-ridden countries in the wake of climate change, an unprecedented food crisis and energy shortages. It is furthermore expected that the evaluation will inform reflection on the further programming of the EU's cooperation with the Government of Somalia, which changed its President and other key leadership positions mid-year 2022.

An important aspect covered by this evaluation is an assessment of the extent to which the EU has been able to respond to security, peace, development and humanitarian challenges in the country and how the EU has positioned itself in Somalia in terms of design, implementation, results and impact of its interventions. This assessment is done along the six OECD/DAC *evaluation criteria*³ plus the additional criteria of EU added value. The assessment includes the performance of EU support in terms of spending (i.e., financial assistance) and non-spending activities (in particular policy dialogue).

The *scope* of the evaluation is the EU cooperation strategy with Somalia and its implementation in the period 2014-2021. This includes actions designed under the previous programming cycle which were implemented during the evaluation period. The analysis covers the whole engagement of the EU in Somalia, including the full set of cooperation agreements. It also reviews to what extent the EU interventions were coherent, complementary, of added value and coordinated with other actions financed and supported by other EU instruments and services, or actions carried out by European Union Member States (EU MS), regional and international development partners.

The *focus* of the evaluation is on EU support provided with funding from the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) for: i) peacebuilding and security; ii) statebuilding and improved governance at national and federal state levels; iii) Public Financial Management (PFM) reform and local economic development; iv) strengthening the education sector; v) promoting food security and better nutrition; and vi) enhancing resilience through improved livelihood and reduced vulnerability. The evaluation also covers the funding top-up provided via the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)⁴ as of 2018 and EU global thematic programmes/instruments (i.e., EIDHR, IcSP, CSO-LA, GPGC, DCI-HUM and DCI-FOOD).⁵ It also looks at cross-cutting issues, i.e., human rights, gender equality, the climate crisis and environmental issues and the lessons to be drawn from working with civil society organisations (CSOs).⁶ The analysis took into account the evolution in the national political and economic situation during the period under review, for which a separate analysis is annexed to this report.

It is important to note that these different themes were not approached in isolation but looked at in the context of a country that is faced with multiple political, security, economic and environmental issues. Therefore, the sectors were systematically analysed while taking into account the cross-cutting dimensions of the cooperation strategy. Special attention in this regard was given to the synergies and interactions between the sectors as well as between different levels of cooperation, including linkages between the country and regional levels. Somaliland, a Federal Member State (FMS) of Somalia but de facto functioning independently from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was looked at taking into account these particularities.

³ The six Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Cooperation Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria are: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, coherence, impact and sustainability.

⁴ The EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, commonly referred in this Evaluation as EUTF. This excludes the private sector and investment related projects in ILED aiming at developing inclusive markets and integrating Somalia in the regional economy which were only partly covered by the evaluation methodology.

⁵ European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), DCI thematic programme on Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO-LA), DCI thematic programme on Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC).

⁶ The private sector and investment related projects in ILED aiming at developing inclusive markets and integrating Somalia in the regional economy were only partly covered by the evaluation, as requested by the EUD.

While the evaluation focused on the EU's development cooperation with Somalia, the analysis took into account the intervention of all EU services in Somalia to assess the relationship and linkages between the different dimensions of EU external action. The EU's integrated approach in Somalia represents an important principle and was therefore carefully looked at when collecting and analysing evaluation findings. The EU's international cooperation with Somalia takes place in a context of wider international partners' support (bilateral as well as multilateral). The evaluation thus also looked at linkages with the actions of these other partners throughout the evaluation period.

1.2 Structure of the evaluation report

The *report* is structured around four main chapters. This introductory chapter briefly describes the EU-Somalia partnership. Chapter 2 presents the methodological approach and key challenges encountered. Chapter 3 compiles findings for each Evaluation Question (EQ) and Judgment Criteria (JC). Chapter 4 describes the overall assessment, presents the conclusions and explains how the EQs, and findings link to the conclusions and recommendations. Chapter 5 presents the main recommendations of the evaluation.

The report also contains the following annexes (see Volume II): i) Terms of Reference, ii) list of interventions, iii) list of stakeholders consulted, iv) list of documents consulted, v) evaluation matrix, vi) details on methodological approach, vii) quantitative analyses, viii) eSurvey results, ix) eSurvey questionnaire, and x) a review of the political, economic, social and security situation of Somalia. Volume III presents the evidence base at indicator level collected per macro-area.

1.3 The EU-Somalia partnership

Supporting fragile and conflict-ridden states with a view to create the pre-conditions for building resilience and development is a high priority for the EU's external action witness to the various policy documents the EU has drafted as of the early 2000s and thereafter.⁷ The EU's support to Somalia needs to be seen against this policy background. Important policy milestones underpinning the design and implementation of the EU's cooperation with Somalia, were the Agenda for Change (2011),⁸ the introduction of the EU comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis in 2013⁹ and EC Staff working Document on Lives in Dignity (2016).¹⁰ Attention to peace and security became central in the EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 (EUGS)¹¹ and featured prominently in the 2017 European Consensus on Development as a key element for realising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The resilience concept, which holds a central position in the EUGS, was further elaborated in a 2017 communication.¹² Council conclusions from 2018 clarified that the integrated approach should enhance the political profile towards fragile and conflict-affected states in EU decision making which became a leading principle for the EU's engagement in Somalia during the evaluation period.¹³

The EU has a *long-standing partnership* with Somalia since 2008 which was guided by the overarching Cotonou Agreement (2000). Under the 11th EDF, the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020 recognises that Somalia's eight-year transition ended in September 2012 with the peaceful handover of power from the leadership of the Transitional Federal Institutions to a new Federal Parliament and Government. The EU committed to support this process.

The EU's cooperation for the period 2014 to 2021 was informed *internationally* via several strategic and programming frameworks formulated by various international partners, including the EU, and Somali authorities. The New Deal (2013-2016) was a key reference point guiding relations between Somalia and the EU during this period. It informed the endorsement of the Somali Compact¹⁴ at the EU-Somalia Summit in

⁷ European Commission (2001): Communication on Conflict Prevention and the Gothenburg Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts. Adopted by the European Council, Article 11 on Peacebuilding policies, conflict prevention and resolution of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement agreed in 2000 and revised in 2005; European Union (2007): Council conclusions on Security and Development. 2831st External Relations Council meeting Brussels, 19-20 November 2007; European Union (2007): Council Conclusions on an EU response to situations of fragility. 2831st External Relations Council meeting Brussels (19-20 November 2007).

⁸ European Commission (2011): Agenda for Change - COM(2011) 637 final.

⁹ European Commission & High Representative for the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy (2013): Final joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council - The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises. Brussels.

¹⁰ European Commission (2016): Staff Working Document, "Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance".

¹¹ European Union (2016): Shared vision, common action. A stronger Europe A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy. Brussels.

¹² European Commission & High Representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy (2017): Final Joint Communication to the European Parliament and to the Council - A strategic approach to Resilience in the EU's external action. Brussels.

¹³ European Union (2018): General Secretariat of the Council (22 January 2018), Council conclusions on the integrated approach to external conflicts and crises. Brussels.

¹⁴ Federal Republic of Somalia (2013): The Somali Compact.

2013 which includes specific arrangements to take account of Somaliland's Vision 2030.¹⁵ A New Partnership for Somalia (NPS), which included an ambitious Mutual Accountability Framework, was concluded during the London Somalia Conference 2017.¹⁶

The overall EU policy vis-à-vis Somali is framed by its Strategic Framework for the *Horn of Africa* adopted by the EU Council in 2013,¹⁷ further revised and adopted by the EU Council in March 2021.¹⁸ The more specific collaboration with Somalia is detailed in the *NIP 2014-2020* and framed along the five Peace- and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs).¹⁹ The NIP's main objective was to rebuild the state, improve security and stability, and reduce poverty, with a focus on food security/resilience and basic service delivery.

As of 2017, the *NPS* and the Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP, 2017- 2019) form the basis for the EU's cooperation with Somalia which aims to contribute to the SNDP's aims 'to accelerate socio-economic transformation in order to achieve the stated objectives for poverty alleviation, economic revival and societal transformation in a socially just and gender equitable manner'.²⁰ Both, the NPS and the SNDP are the key references for the EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia (2017-2020),²¹ which set out new support with an additional EUR 200 million channelled via the EUTF to fund three pillars: i) build effective and sustainable responses to security challenges, ii) respond to vulnerabilities and create economic opportunities and, iii) build state legitimacy and responsiveness, and democratic governance.

The *intervention logic* presented in Figure 2 consolidates the most relevant elements of EU cooperation in a single framework that links rationale to strategy, projects and results. Following the focus of the evaluation mentioned above, key areas are clustered in three domains: i) Governance I, covering rule of law, peacebuilding and security; ii) Governance II, covering institutional support and core state functions, including support to the education sector; and iii) Resilience and economic development, covering the productive sectors and livelihoods, rehabilitation, infrastructure and protection of the most vulnerable.

The evaluation is undertaken against a country background and baseline which has displayed attempts to shape a state and to solve deeply rooted divisions caused by unsolved governance issues, but which has remained in a state of protracted crises, fierce internal conflict with Al-Shabaab, high levels of poverty and a vulnerability which has intensified during the evaluation period due to environmental degradation and natural disasters. In Annex 10, a detailed Political-Economy-Analysis is included explaining the country's political and security situation, the social-economic context, public services (including the education sector), natural disasters, the effects of climate change and food security. The implications of the country's geopolitical situation and international aid efforts in support of Somalia are also included in this Annex.

¹⁵ Republic of Somaliland (2011): Somaliland National Vision 2030. Ministry of National Planning & Development. The vision is grouped along five pillars: Economic Development; Infra-Structure Development; Good governance; Social Development; Environmental Protection.

¹⁶ London Somalia Conference (2017): A New Partnership for Somalia for Peace, Stability and Prosperity.

¹⁷ European Union (2013): Council Conclusions on Somalia adopted at the 3218th Foreign Affairs Council on 31 January 2013.


¹⁸ European Union (2021): The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU - Council conclusions (10 May 2021).

¹⁹ The five Peace- and Statebuilding Goals are: i) building inclusive politics, ii) strengthening security, iii) strengthening justice, iv) revitalizing and expanding the economic foundations and revenues; and v) increasing the delivery of equitable, affordable, and sustainable services.

²⁰ Federal Government of Somalia (2017): The Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP), Towards Recovery, Democracy and Prosperity 2017 – 2019.

²¹ European Union (2017): Development Cooperation Strategy 2017-2020 - Implementation of an individual measure in favour of Somalia (EDF).

Figure 2 Overall intervention logic



Source: Evaluation team – developed from multiple EU and EC overarching global, regional and country policies and frameworks.

2 Methodological approach

The overall Intervention Logic (IL) constitutes the backbone of the evaluation. Based on this IL, EQs, JC and Indicators were formulated and used as the overall *framework for data collection and analysis*.

Seven EQs have been formulated to capture the complexity of the EU's cooperation with Somalia and examine its effects. These EQs are clustered into two broad categories: i) EQs on design and implementation of EU cooperation; and ii) EQs on the effects of EU cooperation. Each EQ is structured around a limited number of JC which are assessed through the analysis of specific indicators – see Volume III.

EQ1 Responsiveness of the design: To what extent has EU support been based on country and regional priorities and appropriately responded to population needs in Somalia?

EQ2 Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities: To what extent have the financing instruments and aid delivery methods used by the EU been adapted to the cooperation context and supported EU complementarities and comprehensiveness?

EQ3 Efficiency and Flexibility: To what extent has EU support been efficient and timely, cost-effective and knowledge-based, taking into account the evolving context?

EQ4 Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors: To what extent has EU support been complementary with other dimensions of EU external action in Somalia and has added value to the support provided by EU MS and other donors?

EQ5 Cross-cutting issues: To what extent has the EU cooperation managed to mainstream cross-cutting issues relating to conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, human rights and the strengthening of CSO engagement throughout its cooperation efforts?

EQ6 Strategic outcomes: To what extent has EU support contributed to achieving the intended strategic sector outcomes of the EU-Somalia cooperation in the main cooperation areas?

EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability): To what extent has EU support contributed to enhanced conditions for stability, improved resilience and sustainability?

The EQs and their coverage of the OECD/DAC and the EC-specific evaluation criteria, as stipulated in the Terms of Reference, are summarised in the Table 1, below.


Table 1 EQ coverage of the OECD/DAC and EC-specific evaluation criteria

EQ \ Evaluation criteria	Relevance	Efficiency	Effectiveness	Impact	Sustainability	EU added value	Coherence	Coordination & complementarity
Design and implementation								
EQ1. Responsiveness of the design	●●				●		●●	
EQ2. Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities	●●	●	●		●	●	●	●●
EQ3. Efficiency and Flexibility		●●	●	●	●			●
EQ4. Synergies		●	●		●	●●	●●	●●
EQ5. Cross-cutting issues	●●		●●	●	●	●	●	
Effects of the cooperation strategy								
EQ6. Outcomes			●●	●	●			
EQ7. Broader effects, Impact and Sustainability			●	●●	●●			

●● Largely covered ● Also covered
 Source: Evaluation team

Figure 3 provides an overview of the three phases of the evaluation, the key tools for collecting and analysing data. They were implemented during the period January 2022 and March 2023.

Figure 3 Phases of the evaluation and key elements of the methodology



Source: Evaluation team.


To ensure *quality control* an internal team consisting of one senior evaluation expert from Particip and one from ECDPM was mobilised to review progress, advise on methodological issues and comment on draft documents before submission.

The evaluation team collected data and findings via a *mixed methods approach* based on both *quantitative and qualitative* tools and methods comprising i) semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions, ii) project document reviews (including a quantitative analysis of particular terms used across key project documents via a text-analysis tool (MAXQDA) which helped triangulate existing findings for crosscutting issues and provided some complementary observations, see Annex 7), iii) review of secondary data sources, such as think tank contributions or non-EU studies on Somalia, iv) a broadly spread eSurvey sent to different types

of stakeholders not working at EU headquarters or the Delegation of the European Union to Somalia (EUD), v) quantitative (financial) analysis of OECD/DAC registered aid flows, vi) a team-compiled political-economy analysis (see Annex 10) and vii) direct observations through selected project visits. *Past developments and perspectives* were captured via interviewees who had worked for the EU in Somalia in the past and with local EUD staff members who work at the EUD for many years.

The evaluation team conducted a *hybrid field mission* whereby one part of the evaluation team conducted interviews in Nairobi (Kenya), Garowe (Puntland), Hargeisa and Berbera (Somaliland) during the field phase and another part of the team conducted interviews remotely. A visit to Aden Abulle International Airport, further referred to as Mogadishu International Airport (MIA)²² in this report, was originally planned for the field mission but then cancelled due to the deteriorating security situation briefly before and during the field mission. The team leader had conducted interviews in MIA during the Inception Mission, already. As for the *interviews conducted*, all relevant stakeholder groups involved in the design and implementation of EU support to Somalia were covered. The evaluation team talked to nearly 180 persons throughout the evaluation. Figure 4 provides an overview of the number of interviewees per category.

Figure 4 Statistical overview of persons interviewed



Source: Evaluation team.

Considering the politically exceedingly difficult and highly fragility country context in which many different narratives exist about ongoing developments, strategic priorities and delivery, and the difficulty to access reliable sources due to the inaccessibility of large parts of the country, the evaluation team gave high priority to the *triangulation of data and information collected*.

Challenges and limitations: Security posed a major challenge for the evaluation and did not allow travel into the country, with the exception of Puntland and Somaliland. The two missions also took place during renewed fierce fighting between forces of the FGS and Al-Shabaab. The evaluation team dealt with this contextual situation creatively. Remote interviews with FGS officials and other stakeholders based in Mogadishu and some areas outside Mogadishu were organised with the assistance of the Somali team member. Face-to-face interviews were held with Somali stakeholders being on mission or visit to Nairobi, during the four-day visit to Garowe (Puntland) and the five-day visit to Hargeisa and Berbera (Somaliland). The evaluation team made also good use of the reports of the EU funded Third Party Monitoring and Evaluation (TPME) project. As such, the evaluation team is confident to have collected a reliable set of data and findings which support the conclusions and recommendations adequately. An elaborate description of the methodology deployed can be consulted in Annex 6.

²² Currently also known as Aden Adde International Airport.

3 Findings

This section presents findings and answers to EQs in a concise format according to the evaluation matrix. Specific findings are summarised per JC and are formulated in response to the respective Indicator. References are made to details presented in Volume III of the report, which lists references to documents and (anonymised) meeting notes. The presentation of specific pieces of information collected through interviews in the text below is made for illustrative purpose. All findings are based on solid desk research, complementary (statistical) analysis (eSurvey, MAXQDA, spending amounts) and interviews.

3.1 EQ1 – Responsiveness of the design

<p>To what extent has EU support been based on country and regional priorities and appropriately responded to population needs in Somalia?</p>	
<p>Summary answer to the Evaluation Question</p>	
<p>EU support was aligned with Somali national priorities and adapted to the changing context. The 2013 Somali Compact – which the FGS played a committed role in shaping – informed the later EU support cooperation frameworks, such as the NIP, the NPS and the EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia, as well as Somali development frameworks like the SNDP. This ensured continuity in EU-Somali cooperation. At the same time, the EU steered its support from a more short-term emergency support in 2013/2014 to a gradually increasing integrated support aimed at resilience, local conflict resolution and long-term stability and statebuilding. Relying on the slowly growing capacities of the FGS, it provided direct budget support to the FGS as of 2017 (postponed as of Quarter 4, 2020 and resumed as of Quarter 3, 2022). The EU also aligned with Somaliland's 1st and 2nd National Development Plans. Local authorities, CSO and the needs of the broader population were also supported in a context of conflict and fragility, low capacity of actors involved, unsolved constitutional issues, natural disasters and human crisis. Good attention was given to support national ownership and to promote inclusive and participatory stakeholder processes though it was impossible to fulfil all expectations of a very diverse set of stakeholders. The Inclusive Local and Economic Development Programme (ILED) preparatory process was described as inclusive and participatory, also interventions in support of resilience and the education sector were mentioned positively in this regard. According to stakeholder interviews, the EU gave more attention to inclusiveness compared to other international partners, but due to Somalia's situation throughout the evaluation period, these efforts were only partially successful.</p> <p>EU support was overall well-tailored, based on a clear rationale to country context and adapted over time. The formulation of the EU's Development Cooperation Strategy (2017) reflected an updated country context analysis. The EU developed interventions which responded to recognised needs and gaps identified in Somalia backed by studies or project-specific assessments, but chosen objectives were overall too ambitious to be realised given the country's situation. As such, they could not respond to expectations in most instances in Somali Government institutions. Various forms of (conflict) assessments were often conducted organically as part of the daily work and, when done explicitly, with varying quality. Assessments and analysis at project level, however, were not systematically conducted in any of the three macro-areas. In line with the NIP (2014 to 2020), interventions aimed to increase resilience to worsening climate conditions and environmental degradation. Those objectives were mainstreamed into EU support to strengthen resilience in rural areas and to respond to the needs of displaced populations (macro area III) but were mostly absent in the support provided to interventions under macro areas I and II.</p> <p>EU support in Somalia has been broadly aligned with and has strengthened the EU's regional and international ambitions and global policy frameworks, including those going beyond development cooperation, though documents consulted did not explicitly explain how the EU's global policy frameworks and objectives should be realised. Since the creation of the EUTF in 2015, the EU took steps to link engagements at the regional level with projects implemented at the level of Somalia, including cross-border programmes. The EU's Regional Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2021) reinforced the need to engage regionally. Regional interventions were realised in a number of instances, but a more deliberate guidance on how to link up strategically with the region is absent, for example via an updated Somalia Council Conclusion (see also EQ2). In terms of the EU's climate change ambitions, the support to Somalia promoted the application of the global change agenda to a limited extent throughout most of the evaluation period, but strong attention has been given to these policy priorities as of 2020/2021.</p>	

3.1.1 EU support has reflected the evolution of Somalia's national priorities and has been fully aligned to national development priorities (JC1.1)

The EU has largely aligned the objectives and sector focus of its strategy, as formulated in the NIP 2014-2020 for Somalia and its complementary Development Cooperation Strategy 2017 to 2020, with FGS and FMS priorities. This alignment took place against the background of a transitional constitutional arrangement in Somalia, which the EU and its development cooperation took well into account. (I1.1.1)

The recognition that Somali ownership of aid and donor coordination had been exceptionally low and the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud motivated the 2012 decision to adapt the New Deal²³ to Somalia to make external support more effective and Somali-owned. The New Deal Compact for Somalia, with large parts drafted by external actors, was adopted in 2013 at a conference co-hosted by the FGS and the EU in Brussels showing the firm commitment of the EU and other international actors to align themselves with this fundamental reform. The Somali Compact is based on the priorities of each PSG and was used as the basis for later EU-Somalia cooperation and other development frameworks for the period 2014 until 2020.

A key outcome of the EU's alignment on the Somali Compact is the EU's NIP 2014-2020, which follows strategic objectives and three focal sectors aligned to the Somali compact, the focal sectors being Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (PSG 1, 2, 3), Food security and building resilience (PSG 4) and Education (PSG 5). Its strategic objectives for building and revitalising the economy, for instance, prioritised livelihood enhancement, job creation, expansion of infrastructures, opportunities for youth and management of natural resources. The NIP also sought to align with 2016 SNDP, which itself built on the Somali Compact and included a resilience pillar, reflecting the desired shift by both the FGS and donors from a stabilisation and humanitarian and emergency-dominated support to a longer-term support for development, resilience and the political transition. Somalia's most recent National Development Plan (NDP-9 2020-2024) also remains in continuity with the Somali Compact by establishing three national priorities: Inclusive and Accountable Politics; Improved Security and the Rule of Law; and Improved Economic Development.

In 2017, efforts to provide direct funding to the FGS increased, reflecting improved institutional capacity and trust between the EU and Somalia following the election of President Farmajo. The NPS endorsed at the London Somalia Conference 2017 and the 2017-2020 EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia were adopted, largely in continuity with the priorities of the Somali Compact but it was seeking to move towards a more integrated support, better linking the different EU services, sectors and interventions. With regards to peace and security, the EU's Development Cooperation strategy also aims to better support the local level (local conflict resolution, strengthening local councils, community policing, alternative dispute resolution, etc.) and deliver tangible stabilisation dividends to the population notably in areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab. At the level of project documents, the Somali Compact is most often mentioned as a reference document for EU-Somalia cooperation. But other Somali frameworks are also referred to such as education sector plans, and policies (including Somaliland and Puntland policies) and PFM-related government strategies.

Somaliland negotiated a Somaliland Special Arrangement within the Somali Compact, based on its National Vision 2030 and formulated its Somaliland NDPs. Throughout the evaluation period, the EU supported the principal pillars of Somaliland's NDP I (2012 to 2016) and NDP II (2017 to 2021) which are economic development, infrastructure development, social development and good governance and environmental protection plus several cross-cutting themes, including youth, employment, social protection and human rights. More recently, in February 2022, the Partnership Framework for Somaliland was finalised, which was endorsed by international partners, including the EU.

A multitude of linkages to achieve synergetic effects were foreseen between the EU's support and Somalia's priorities at different government levels and across the focal sectors. Strong efforts were made to support national ownership at strategic level but due to the fragile situation of Somalia during the initial years of the NIP and beyond this was only partially realised. (I1.1.2)

The FGS was committed to playing a main role in formulating the PSG and set up a dedicated High Level Task Force to guide the implementation of the Somali Compact, which was launched in 2013. However, dialogue was not regular between donors and Somalis in the lead up to the Somali Compact and was overall undertaken too quickly, in part because of their limited presence in Mogadishu due to insecurity. Also, the internal Somali coordination between FGS and FMS was erratic and tense. According to think tank analyses and commentaries of independent policy analysts, consultations with the FMS and civil society overall were extremely limited to inform the Somali Compact, leading to frustrations. An Overseas Development Institute


²³ The New Deal (2011) sets out five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) which are legitimate and inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenues and services.

report stated that “the dialogue processes of the Compact [were] viewed as unduly burdensome and [failed] to provide space for real engagement with Somalis.”²⁴

The set-up of the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) in 2014 was an early manifestation of donor’s commitments to align to Somali national priorities. The SDRF provides a financing and coordination mechanism to support FGS priorities – it was revised to follow the NDP’s goals – made up of several multi-partner funds (UN MPTF, WB MPF, AfDB SIF), and has aimed to increase funding channelled directly through the government, especially since 2017. The World Bank Multi-Partner Fund for Somalia (WB MPF) also aimed to facilitate policy dialogue with national Somali actors and promote mutual accountability on core state functions and socio-economic recovery projects. The SDRF was supported by the EU with some 24 per cent of its funding during the evaluation period of which EUR 103 million was channelled via the WB MPF, EUR 82.16 million via the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UN MPTF) and EUR 41.45 million via the African Development Bank Multi-Partner Somalia Infrastructure Fund (AfDB SIF).

In line with the NPS agreed in London (2017), the renewed commitment to supporting statebuilding in Somalia was accompanied by an additional EU funding of EUR 200 million via a EDF reserve to the EUTF for the Horn of Africa window which included EUR 100 million direct budget support to the FGS (the Somalia State and Resilience Building Contract) for the years 2018 to 2021. The programme was aimed at statebuilding, strengthening PFM and increasing the legitimacy of the FGS, and came with technical assistance (TA) for capacity building and PFM reforms. Despite the public commitment to one-person-one-vote elections to be held by the end of 2020, Farmajo’s presidency did not prioritise the enacting of the federal constitutional review process and the electoral reform. Little tangible progress was achieved, including the constitutional review being not completed and passed to the next Parliament. Tensions between the FMS and FGS and lack of trust kept increasing, resulting in lengthy electoral delays and the breakout of armed conflict in Mogadishu in April 2021. In this political context EU postponed its budget support as of Quarter 4 2020 and only resumed it in Quarter 3 of 2022.²⁵ Budget support was immediately revived following the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May 2022. The priorities of the new government include promoting national reconciliation; strengthening the federal system and improving relations between Mogadishu and the regional states; intensifying the fight against Al-Shabaab; finalising the constitutional review process and judicial reform; and addressing the humanitarian situation. The EU’s support to Somalia’s sectoral priorities is displayed in Figure 5 and reflects the alignment with national priorities.

Figure 5 Overview of amounts contracted by sub-areas during the evaluation period



Source: Particip GmbH based on data retrieved from the Cross-Regional Information System database from the EC (CRIS database).

The formulation of strategy and individual interventions are underpinned by strong EU efforts to shape inclusive stakeholder processes and the EU, also compared to other international actors, is overall well seen in this regard. Though individual voices within key FGS and FMS departments expressed

²⁴ Overseas Development Institute (2017): The new deal in Somalia: An independent review of the Somali Compact, 2014-2016. Available at: <https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/11466.pdf>.

²⁵ Formally the operation was never suspended, rather payment were postponed until the political/constitutional crisis of Somalia resolved itself following much delayed federal elections.

diverging, and at times opposing views on the way consultations and resulting decisions have been shaped. (I1.1.3)

With the gradual strengthening of FGS institutional structures and capacities, opportunities for consultative processes increased over the years. As of 2017, meetings with FGS became regular and more inclusive. This was further enhanced with the opening of the EUD in Mogadishu in early 2017, where the EUD political section has been based since.

Comments from FGS and FMS senior officials about the inclusivity and quality of consultative processes cover a wide spectrum from appreciative comments on one end to dissatisfaction on the other. On the favourable end, officials from both FGS and FMS commented that the EU staff consults with senior officials, is more responsive to national views compared to other international donors and tailors support to local needs. Several respondents from CSOs also highlighted that the EU does not impose its priorities but consults and discusses implementation processes. On the other end of the spectrum, the evaluation team noted that some senior FGS officials were dissatisfied, stating that the EU's consultation is limited and that national priorities are not fully considered. The wish was expressed that more attention should be given to economic and digital development, the private sector and infrastructure. Such views, however, counter findings above that EU priorities are aligned to FGS policy documents and development priorities. From Somaliland, complaints were expressed about the low level of exchanges with the Somaliland authorities and the need to bring them more on board when preparing and implementing interventions. FGS and FMS acknowledged, however, that the high turn-over of officials in senior positions works against their own aim of being more involved and able to shape priorities.

At project level, to further ensure alignment with Somali priorities and needs, almost all interventions included a form of consultation. Reviews and evaluations on civil society support were very positive concerning the consultative approaches promoted and practiced, the same was noted for interventions in the education sector (mostly with ministries at FGS and FMS level) and the resilience domain (Building Resilient Communities in Somalia, BRCiS and Somalia Resilience Program, SomReP). Good levels of consultations took also place in the context of EUTF funded interventions (REINTEG and RESTORE) which had more of a community focus, including also local authorities and community members. The Rule of Law (RoL) evaluation (2021) states that a broad range of stakeholders were consulted from political and policy dialogue to service-level implementation. The ILED preparatory process was also described as inclusive and participatory, also the support to the education sector was mentioned in this regard. Most consultations included mainly FGS actors, or local actors, but less often both or FMS actors. At times, consultations failed to include some key stakeholders in an area of intervention (such as seed companies in the Somaseed project and local communities in Somalia), which risked creating gaps in design or conflicting understandings of the intervention. A more diverse picture in response to inclusivity and consultation is reflected in the findings of the eSurvey. On average some 40 per cent of respondents were to a 'great extent' satisfied with the EU's consultation and around 40 per cent to 'some extent'. The remainder answered to a 'limited extent' or had no opinion.²⁶

3.1.2 EU support has been tailored to the country context, including its levels of insecurity, fragility, environmental stress, and poverty (JC1.2)

There is evidence that conflict analyses and other type of assessments, such as risk analyses, were undertaken but conflict analyses were not done systematically across sectors and the differences in the quality of these analyses varied. (I1.2.1)

Until 2015/2016, many parts of the country were not accessible leading to rather generic assessments with the exception of Puntland and Somaliland where the EU was supporting development between 2010 and 2014, already. A Third-Party Monitoring Project did not exist during these years. Throughout the following years, most interventions were based on various types of external and EU assessments and studies, which help understand the country context, identify needs and inform intervention objectives and activities. Most assessments were made at the regional level and intervention level identifying capacity, organisational and community needs, or focused on a better understanding of a specific (sub)sector, or on issues like conflict, justice, gender, education, poverty/socio-economic trends, risk/vulnerability and displacement. In several instances, however, specific conflict analyses were conducted, particularly for the peace and security interventions which also paid some attention to power dynamics. However, for non-security related interventions, conflict analyses were not conducted systematically. Where risk assessments were done, they remained generic at times and integrated elements of conflict sensitivity more superficially. Some interventions displayed good practice, such as the BRCiS programme, where regular assessments were conducted to adjust BRCiS projects to the evolving context.

²⁶ 46 per cent of the respondents to the e-survey work as implementing partners of EU projects. 46 per cent are equally split between CSOs and development organisations. Only 5 per cent were from government and 3 per cent did not specify their origin. Full eSurvey results available at Annex 8.

The priority sectors and key interventions chosen had a rationale, responded to the changing country context but could not respond to expectations in all parts of Somalia. (I1.2.2)

From 2017 onwards, the international community's support – including the EU – focused more on broader statebuilding and peacebuilding goals with enhanced support to government institutions, e.g., via budget support, and the security sector, e.g., via the joint programmes channelled through the United Nations (UN) (Security Sector and Governance, Police, Justice and Corrections). In terms of balancing the EU's development support between Somaliland, Puntland and the remainder of Somalia, the EU overall addressed the respective priorities adequately despite criticism expressed by FMS officials of not being sufficiently supported and not delivered in the right way. Concerning priority sectors and key interventions chosen, there is evidence that the longer-term objectives of EU support in Somalia as set out in the Somali Compact, notably peacebuilding, statebuilding and poverty reduction were addressed. This was found, for example, in some EIDHR and CSO-LA interventions which combined objectives to support human rights, CSO and local authorities with the Somali Compact priorities (for instance, supporting CSO to hold the state accountable would contribute to building the state and more accountable, legitimate institutions in the long term).

The objectives were clearly identified and responded to the needs of the population but were overall too ambitious to be realised given the country situation. (I1.2.3)

Interviews with international development partners as well as implementing organisations underline that the development programmes linked to the New Deal are too ambitious in terms of their number of priorities and expected outcomes. Especially on security, justice and governance related support it was remarked, that these are extremely contentious issues in Somalia which will take many years to fall into place and external supporters tend to forget how fragile and politically fragmented the country is. This is translated to the programme and project level where interventions are then designed with overly optimistic assumptions (e.g., a conducive political context; or the capacity of partner organisations to implement activities and influence decision makers – also based on commitments of local officials which are unrealistic). Also, power relations, in particular clan dynamics as a relevant factor, are not often taken into account when interventions are designed. Linkages were generally made between the short-term and medium-term objectives of interventions at the design stage, but how these should support the overall long-term objectives as stated in the strategic documents were not always explicitly mentioned. Moreover, while several projects clearly made the link between activities and the needs of a specific stakeholder group (such as detainees, CSO, internally displaced persons (IDPs), etc.), it was not always made clear how this would help to influence change in the wider context in which these stakeholder groups function.

Climate change and environmental degradation were not focused on via specific objectives, programmes or projects but were mainstreamed into initiatives which aimed to address the resilience in rural areas and the needs of displaced populations. (I1.2.4)

In line with the NIP (2014-2020), interventions aimed to increase resilience to worsening climate conditions and – as such – recognised the need to fight climate change induced effects. From desk findings, it is evident that climate change and environmental degradation were taken to some extent into account in resilience-building and agriculture development interventions and to a limited extent in education but remain absent in RoL and PFM interventions and are rarely addressed under peace and security. There was an emphasis noted on environmental neutrality (i.e., ensuring that project activities do not contribute to environmental degradation), Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), natural resource management and awareness raising (see the Somali Water and Land Information Management, SWALIM, BRCiS; and SomReP projects, for instance). However, in a number of project documents, climate change and environmental degradation are treated as a crosscutting issue without further explanation as to how they will be tackled in practice. The documents consulted also did not provide sufficient evidence that climate action actually took place as part of education interventions (based on the information received, climate action was mentioned in the description of actions but not in progress reports or evaluations) and there was no information on the integration of climate and environmental considerations in local economic development interventions.

3.1.3 EU support in Somalia has been aligned with and has strengthened the EU's regional and international ambitions and global policy frameworks, also those going beyond development cooperation (JC1.3)

EU support to Somalia promotes the EU's overall frameworks and global goals in the region in support of peace and security and regional stability, also those from non-development areas. (I1.3.1 & I1.3.2)

The EU has linked its support in Somalia with its global goals of promoting democracy, statebuilding, federalism, and restoring security and political stability. This is done implicitly in the EU's projects, as well as explicitly by making reference to the Somali Compact and PSGs, and via policy dialogue and diplomacy at the international, regional and national levels. For instance, the EU has supported shuttle diplomacy and mediation between certain political actors in Somalia (such as between the new President of Southwest and the opposition leadership in Nairobi in March 2019) and more broadly in the Horn of Africa, for example by recognising and supporting the role of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Of particular

relevance was the shuttle diplomacy project's efforts to mediate the conflict between Somaliland and Puntland, considering the growing tensions between Somaliland and Puntland and the risks of escalation of the border conflict in places such as Las Anod, where several incidents took place as of 2007.²⁷ The EU development cooperation also includes preventing and countering violent extremism (Al-Shabaab notably), economic interests (piracy, trade) and migration-related interests, in particular curbing and preventing immigration to Europe. Those aspects are also connected to interventions in the maritime domain in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions, including the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta) that fights piracy. The EU has finally been vocal about its global commitments and policy frameworks on human rights, gender equality and its support for CSO and local authorities, which has materialised in Somalia in the form of various programmes. For instance, the EIDHR and CSO-LA programmes place human rights and support for CSO and local authorities at the centre of several interventions implemented in Somalia.

The support to Somalia promoted the application of the global climate change agenda only partially and indirectly. Though strong attention goes to this sub-sector as of 2020/2021. (I1.3.3)

The EU has played a gradually growing role in promoting climate action in its resilience-building and economic development interventions, by linking resilience-building activities and DRR, awareness raising and natural resource management with food security and economic measures to ensure affordable energy and alternative livelihoods for the population. Under the EUTF, the EU has supported the response to climate-related disasters and forced displacement in the Horn of Africa more broadly, following El Nino. There have also been some efforts at promoting clean energy and climate-conscious education in the EU's support to education, peace, and security. In other areas like RoL, climate and environmental issues are not considered yet or are only included to the extent where the project teams avoid contributing to environmental degradation and climate change through their project activities. But towards the end of the evaluation period, 2020/2021, efforts were made to prioritise the climate change agenda and to give it a strong footprint in the new budget cycle. The Team Europe Initiative (TEI) – as further presented under EQ4 – is currently being used as an entry point to this effect.

Linkages are made between the bilateral and the regional level and aim to respond to the EU's Regional Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2021), but a more deliberate Somalia-specific guidance on how to strategically engage with the region, such as in an updated Somalia Council Conclusion, is absent so far. (I1.3.4)

Regional programmes reflect the EU's regional stability efforts as formulated in the EU's Regional Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2021). Most EUTF regional programmes are managed by EU headquarters, others by EUDs in the region, including the EUD Somalia. Several focus on regional security and stability, counter-radicalisation and violent extremism, rule of law, democratic governance and migration – and how they can be linked to EU bilateral and other regional support in Somalia. EU support to IGAD and programmes extending to Yemen can be noted in this regard. The EUD connects pro-actively with these programmes and efforts are made to use their funding in the best way possible. Though, staff interviewed signalled that it has not always been easy to plug into regional programmes. Concerning macro-area III, EUD staff interviewed pointed out the need of being proactive to break through institutional communication challenges so as to find ways for the EUD to connect with these programmes. A more deliberate guidance on how the EU's support to Somalia should link up the region is absent (see also JC2.3). So far, it appears that efforts are made from different entry points in support of the EU's regional strategy but a more strategic packaging and direction – possibly informed by a rather fragmented programming responsibility between different departments in headquarters and different EUDs in the region – is less visible.

3.2 EQ2 – Appropriateness of Instruments and Modalities

<p>To what extent have the financing instruments and aid delivery methods used by the EU been adapted to the cooperation context and supported EU complementarities and comprehensiveness</p>	
<p>Summary answer to the Evaluation Question</p>	
<p>Based on a well-founded analysis of the country situation, the EU's choice of aid modalities and channels was appropriate across the three macro-areas, but choices for channelling the support are limited given the complexity and difficulties of the Somali context and the comparatively small number of implementing partners able to work in the country successfully. Taking into account these limitations, the EU managed to</p>	

²⁷ Markus Virgil Hoehne (2023): The Roots and Implications of The Crises in Las Anod. RAAD Peace Research Institute. The most recent situation in Las Anod represents an escalation of a long-time ongoing issue. The policy brief (footnote) precisely mentions that: "There has been a long series of similar assassinations of mostly Dhulbahante intellectuals and officials, often those working for the Somaliland administration that had forcibly taken over the city end of 2007."

find solutions that worked without compromising the very nature of the EU's engagement. The situation also allowed the EU to successfully explore and implement the financing of its cooperation via general budget support which permitted the EU to gain valuable lessons on how to support statebuilding in a politically very fragile and conflict-ridden context. The analysis backing the use as well as the postponement of budget support was sound. Risk assessments and mitigating measures applied at sector, programme and project levels were overall also sound. As highlighted under EQ 1, the EU promoted ownership and various sources provide evidence of participatory approaches deployed. Steps taken to increase ownership via budget support and the "*localisation*" of non-governmental organisations (NGO) support were highly appreciated and led to calls for bolder moves into this direction in the future. The nature of the aid system (accountability to donors) and the very limited capacity on the Somali side to co-finance and execute engagements, however, worked against attempts to increase ownership.

The EU was able to increasingly establish strategic complementarities across financing instruments and intervention modalities as of 2017/2018, supported by headquarters' orientation to work via a more integrated approach. Complementarities are particularly strong between the work of the EUD and the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) in the domain of stabilisation, peacebuilding and governance. Complementarities were also evident in the public sector development and social services domain where the provision of general budget support, support to PFM reform and the education Sector Wide Approach (SWAP) complemented each other well. Collaboration with DG ECHO (DG for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations), which was not optimal until approximately 2018, has developed into a very constructive, mostly strategic, collaboration on safety nets, livelihood support and education, though with room for improvements in the education sector, in particular. Beyond the complementarities with the education sector and PFM reform, general budget support allowed the EU to open doors for politically sensitive and strategic policy discussions at national level, e.g., concerning fiscal transfer issues, which would have been difficult with other forms of engagement. Concerning macro-area I (peace and security) synergies and better development cooperation results were created through linking EU development support and the EU's diplomatic/political engagement. The EU's integrated approach has over time unfolded positively on security sector reform and past overlaps with FPI's interventions were overcome. Relationships with CSDP missions (a rather siloed engagement throughout most of the evaluation period) are broadly positive and – following a more recent critical EU-internal review of CSDP missions – directions are set for a more productive collaboration, possibly leading to better development cooperation results in the domain of security (police reform, in particular). As for complementarities established between bilateral and regional cooperation, there is evidence that these reinforced each other such as in the domain of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) or via the regional Red Sea Programme which is coordinated by the EUD Somalia. Complementarities between the EUD/FPI's work and the political engagements of the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa (EUSR) exist (e.g., FPI interventions were designed based on discussions with the EUSR) but exchanges can be intensified to make them strategically more relevant according to stakeholders. Findings also point to potential complementarities with the EU's maritime security strategy and actions though the FGS' limited interest on maritime matters has so far halted real progress.

Different approaches and frameworks for (sector) policy dialogue were set up and strengthened but were only partially successful due to the absence of a government lead and a changing political situation resulting in varying levels of policy exchange. The EU, international partners and the FGS engaged overall constructively throughout the post-New Deal period (as of 2011/2012) up to the initial years of the Farmajo Government (2018/2019). With the thwarting of constitutional reform and the delay of the electoral process, the EU put policy dialogue with the FGS on hold as of 2020 (except for the dialogue around the electoral process) but the EU maintained sectoral exchanges at the technical level throughout the period. The EU's policy dialogue with Somali partners was particularly strong when coordinated with the United States of America (USA), United Kingdom (UK), WB and UN for high-level political and policy dialogue – pursuant to the EU's policy engagement via general budget support. There was also high-level dialogue around the joint monitoring/accountability framework agreed during the London Somalia Conference 2017 (see EQ1) and worked with until late 2020, as mentioned above. Multiple sector dialogues took place and were overall strong in relation to PFM, security and education, but with some variations under macro-area III (resilience and economic development). The monitoring of sector development progress was part of these dialogues, but their effectiveness differed across sectors and mirrored the quality of overall sector dialogues mentioned before.

3.2.1 The EU's choice of particular modalities (projects and budget support) and channels (e.g., UN agencies, CSO, etc.) is based on sound criteria and responsive to the national context (JC2.1)

The choice of aid modalities and channels to implement the EU's support were based both, on a thorough analysis of partner country needs and on existing capacities. The difficult country context and the limited number of potential partners to work with determined to a large extent these choices. The project modality was mostly used, but the statebuilding agenda (via PFM in particular) also allowed

the EU to successfully explore and implement the deployment of budget support in a highly fragile and conflict-ridden context. (I2.1.1)

In terms of aid modalities, the EU adapted its approach over the evaluation period from a multitude of smaller projects during the early years, which allowed the EU to create entry points to different sector domains, to bigger engagements as of 2017/2018 when new money could be programmed via the EUTF. The project approach was mentioned as most plausible during interviews considering the weakness or even absence of government structures, in particular for engagements in macro-area I (peacebuilding/local governance) and macro-area III (resilience and economic development). The project modality under macro-area III proved to be time-consuming due to a large range of small-scale interventions and the absence of a clear sectoral strategy. For macro-area II (education and PFM) a somewhat different path was taken following an assessment of the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) III in preparation of the Somalia Education Sector Support Programme (SESSP). The latter aimed at a strengthening of country systems and enhanced ownership. The programme support to the education sector was embedded in a sector-wide approach for the education sector (though not entirely successful, because not all SESSP implementing partners reported that they perceived their project as part of an education sector-wide approach according to the SESSP evaluation report, 2021). An additional finding applicable to all three macro-areas is that the EU mostly did not consider exit strategies (at least explicitly) according to quantitative findings from a MAXQDA analysis (see Box 1 below).

EUTF funding allowed the EU to programme bigger interventions. As mentioned above, it allowed to target some new sectors, but it only allowed for a bit more flexibility because the support to Somalia had already been programmed via the crisis modifier arrangement before the EUTF funding was made available. EU budget support was provided as of 2018 – in particular to support core state functions and incentivise institutional reforms (in PFM and the sectors of fisheries, education and federal police). The EU contributed also to pooled funding of the UN's MPTF based on arguments of reducing risks, lowering transaction costs, strengthening country systems and – in one case – the pooling of political capital for a highly challenging engagement in the (then) Department for International Development of the UK implemented State and Peacebuilding intervention (2015). The support was often combined with the mobilisation of TA. References in documents to the fielding of TA reflect its advantages (the EU's budget support was accompanied by a TA project to mitigate potential risks and rated as highly valuable) as well as disadvantages (such as dependency on experts working outside state structures or state regulations). The Rule of Law Evaluation (2021) commented that the mechanics leading to the provision of TA for larger joint programmes was charged with being unresponsive, inflexible and unimaginative by donors, partners and beneficiaries alike. The evaluation pointed with this critique particularly at UN agencies.

The choice of organisations for channelling the support and its implementation was overall sound and adapted to the country context. This was done for the EU-internal change for managing the implementation of CBDSD²⁸ projects from FPI to the EUD, but also for the change of partners for the implementation of projects in a number of areas (mostly relating to peacebuilding and security) from UN organisations to international NGOs (INGOs) and consulting firms. Several interviewees mentioned dissatisfaction when working with UN organisations such as high overhead costs, the low visibility given to the EU or inappropriate reporting and accountability²⁹ which partially motivated this change.

But there are only a limited number of organisations operating in Somalia, which know the country well and are able to work under often extreme contextual and security conditions. Those also must be able to mobilise human resources, which are qualitatively good and able to work under these difficult circumstances. There are agencies and INGOs which could in principle work in the country, but their high security standards make them too slow and expensive. Smaller organisations, which in principle could qualify for working in this context, are not strong enough to take on large projects. This results in a limited choice of potential partners to work with, a reality for the EU as well as all other international partners working in Somalia.

The comparative advantage of the UN is its long-term engagement and extensive network in Somalia, and its presence in all FMS in Somalia regardless security considerations and accessibility. Beyond that, not mentioned during interviews but evident from EU Council Conclusions and Communications, there are various EU commitments to strategically partner with the UN, to strengthen rules-based multilateralism and to identify opportunities for collaboration and possible areas of support.³⁰

²⁸ CBDSD stands for Capacity Building Assistance to Military Actors in Support of Development and Security for Development (formerly called Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development); funding was mainly used for infrastructure development, i.e., constructions, in the military domain, but also equipment provision, training and capacity building. It resulted from an amendment of the IcSP in 2017.

²⁹ Interviewees from NGOs and UN organisations, however, complained about insufficient EU funding for reporting.

³⁰ European Union (2018): Council Conclusions Reinforcing the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Priorities 2019-2021. 12264/18; European Commission (2019): EU action to strengthen rules-based multilateralism - Council conclusions (17 June 2019), 10341/19; European Union and United Nations (2018): Joint EU-UN Communiqué. A renewed partnership in development.

The analysis backing the choice in favour of budget support was sound but the analysis to postpone budget support was non-conclusive but finally valued by all parties concerned. (I2.1.2)

According to the Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the EUTF (2020) the decision to provide budget support was based on the normal arguments for budget support, i.e., not using parallel systems and building national capacity combined with EU criteria to make a judgement of whether it is feasible in the Somali context. But the final decision was based on a thorough process combining the results of the 2016 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability assessment, EU analysis, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) analysis which the MTR judged as sound and overall appropriate to the context (see Box 1). A strategic review of EU support to the education sector recommended to complement the financing of the education sector-wide approach (via the Horumarinta Elmiga projects) with a TA project (long-term as well as short-term TA) for the education sector. Complementary to that, budget support was provided with some variable tranche indicators for education, underpinning the finding that the analysis backing the choice to provide budget support and accompanying measures was sound.

Box 1 Appropriateness of PFM support and budget support provision

PFM support was very appropriate to the context as it was fully aligned with Somalia's statebuilding objectives as strong PFM systems and the ability to raise revenue to support service delivery are essential to the achievement of this goal. The budget support provided allowed to pay off government arrears which has helped the FGS move towards Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) completion point, which will unlock funds from International Financial Institutions (IFI), while other PFM support funded the Multi-Partner-Fund supported initiatives – such as the paying of government salaries through the Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Programme (RCRF) and the TA for PFM supported FGS and FMS capacity building. There was, however, a lack of realisation that the political goals and objectives of the FGS and FMS differed which undermined initiatives to the strengthening of the PFM systems and influence progress on intergovernmental fiscal transfers and to achieve some budget support variable tranche indicators.

There was a less clear-cut decision-making process concerning the postponement of budget support. While this funding is typically used as an approach to facilitate the payment of recurrent costs, it became a political issue during the last year of the Farmajo government. The dividing line between the different opinions, in short, was between those who see budget support as a development tool, not linked to any political decision making or leveraging change, and those who see budget support also as a means to communicate a political message.³¹ This divide explains the rather difficult and time-demanding decision process which led to the postponement of budget support. This decision, however, was retroactively seen as the right decision by all EU stakeholders consulted and by senior FGS officials working under the current President. It was also taken in line with views of other donors – notably the UK – a key partners in supporting Somalia's macro-economic reform.

There is sound evidence of risk assessments made at sector, programme and project levels and mitigating measures considered and applied. (I2.1.3)

Risk assessments were mostly done according to institutional requirements as part of the fund application process. Risk analyses were often combined with contingency plans, also recognising internal as well as external risks and how to mitigate them. These were generally formulated during the design phase. For the provision of budget support, an assessment of the eligibility criteria and performance indicators is done before disbursements. For one of the INGO consortia on resilience (BRCiS) there is also evidence of periodical DRR Committee meetings to better understand changes and risks in an evolving context. Another project from macro-area III reported that local security agencies were mobilised to provide intelligence on the security situation. Risks, as part of ongoing performance monitoring during implementation, were assessed by EUD staff at sector, programme and project levels regularly and to the extent this was possible. Adaptations were primarily done when a contract for a sub-sector ended, for example in the domain of stabilisation where new implementing organisations were contracted for infrastructure projects when a new project started.

National and local stakeholders highly appreciate the EU's steps taken to increase ownership via budget support and the "localisation" of NGO support but would like to see bolder moves into this direction in the future. (I2.1.4)

According to the evaluation team's interview records, the EU gained high regards among FGS officials and well-informed Somali stakeholders from outside government for the provision of budget support. The EU is remembered as the first international partner who has taken this step which was seen as a sign of confidence in the capacities of the government. IMF and WB documents also report that the demand for and the ownership of the provision of budget support was high. The EU further started gradually to "localise" the support to NGOs. Specific calls for proposals for national NGOs with a maximum of EUR 500 000 and a reduced percentage for

³¹ More precisely, the decision not to pay was based on the overall context and conducive environment for national development not being met. The overall context, including political developments, are assessed prior to each tranche released and has to be judged as conducive to an effective budget support partnership for payments to be given. The discussion was on whether that was the case or not.

co-funding are highly appreciated (though still rather high for most local NGOs) because they allow for direct implementation of activities without having to work, at times tediously, via INGOs. So far, only a limited number of such contracts have been implemented but demands among local NGOs for more “localisation” are growing. Findings from the desk report, along with quantitative findings from the eSurvey highlight positive experiences as well as hurdles in support of promoting ownership among national stakeholders. Across intervention areas, efforts were made, or supported, to follow a participatory approach during formulation and implementation. The reference to the ILED experience gained by a FGS official, mentioned above, supports this. There are also many references to consultative (planning) processes, the establishment of boards to promote participation and decision making for project interventions, including minimal co-financing targets for interventions, assigning clear roles and responsibilities to authorities and, in one case, the provision of block grants in support of communities to quickly seize opportunities for stabilising action. However, records from government institutions and officials for projects which are executed via international partners show often low levels of ownership for a variety of reasons. Officials lamented also that authorities are often at the end of the decision-making chain though also agree that institutional incoherence and capacity gaps work against taking ownership. Where implementing partners, NGOs in particular, interacted actively and deployed appropriate skills in support of capacity development with country stakeholders on smaller-scale interventions, the likelihood of ownership was higher. But this was not always the case as the evaluation team’s project visit to Puntland and Somaliland revealed. In Somaliland, strong calls from government officials for budget support, which are unrealistic for political reasons, were noted. But well appreciated steps were taken in the Somaliland education sector to increase capacities for national execution and ownership. The latest phase of the Horumarinta Elmiga programme, a cornerstone of the education SWAP, includes a first ever portion of funding (16 per cent) to be programmed and implemented by the Ministry of Education and accompanied via a hands-off approach by Save the Children and CARE.

3.2.2 Strategic complementarities are established across financing instruments, intervention modalities, type (non-spending vs spending) of engagement and via the integrated approach and help to reinforce bilateral and regional cooperation (JC2.2)

Financing instruments and the intervention modalities deployed in Somalia via the EUD and FPI, in particular, are mostly complementary today under macro-areas I and II, and largely connect well with ECHO’s humanitarian funding. But complementarity under macro-area III has so far proven difficult to achieve. (I2.2.1)

This is the result of an unfolding learning process over the evaluation period whereby connections between different EU services were increasingly made, supported by a headquarters promoted integrated approach which was notable at EUD level as of 2017/2018. This can be strongly noted in stabilisation interventions, where an understanding and practice has emerged that FPI starts up and connects with other engagements (in one case up to three years), after which the EUD is taking over for longer-term support (see Box 2).

Box 2 *FPI’s flexible and complementary funding in support of stabilisation efforts*

FPI continued to provide the link between short-term and longer-term interventions, while making use of its enhanced flexibility (if compared to EUD’s long-term programming). Along with its project partner (UN Habitat), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) implemented an IcSP-funded stabilisation project throughout 2018-19 (18 months, extended to 21) in the FMS of Jubaland, Southwest, Hirshabelle and Galmudug. It consisted of both soft and hard components (e.g., reconciliation dialogue, and public infrastructure) led by IOM. UN Habitat conducted research and analysis. This project aimed to link local community reconciliation to higher-level national peace processes but there was little space to conduct such dialogue processes and to link them to promoting economic collaboration. FPI then funded a second IOM-implemented stabilisation project (with a smaller contribution from United States Agency for International Development, USAID) with an exceptionally longer duration for an IcSP-grant (36 months). This duration was considered more appropriate to a protracted crisis as it helped to deliver basic services to the population through highly flexible programming modalities and on-demand activities brought forward for approval by IOM upon identification of needs at community level.

Several other findings across the three macro-areas highlight that complementary engagement via different financing instruments and modalities was aimed for, as found under JC2.1, and also achieved. There are several instances of smaller engagements under macro-area I where EIDHR funded actions, in relation to human rights for example, connected and complemented interventions funded via the UN MPTF and IcSP. This went down to the local level, such as the delivery of tangible peace dividends (constructing police projects via one project and connecting road construction via another project). Interview records also confirmed that EDF funding was used to complement and scale up thematic CSO or EIDHR funded projects – as of the 11th EDF, the EUDs were asked to use the NIP for complementary CSO funding. Concerning interventions in policy and justice, via the Joint Police Programme (JPP) and the Joint Justice Programme (JJP), the Rule of Law Evaluation (2021) states that both are performing basically in parallel because there had virtually been no attempt to connect between the two – as such, they are principally regarded as siloed activities. Evidence from

the education sector (Horumarinta Elmiga II and III) certifies that division of labour among the SESSP consortium members has brought about synergy amongst the partners which comprise the EU, several NGOs and local CSOs. Moreover, this SWAP approach in the education sector is seen as highly complementary to budget support, which is monitored, among others, via several variable tranche indicators on education sector progress. From the domain of PFM, there is clear evidence that the WB MPF has provided strong coordination on governance with other key programmes in the sector, Customs Reform and Trade Enhancement in Somalia Project (CRATES) and Public Resource Management in Somalia Programme (PREMIS), in particular, which the EU also co-funds.

Concerning macro-area III, the BRIDGES project (TVET and Higher Education for Boosting Road Infrastructure Development and Growth of Energy Services), via technical and vocational education and training (TVET) under macro-area III, promoted linkages with the private sector and synergy with other EU funded projects in the education sector. But most of the interviewees agree on the limited integration between economic development, social protection, responses to climate change, and sustainable management of natural resources ambition, which has been a real challenge given the country situation. By encompassing objectives addressing all these issues, the design of the ILED programme presents a turning point for the EUD willing to adopt an integrated territorial approach. ILED's design is based on key lessons learned showing that achieving long-lasting stability and security requires *“mutually reinforcing interventions rather than the fragmented, linear or sequenced ones of the past.”*³² A review carried out mid 2020³³ highlighted to what extent integration between ILED components was challenging and how limited synergies so far had an impact on stakeholders' engagement and programme effectiveness.

To overcome parallel engagements and duplication, the EUD and ECHO gradually connected as of 2018 though experiences were a bit bumpy at times, in particular during the early years of the evaluation period, because of the need to understand ECHO's mandate and resulting inability to be a partner for engagements in a stabilisation context. ECHO and EUD principally connect along a Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus approach implemented in a national context of stabilisation while fight against Al-Shabaab is ongoing. ECHO does not engage in peacebuilding and thereby only indirectly contributes to the HDP nexus which became an official EU guidance as of 2019.³⁴ Today, ECHO's collaboration with the EU is done on 'social safety nets', 'livelihood' and 'education' and was described throughout as very constructive, regular and collegial in particular with regard to exchanges at the strategic level. Though more could be done to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian aid and education, in particular as ECHO has a large portfolio on education,³⁵ and there was an intention to contribute more to curricula development and capacity strengthening. This is currently superseded due to the prolonged drought and the need for immediate humanitarian support.

Budget support allowed the EU to engage in politically sensible and strategic policy discussions at national and sector levels which would not have been possible to that extent with other forms of support. (I2.2.2)

While the EU has been one of the most important funders at the time of the Somali Compact, its role was further sharpened with the provision of budget support as of 2017/2018. The EU was the first international partner to provide budget support. As it was linked to PFM macro-economic reform, it helped to give the EU an important seat at the table with other international partners promoting PFM reform, the IMF, WB and the UK. Towards FGS, budget support sent an important signal to international partners that Somalia could be taken seriously (as mentioned above) and thereby opened the door to participate and play a role in high-level political as well as policy discussions. This then translated to the education sector and the national police for which the EU was an important supporter since the early days of the NIP. The provision of budget support reinforced this role witness to some targeted variable tranche indicators linked to the education sector (next to several other indicators that have to be fulfilled). Three of the four variable tranche indicators to monitor the education focus of budget support were achieved: i) teacher proficiency testing [qualifications]; ii) provision of policy on private schools [90 per cent of schools are private]; iii) review of textbooks [curricula] The fourth indicator, a MoU that defines the relationship between Centre and FMS on education related reform, a politically sensitive issue, was not achieved so far which suggests that the EU's ability for leveraging more fundamental change is relative. The MTR of the EUTF (2020) however comments that the EU's combined budget support provision plus complementary TA project gives the EU an anchor for high-level engagement with the IFIs, resulting in a solid reform track record for IFI arrears clearance and HIPC decision point. It has provided a framework for dialogue and donor-coordination particularly around PFM and domestic resource

³² EUTF funded ILED Action Document T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-57.

³³ Territorial Integration and Planning Facility for the ILED Programme (TIPF). Third Party Monitoring and Evaluation Report II. Contract N° T05.909.

³⁴ EU promotes the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus along the recommendations of the OECD/DAC (<https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-5019>).

³⁵ EU humanitarian aid amounts to roughly EUR 50-100 million per year in Somalia and is thus sizable. In education, it even matches the EUD funding. ECHO spends roughly EUR 8 million/year for education in emergencies as funding for education is earmarked (10 per cent).

mobilisation. For the fisheries sector, EU support has led to breakthroughs in revenue sharing, which has had a wider impact on the revenue sharing discussions. Given this important role of the EU and its budget support it is plausible that the temporary halting of the budget support in 2021 helped to reinforce a message – in line with the position of other international partners – that the Farmajo Government was not seen legitimate anymore because of the expiry of its mandate and that election process should be finalised with no further delay. There are no findings, however, which would suggest that there was a direct causal link between the EU's postponement of budget support and this leading or contributing to a change of the Farmajo Government.

Linkages made between EU development cooperation support and EU's non-development support led to synergies of engagements in the security sector but evidence that this has led to better development cooperation results are mixed. (I2.2.3)

In addition to the EUD's collaboration with ECHO (described above), there is good evidence from the security sector support (macro-area I) that linkages between EU development cooperation and the EU's non-development support led to synergies. Today, an integrated approach is shaping and illustrates how different EU tools and financing instruments connect and come together. Inter-service meetings and other exchanges take place regularly, for the JPP sometimes even several times per month. The efforts of the EU Training Mission to Somalia (EUTM) have been complemented by the provision of non-lethal equipment (through the African and the European Peace Facilities) leading to a comprehensive "train and equip" approach. Additional funding to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) – now African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) – has also been provided via the same Facilities.³⁶ Concerning FPI, its engagement was complementing what the EU was supporting overall in the domain of peace and security, though infrastructure works under such a short-term instrument has not been considered as the most effective support nor aligned with the scope of this instrument.

Relationships with CSDP missions were described as broadly positive and regular collaboration have developed throughout the years with the Delegation as well as between the missions³⁷. Some criticisms were, however, expressed about the functioning and effectiveness of these missions, in particular EUCAP, and the added value they had for the EU's international cooperation support. Considering developments throughout the evaluation period, if change might have taken long time to materialize, the EU is now getting to the point where its support can become more useful in the security sector.

There is also a scope to create more relevant connections and synergies in the education sector between the support provided via DG INTPA and ECHO, respectively (as mentioned above). There is no evidence that synergies of engagement led to better development cooperation results on resilience or food security (the macro-area III of the evaluation). Exchanges between the EUD's political section and its cooperation section concerning the EU's support to PFM and macro-economic reform, however, have resulted in a gradually increasing institutional capacity and better performance of Somalia's institutions at FGS level (as will be further presented, below).

The degree to which EU country level-support and EU regional-level support (also non-development support) complemented and reinforced each other was slowly developing over the years and has gained some, though not a strong momentum over the more recent implementation period. (I2.2.4)

Further to the findings presented under JC1.3, some reinforcing effects were noted from the domain of countering violent extremism and maritime security. An IcSP funded project, implemented in 2015/2016, laid the ground for longer term actions in support of countering violent extremism funded from the Global EU Programme to Counter Violent Extremism (STRIVE) Horn of Africa project which includes a Somalia focus. The recent regional "Red Sea Programme" is coordinated by a EUD Somalia staff member, who liaises with EUDs covered by the programme, headquarters' colleagues involved in similar programmes, CSDP Missions and the EUSR Team for Horn of Africa. This was described as strategic because of the programme's different pillars on regional common policy (IGAD), maritime law enforcement (International Criminal Police Organization, INTERPOL), ports security and safety (International Maritime Organisation, IMO), and regional maritime domain awareness cooperation (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC). Collaboration with IGAD, via the EUTF-funded programme on Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa, however, encountered major delays and required a substantial revision. And, under macro-area III, limited evidence was found that projects supporting IGAD made progress regarding the development of borderlands, which are critical for both, formal and informal trade.

The EUSR for the Horn of Africa plays a potentially relevant role in linking and cross-fertilising the bilateral and the regional levels. Several non-EU interviewees highly appreciated the role which the former EUSR played in connecting the EU's diplomatic efforts concerning Somalia with the region, i.e., African Union (AU), UN and cooperation in the Nile Basin and the Red Sea. That time, the EUSR's long-term service and institutional

³⁶ The APF used to cover the military, police and civilian components until mid-2021. Since this date EPF has taken over the military component while the other two remain funded by the APF (until end of 2024).

³⁷ This is now also supported by the Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2443 of 12 December 2022 - amending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the SNAF.

memory helped to bridge knowledge gaps of EUD staff who stayed for contractually shorter assignments. FPI programmes and EUD managed programmes can also play a relevant role in shaping complementarities. Interviewees mentioned the positive collaboration between the present EUSR and FPI in the domain of stabilisation, for example, but there is scope for improvement, for example by conducting political analysis jointly.

3.2.3 The approaches and frameworks for policy dialogue underpinning EU-Somalia cooperation have been strengthened and address both performance assessment and broader policy issues (JC2.3)

Instruments and structures to foster policy dialogue at higher policy as well as sector levels are in place but not all of them function due to a proliferation of formats and working groups, resulting in overlaps and fragmentation. Government lead is basically absent. Efforts to revive a more effective aid policy and implementation infrastructure re-gained momentum with the change of FGS leadership as of mid-2022. (I2.3.1)

Throughout the evaluation period, the EU supported donor community efforts to set up aid coordination structures. This was done via co-funding the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) coordinated 'Partnership Coordination Facility' in support of the overall aid coordination framework (Somalia Partnership Forum, SPF) but also in the context of sector-related policy dialogue, steering group meetings and a multitude of meeting formats across sectors. For the security sector, for example, the evaluation team collected information about five different formats during interviews, all of them bringing international partners together in different constellations. Beyond, the EU actively participated and co-shaped the dialogue via participation in a variety of fora, committees, working groups, support arrangements and in the context of two multi-donor trust funds (WB MPF and UN MPTF) and the EU budget support. The official aid implementation architecture was functioning until some four years back but was used mainly for information sharing and never became a platform for exchanging more substantially about policy reforms. It then faded away because FGS considered structures as too complex and eventually stopped due to the Farmajo Government's thwarting of state and constitutional reforms. The government was not considered legitimate any more by international partners because of the expiry of the mandate. The last meetings at higher policy level (SPF and SDRF) took place towards the end of 2020. COVID-19 and the reduced ability to connect via meetings, as discussed further below, also did not help to solve this crisis. Though technical level meetings with the FGS continued, for example in the education sector, and more informal exchanges with key ministries of the FGS were held regularly as of January 2021. Throughout the evaluation period, the EU's principal international partners for policy dialogue and coordination at higher policy level but also in selected sectors and sub-sectors were the UN, UK, USA, WB and – for public sector reform – the IMF. With the Government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in place since mid-2022, attempts to revive the aid implementation structure gained a new momentum.

The EU, in collaboration with other international partners, has been able to engage effectively with the FGS and other government entities in political and policy dialogue at a strategic level, in particular as of 2017/2018. Though the strategic dialogue with the FGS became difficult as of 2020 due to political reasons, the selected sector and technical exchanges continued constructively. (I2.3.2)

There is an abundance of findings from interviews, in particular, which provide insights about the EU's ability to engage effectively in political and policy dialogue. Stakeholders working with the EU during the early years described the EU as gradually developing from a rather non-strategic international partner during the years 2012 to 2016, towards a more relevant political and policy dialogue actor as of 2017/2018. The EUSR, however, was noted as having provided constructive inputs into high-level (regional) policy dialogue processes already during the early years of the evaluation period. As mentioned under JC2.2, the provision of budget support and complementary support to PFM as of 2018 gave the EU an anchor for high-level engagement and strategic dialogue with IFIs, but also with the FGS. This took place against the background of the formulation of the NPS (2017),³⁸ a process to which the EU was strongly associated, and which allowed the EU to engage, complementary to the other policy dialogue processes mentioned, in political and policy dialogue with the FGS at strategic level. These findings relate to the engagement with the FGS in Mogadishu, but there were also instances where the EU played an important role at FMS level and in Somaliland. As for the latter, in 2020 for example, the Head of the EUD (HoD) was able to bring different political stakeholders together and mediate during political and strategic dialogue meetings. Nevertheless, quantitative findings from a text analysis using

³⁸ The 'New Partnership for Somalia for peace, stability and prosperity', also known as NPS, is a mutual accountability framework (MAF) which was agreed between the FGS and international partners to develop and then report on high-level reforms in relation to 'inclusive politics', 'security and justice', 'economic development' and 'social development' along a set of milestones which either the government, the international partners or both together have to achieve. The MAF was updated until 2021 but its monitoring got on halt since the last high-level SPF in December 2020.

MAXQDA suggest that the FGS tended to receive more attention from the EU than the FMS (see Box 3 below). This should not come as a surprise given the centrality of the FGS.

Strategic policy dialogue also took place at sector level, as findings from interviews on the education sector, security and PFM highlight. The WB described the contributions of the EU to these sectors as invaluable during the recent years. Concerning budget support, the policy dialogue was assessed positively, though with some room for improvement according to the MTR of the EUTF (2020). Until the end of 2020, high-level meetings were held via formalised meetings at macro-level and sector level, led by the FGS but stopped thereafter for political reasons, as mentioned above. The decision to postpone budget support, discussed above, was noted by stakeholders working on constitutional reform and raised suggestions that the EU should also become more vocal to address political bottlenecks at sector level. A plea was made for a more proactive political engagement by the EU together with other international partners during high-level policy dialogues in support of constitutional reform. Though there was acknowledgement that this is extremely sensitive, because the constitutional issues can only be solved by Somalis.

To further shape an effective political and policy dialogue between the EU and Somalia, as two senior EU stakeholders as well as respondents from EU MS underlined, an update of the 2016 EU's Council Conclusions on Somalia³⁹ is very much needed. The current EU Horn of Africa Strategy (2021)⁴⁰ is not seen as specific enough to guide the EU's work with Somalia sufficiently.

Evidence of improved programming/design due to the EU's engagement in policy dialogue at sector level is mostly strong in relation to PFM, security, education with some variations with regard to resilience and economic development. (I2.3.3)

Findings indicate that (steering group) meetings at technical sector and sub-sector were relevant, but their effectiveness was not always as expected (for example, mentioned in the MTR of the WB MPF, 2019). The SESSP evaluation report for the education sector notes, however, that dialogue at political, policy and technical levels has been effective whereby the EU had convening power and played a relevant role. Though EUD staff expressed concerns that a possible future reduction of EU funding for the education sector might impact negatively on the EU's position and ability to inform and influence this policy dialogue. Already before budget support started the EU, by virtue of its track-record, technical expertise and financial weight, was able to shape and improve the dialogue, and to maintain a constructive and intense exchange at the technical level – this continued, even after the high-level dialogue stopped towards the end of 2020. Policy dialogue around budget support and PFM, where the EU was valued for its technical expertise which helped to strengthen the donor dialogue, was also considered successful and noted as an anchor for continued dialogue with the FGS and as a vector for change and structural reforms (MTR of the EUTF, 2020). In the security sector, as discussed in more detail under JC4.2, the JPP meetings became a relevant forum for technical coordination but also to discuss issues of wider (strategic) nature. In the absence of effective Common Approach to Security meetings at the strategic level, JPP meetings helped to discuss more fundamental issues between the FGS and FMS and how donors should relate. There are mixed findings from macro-area III. Interviewees mentioned the EU's constructive role in solving a complex and difficult road construction issue in Puntland but stakeholders from the agri-food sector pointed out that the EU, as donor, could have engaged more with the government when political issues impact project implementation. This aligns with quantitative findings obtained via MAXQDA, which suggest that policy dialogue was not a particularly strong component of EU projects at sector level (see Box 3 below). Finally, several findings from smaller project interventions across the three macro areas say that project boards, steering groups or advisory committees worked overall well – confirming that steering and monitoring of engagements was taken seriously across intervention levels.

There are joint monitoring arrangements in place and used between the EU, Somali government and donors to steer the implementation of the reform process through both, formal and informal exchanges at higher policy level. Monitoring arrangements at sector level are equally in place but their effectiveness differs across areas. (I2.3.4)

At higher policy and diplomatic level, meetings between the Somali government and international partners take place in formal as well as informal settings though not according to a particular scheme or rhythm. They are convened for particular purposes and combine discussions about high-level policy issues, such as the monitoring of Somalia's reaching of the HIPC Completion Point, with political commitments to further fund the country's reform process.⁴¹ Those have taken place throughout the evaluation period. At sector and sub-sector levels, findings from the three macro-areas of this evaluation highlight various forms of monitoring via different (organisational) constellations, but evidence about the extent to which these monitoring mechanisms helped to steer implementation differed. There are references to the usefulness of these processes, such as for the

³⁹ European Union (2016): EU Council Conclusions, 18 July 2016 (OR. en) 11238/16. Brussels.

⁴⁰ European Union (2021): EU Council Conclusions - The Horn of Africa: a geo-strategic priority for the EU - Brussels, 10 May 2021 (OR. en) 8135/21

⁴¹ Such a meeting took place in Washington in November 2022, attended by the FGS and various international partners, including the EU.

education sector mentioned above, and multiple references were made during interviews to PFM related exchanges to monitor support to macro-economic reform, in particular between the EU, WB, IMF, UK and FGS officials. The Rule of Law Evaluation (2021) observed a tendency across interventions to proceed with implementation without having a proper reporting and dialogue framework in place which prevented fully informed decisions about the further course of programme interventions.

Box 3 *Complementary findings from quantitative word analysis of EU documentation*

- The EU puts a strong emphasis on coordination, cooperation and consultation with other stakeholders in Somalia, although some stakeholders, like FGS authorities, tend to receive more attention compared to FMS authorities.
- While the EU projects emphasised cooperation with Somali authorities especially at the FGS level, they did not have a strong overall policy dialogue component.
- The EU did not strongly incorporate elements of Somali society and culture like tradition and the importance of informal practices and institutions into its programming, which could reduce the impact of certain projects. This gap may be partly explained by the EU's more limited attention to bottom-up approaches which the results also pointed to.
- EU projects most often did not explicitly consider exit strategies. Somali resources are very limited and a volatile context makes planning difficult. This might explain why exit strategies are not included in project documents.

For the supporting statistical evidence collected with MAXQDA, see Annex 7.

3.3 EQ3 – Efficiency and Flexibility

To what extent has EU support been efficient and timely, cost-effective and knowledge-based, considering the evolving context?



Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

The EU had to go through an intense learning process over the years to understand what it means to work in a highly fragile environment like Somalia. The EU's engagement can be split broadly into two parts. The first part from 2014 to 2017, when the full EUD was based in Nairobi. The second part, lasting until today, started with establishment of the EUD in Mogadishu International Airport in 2017. Having the EUD established in Somalia was overdue according to several interviewees. The move of the political section to Mogadishu went in parallel with an updated strategy, additional funding and the start of budget support. The timely mobilisation of appropriate staff was the key factor determining an efficient implementation, which headquarters had difficulties to manage successfully and in time. Today, much more attention is given to human resources resulting in a team which has been described by international partners as competent, committed and well informed. But, as highlighted from different sources inside as well as outside the EU, the EUD's team is hampered by lack of staff considering the ambitious aims and need to accompany change processes in various sectors intensely at the technical level. In this regard, the EU compares badly to the UK, another international partner which engages at the strategic level across multiple sectors. It outnumbers the EU by roughly two to three persons on average per sector. The split of the EUD between Nairobi and Mogadishu has several advantages and disadvantages. The recruitment and timely fielding of qualified staff has proven a key challenge throughout the evaluation period impacting on the quality of cooperation. This is a major bottleneck speaking against moving the entire EUD to Mogadishu. FGS stakeholders and international partners based in Mogadishu, however, would like to see a more prominent presence of the EU in Mogadishu (the pros and cons are discussed in more detail in the findings section).

The country's situation makes aid delivery expensive and costs for running this cooperation are considerably high (e.g., air transport – around EUR 23 million for a 6-year contract – making it particularly expensive, plus high security costs). The EUD showed cost-awareness, for example when contracting new implementing partners, NGOs or consulting firms, which are less expensive than UN organisations. Experiences with those organisations also show that they can work more flexibly, timely and effectively than UN partners, although NGOs cannot work in all sectors and not in all parts of the country. In terms of programming, interventions were designed with an increasing level of flexibility over the years, while still adhering to the EU's rules and procedures, which was part of the EU's learning process mentioned above. For example, decisions were more broadly formulated to allow for a broader range of projects under these decisions when designing them. The EUD's and headquarters' understanding about the need to engage flexibly and pragmatically is high. This also helped to disburse funds according to plan but with frequent delays, which is common for interventions in such contexts. Though various implementing partners complained about high transaction costs, for reporting in particular, and red tape when dealing with amendments and financial reporting. Delays were further caused by external factors outside the control of

the EU which influenced the efficiency of interventions, i.e., the unsolved constitutional process hampering reform in most sectors, the spreading of COVID-19 and the political impasse during the last 2.5 years of the Farmajo government.

There is evidence that the EU paid attention to independent project monitoring and evaluation throughout the evaluation period, though with some gaps. Monitoring and Evaluation was used for: i) monitoring the implementation process of interventions; ii) the review and evaluation of their results in line with set objectives; and iii) drawing lessons for adaptations, continuation or termination of an engagement. There is some evidence suggesting that this overall framework was regularly used and was internally consistent. However, monitoring indicators were focused on outputs and did not pay enough attention to longer-term objectives, i.e., outcomes, impact and sustainability. Keeping track of developments in an overly complex and largely inaccessible environment has not been easy. Third party monitoring and evaluation facilities were set up as of 2016 and implemented successfully, which compensated a good deal for the inability to visit certain projects for security reason, but not entirely. Information collected about the strengths of results of the monitoring carried out by implementing partners is acceptable given the circumstances, though with room for improvement (e.g., to conduct better baselines before the start of a project – also qualitative baselines if statistics are not available). Throughout the evaluation period, the EU invested in learning and the evidence is strong that the EU has revised its strategic approach during the evaluation period. Lessons learnt across the sectors were generally taken on board, they informed revisions and adaptations to the programming of interventions and led to changes and modifications during implementation. Uptake at the strategic level resulted in the EU Development Cooperation Strategy (2017-2020) providing a new impetus and innovations to the cooperation as of 2017/2018. Various sector reviews and evaluations, such as on RoL or education, helped to inform the formulation of the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) 2021-2027.

3.3.1 The EU's internal institutional set-up at headquarters, regional and country level to execute EU cooperation with Somalia is conducive to a timely, flexible and cost-effective implementation of EU support (JC3.1)

The support was designed with an increasing level of flexibility over the years to allow for adaptation and the EUD's understanding about the need to act flexibly is high. Though translating design into operations can be challenging in the Somalia context. (I3.1.1)

With more experiences gained in a politically fluid and conflict-infected environment, the EU increasingly adapted to the context over the years and flexibility was increasingly seen as the necessary point of departure when dealing with Somalia. This was a gradual process which took time to fully land among all EU stakeholders. Today, the need for flexibility has become part of the EU's 'DNA' when working with Somalia and attempts are made to follow a flexible approach from the onset of an intervention. For example, big funding decisions are often a compilation of several larger action documents to reduce administrative burden and are broadly formulated, which allows for flexibility during implementation. And the provision of budget support was partially reoriented to provide funding for the clearing of Somalia's outstanding arrears towards IFIs, as part of the HIPC process. Finally, several interviewees (in particular from NGOs) expressed their appreciation for the EU's flexibility during COVID-19 when the EU allowed them to use some of their already programmed funds for emergency funding.

But other findings show that flexibility can be difficult to realise in Somalia. There is evidence that in particular smaller projects, implemented by NGOs, were able to adapt more easily, find innovative solutions and work comparatively cost-effective (a finding often mentioned in TPME reports of smaller projects). But several annual reports and external evaluations, in particular for big interventions, document that this has not been realised across interventions. A report reviewing the implementation of the WB MPF in 2019 underlined that donor earmarking has hampered fund flexibility, that this practice was increasing and that this has hindered the intervention's ability to adapt. Critical comments were also shared by different respondents about the ability of UNDP to implement interventions effectively. The UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund (UN MPTF) was qualified as a heavy structure and managed from far away with significant difficulties to adapt to the situation on the ground. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) management of the JPP, on the contrary, appeared more positive in this regard.

Because of the security context any international engagement in Somalia is very costly, making aid delivery also very expensive. (I3.1.3)

Interviews with different stakeholders, ranging from NGO representatives to different international funding partners, underline that doing business in Somalia is highly expensive. Returns from investments in the country are low and the ability to achieve real progress is limited. The expenses incurred, an observation shared several times during interviews, need to be looked at from a wider geopolitical level. Accepting this axiom as a point of departure, one can look at the different ways the cooperation was given shape in this overly complex and challenging environment. The EU's operations in Somalia are steered and managed today by a combination of headquarters engagement, the cooperation section of the EU Somalia Delegation based both

in the EU's regional office in Nairobi and MIA, and the HoD and political section situated in the MIA area. The EUD's political and cooperation work is supported by three local consultants, one each in Hargeisa (Somaliland), Garowe (Puntland) and Mogadishu. Security costs and staff compensation for living and working in MIA are significant. EU cooperation staff regularly travel between the EU's Nairobi and Mogadishu offices, alternated with visits to authorities and projects in Somaliland and Puntland. Occasionally, the EUD can visit a project in Mogadishu town, but those opportunities are rare due to the lack of security, and because the budget for security/close protection is limited.⁴² Other travels inside the remainder of Somalia are extremely limited for security reasons. Operations were supported by an EU flight service until 2022, serving all EU services, international community and implementing partners, which participated to the cost of operations. As a conclusion, operating in Somalia involves a dedicated logistic, security and is more costly than in many other developing countries (e.g., air transport – EUR 23 million for a 6-year contract – makes operations particularly expensive).⁴³

Funds were overall disbursed for set objectives, despite very regular delays, with some lesser amounts paid versus planned during the years 2020 and 2021 due to COVID-19. Multiple complaints about red tape were registered, in particular with regard to financial matters, were shared by implementing partners and referred to in project documents and evaluations. (I3.1.2, I3.1.3 & I3.1.4)

The frequency of delays which influenced the efficiency of interventions was high and manifold. Factors mentioned by implementing organisations were delays caused by disbursements arriving late (also because of administrative process in their own organisations), bureaucratic requirements causing high transaction costs as different NGO representatives mentioned, selection of implementing partners which could not perform, mistakes in the planning phase (e.g., possible instances of delays and challenges were not foreseen), centralised decision-making processes and delays in budget approval, heavy procedures when amendments have to be done (often also caused by UN agencies, which have cumbersome and costly procedures on their own), security matters, or a long start-up process caused by slow organisational processes, finding appropriate staff, unclear procedural requirements, etc. 'No-cost extensions' for projects of 6 to 12 months are on average needed, according to one EUD staff member.

Despite regular delays reported in project documents, disbursements for the overall evaluation period did not get affected severely according to Figure 6, which compares EU contracted amounts (2013-2021) versus paid amounts, and Figure 7, which lists disbursement rates per funding instrument. Figure 6 shows a high disbursement rate of the amounts contracted between 2013 and 2016. As can be expected, contracts from 2017 to 2020 show a gradually smaller disbursement rate (95 per cent – 73 per cent).

Figure 6 EU contracted amounts versus paid amounts (2013-2021)⁴⁴



⁴² One EUD staff member, serving for four years, could only six times visit projects outside MIA.


⁴³ The EU had funded air services since 1990. First via ECHO, as of 2006 via EDF funding. The last contract via EDF funding was from 2016 to 2019. Then, a successor contract via EUTF funding run from the 4th quarter of 2019 to June 2022. Flight services were subsequently resumed in April 2023.

⁴⁴ The amount contracted per year is not equal to the amount yearly disbursed (i.e., payment instalments).

Source: *Particip GmbH* based on data retrieved from the CRIS database.

The analysis done by funding instrument in Figure 7 depicts a high disbursement rate, ranging from 97 per cent to 100 per cent. DCI-HUM, DCI-FOOD and EOM⁴⁵ show 100 per cent disbursed amounts. EDF, CSO-LA and EIDHR⁴⁶ – also the larger funding instruments – present relatively lower rates.

Figure 7 Disbursement rates per funding instrument



Source: *Particip GmbH* based on data retrieved from the CRIS database.

EU internal institutional arrangement, in particular the split between Nairobi and Mogadishu and the fielding of staff, increased the challenge for aid implementation and impacted negatively on the efficiency of the EU's support to Somalia. (I3.1.5)

Working conditions to implement the EU's cooperation with Somalia are not easy. The reasons are manifold. The EUD is split between Mogadishu (a non-family posting) and Nairobi, a situation which requires regular travels to connect within the EUD but also with the FGS and international partners based in MIA. Working days during the week differ due to the Islamic working week and the Christian working week, resulting in weekend work and, for those working in Somalia, security related tensions occur regularly. An internal control mission visited the EUD in 2017 was overly critical about the working conditions but the resulting agreement to allocate an additional half day for rest and relaxation was never implemented. Information provided by interviewees having worked at the EUD earlier document that the EU's engagement in Somalia has been an intense learning process when starting to intensify its cooperation as of 2014. Things changed for the better when the EU opened its delegation in Mogadishu in 2017, which sent an important political and operational message to the FGS and other non-EU stakeholders. It was noted that proximity is an asset and that this locational change was overdue, because for a long time before, there was a sense of the EU had been far away. It was also an improvement in terms of logistics, in particular security (before 2017, the EUD had an office in the UN/AMISOM compound but with no overhead protection).

Staff turnover had been higher than expected during the earlier years of the evaluation period (2014 to 2017), which affected the effectiveness of cooperation considerably. This was compounded by positions not being filled in time. Local staff staying long-term at the EUD can only partially compensate for such gaps. While finding and fielding appropriate staff has been a major difficulty for the EU throughout the evaluation period, non-EU stakeholders pointed out that the current cooperation team has been well selected and functions very well. Some posts have remained vacant for more than a year. Next to the EUD's political staff, some 33 per cent of the EUD's cooperation team covering resilience, infrastructure and productive sectors is based in Mogadishu. Due to the short contractual period of staff based in Mogadishu (two years, for officials), turn-over is high, risking a loss of institutional memory. A problem has been, and still is, the timely recruitment and fielding of colleagues for the political section. It includes the military and police attaché positions (vacant since 1 and 3 years, respectively, though the latter has been cancelled in the meantime). These positions had been

⁴⁵ Domains of the EU thematic instruments present in the CRIS database: Development Cooperation Instrument for Human and social component of the investing in people programme (DCI-HUM); Food Security Instrument (DCI-FOOD); EU Election Observation Missions instrument (EOM).

⁴⁶ Domains of the EU thematic instruments present in the CRIS database: European Development Fund instrument (EDF); Civil Society Organisations-Local Authorities instrument (CSO-LA); European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights (EIDHR).

crucial for the EU's growing investment in the security sector in Somalia. The tasks expected from these advisory roles have been partially covered by EUD's Political Advisors. Though it also affects the work of cooperation staff, because several of them have to take over tasks which relate strongly to the political domain. The exchange and cooperation between the political and the cooperation sections was assessed as fine but should be strengthened considering political affairs and development projects are intertwined.

A number of EUD staff members noted the split between Nairobi and Mogadishu as problematic, as it affects the efficiency and effectiveness of the work, though without clearly voting for all EUD staff members being based in the same location. Several national and international non-EU stakeholders who are based in Mogadishu would welcome a permanent presence of all EUD staff in Mogadishu, assuming that this would lead to a closer contact with national institutions and other international partners based in Mogadishu, in particular the UN staff. All staff being based in one location would also enhance professional interactions among colleagues. While such a merger of offices would send a strong (political) message that the EUD is fully embedded in Somali realities, numerous arguments were mentioned against such a move. Among these were high costs to accommodate everybody in an unsecure environment, difficulty to find qualified staff willing to stay in such a high-risk location (Mogadishu is not a family-posting), a higher turn-over of staff compared to the present situation due to the contract duration, and difficulties to connect with other international partners based in Nairobi (many international partners working in support of Somalia are based there). Beyond that, according to several interviewees, it takes quite a long time to get one's head around the unique challenges of working in Somalia due to the ever fluid political and security context, language and cultural barriers, inability to perform field visits, etc. The short contractual period for stays in Mogadishu would work against this. The issue of moving the entire EUD to Mogadishu had been discussed intensely in 2019 already but was not considered viable at that time.

In terms of staffing, the EU's approach to externalise relevant content and advisory work to third parties – consulting firms, NGOs, the UN – compares not so well with other major international partners working in Somalia and impacts on the quality with which change processes can be accompanied. The UK, for example, has more advisory and technical capacity within its own ranks, which allows them to accompany and inform change processes more directly and more intensely. Roughly speaking, the ratio for cooperation staff is one EUD staff member per sub-sector area against some two to three at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office of the United Kingdom (FCDO) office.

Three external factors outside the control of the EU influenced the efficiency of interventions, i.e., the unsolved constitutional crisis which hampers reform in most sectors, the spreading of COVID-19 and the unfolding political impasse during the last 2.5 years of the Farmajo government. (I3.1.6)

Among these three external factors, the unsolved constitutional issues between FGS and FMS are by far the most important factor causing a very tedious and lengthy cooperation process with Somalia. This was mentioned during many interviews and transpires from multiple documents consulted. Second, the pandemic had a severe impact on the implementation for more than one year because travel and contact were highly restricted, and in some cases implementing partners withdrew their staff from Mogadishu and other places in Somalia. Third, the breakdown of policy dialogue with the Farmajo government caused delays in the reform process but was partially compensated via a continuation of the cooperation at the technical level.

3.3.2 The EU and its partners applied appropriate result frameworks for monitoring and evaluation, used them for learning and reviewing experiences, fed back lessons learnt into the cooperation and policy dialogue at different levels and ensured their uptake (JC3.2)

There is evidence that the EU adopted an overall comprehensive and consistent internal results-framework at strategy and sector level though keeping track of developments in an extraordinarily complex and largely inaccessible environment has not been easy. Information about the extent to which the EU adopted such a framework during the early years of the evaluation period is limited. (I3.2.1)

A multi-pronged approach to monitoring and evaluation was necessary to follow the implementation of the EU's interventions at strategic and implementation level because, as one EUD staff member said, to monitor and evaluate interventions in such a complex and difficult to visit environment is highly challenging. Moreover, baselines for projects are difficult to establish and reliable national statistics and databases to monitor sector progress are not available. Against this background, the EU has deployed an approach to results-monitoring which works through a multitude of instruments to assess the extent to which implementation of the NIP and, as of 2017, the Somalia Development Cooperation Strategy were on track. The EU used the External Assistance Management Reports to annually report on results achieved at overall country level as well as sector level, and it mobilised funding for an extensive TPME facility as of 2016 which is today in its second phase (so far, more than 150 reports have been produced). It also commissioned MTRs and evaluations to get more insights on the performance of sectors and financing instruments – such as the SESSP (2021), the Rule of Law Evaluation, which reviewed 17 interventions in the domain of peace, security and governance (2021), a short review of lessons learnt from resilience projects and the Mid-term Evaluation of the European

Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019 for which an elaborate case study on Somalia was undertaken (2020). Moreover, the EU undertook the final evaluation of the Economic Development for Growth and Resilience in 2019 to review 14 projects supporting value chain development, resilience and social protection. There were also thematic and facility evaluations, such as on the EU's global support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding, and the evaluation of the EU's support to the AU via the African Peace Facility (APF), which included case studies on Somalia, and it made use of reviews undertaken by development partners, such as the WB's MTR of the WB MPF (2019) which the EU contributes to. This was complemented by some Results-oriented monitoring (ROM) reports and various external and internal programme/ project reviews and evaluations, though the evaluation team noted that this was not done for all interventions according to the documents registered in CRIS. It is also noted that the overall sector reviews and evaluations were done mostly towards the end of the NIP and in preparation of the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) funding cycle 2021-2027. Information about the extent to which the EU was sufficiently informed about the strategic course of its work mid-term of the NIP's implementation could not be traced.

The strength of results from third party monitoring carried out by implementing partners is acceptable given circumstances, though with room for improvements. (I3.2.2)

Concerning the strengths of results monitoring carried out by implementing partners, findings so far provide evidence of positive practices as well as issues for improvement. Overall, monitoring and evaluation is done as well as possible under given circumstances. Implementing partners of stabilisation projects mentioned that the situation requires to monitor project implementation via a pragmatic combination of internal staff as well as externally mobilised consultants who are permanently on the ground. The reports of the TPME facility are considered good and reliable by EUD staff members. Several external evaluation reports document a range of findings, for example that interventions designed a consistent intervention logic and a coherent theory of changes and translated these into detailed monitoring plans. But there is also evidence from a good number of interventions where, according to desk material, monitoring frameworks lack a logic; log-frames and their specific objectives were not sufficiently aligned with the overall objectives of an intervention; indicators formulated were difficult to measure; planned project-internal monitoring documents were not being prepared; guidance on how project staff should undertake the monitoring was not clear; and little attention was paid to gender sensitive monitoring (see also JC5.2). On the positive side, findings highlight that projects not only drew up monitoring plans but also used them for reporting and learning; that a dedicated Monitoring and Evaluation officer was mobilised to collect data and feedback in some cases; that third-party consulting companies were contracted to conduct periodic monitoring exercises; that learning was captured via research and briefs; that particular attention was attributed to the development of a conflict-sensitive monitoring-evaluation-learning framework; or that the intervention logic was assessed as sound and valid. This "light and shadow" assessment originates from findings across sectors and across smaller engagements implemented by INGOs as well as bigger interventions implemented by multilateral partners or development agencies.

Evidence is strong that the EU has revised its strategic approaches and has adapted to changing circumstances based on international as well as EU-own assessments and lessons learnt (I3.2.3)

The evaluation period covers different phases of EU engagement and therefore different phases of learning. The EU accompanied Somalia's institutional development under a transitional government which started during the early years of the Somali Compact, it accompanied the FGS/FMS stabilisation efforts, it accompanied periods of severe drought, flash floods, and environmental degradation and it accompanied the political difficulties of changing governments in Somalia and Somaliland. Over this period, the EU changed its approach from smaller project engagements during the early years, often focusing on humanitarian and poverty-reduction needs, in combination with the financing of multilateral trust funds (UNDP, WB and AfDB), towards a more strategic engagement at macro level. The latter took principally place as of 2017/2018 when additional EDF funding arrived via the EUTF, which allowed also to start with the provision of budget support. The latter switch was based on a thorough assessment, as presented under JC 2.1. This change in the EU's strategic approach followed the preparations and holding of the London Somalia Conference 2017, which set the new framework for relations between Somalia and the international community after the newly elected President Farmajo and a new Somali government took office. The meeting agreed on the Security Pact – based on the Somali-agreed National Security Architecture and setting out the vision of Somali-led security institutions and forces and international support, and endorsed the NPS, in support of the National Development Plan – the first in 30 years. The EU was one of the principal partners shaping the conference and committing to the implementation of the new framework.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Europa Nu (2017): The European Union steps up its support to Somalia with EUR 200 million at the London Conference. Available at: https://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vke4ffzo6lz9/nieuws/the_european_union_steps_up_its_support.

Lessons learnt at sector level, including for interventions implemented for several years, have been collected with some success and fed into the MIP programme 2021 to 2027. Though learning under macro-area III was elusive due to many small-scale interventions. (I3.2.4)

The above mentioned TPME facility was described as crucial for the work of the EUD and to inform learning processes, though it was indispensable to triangulate information from multiple sources on a daily basis. Over the years, according to another EU official, the programmes were formulated with an increasing level of flexibility to allow for adjustments in line with the evolving context. The complementary funding via the EUTF as of 2017/2018 allowed for this to happen and several cases testify this finding. One useful example to highlight the extent to which the EU has revised its strategic approach to a sector comes from the JPP. Originally, roughly between 2015 and 2018, the EU financed the payment of stipends to the police which was linked to the support for reforms in the governance and security sector at the central level. As of 2018, with the new EUTF funding, a more ambitious and comprehensive engagement was started. The new approach set out a path to support the FGS and, complementary to that, to support the FMS as well. This revision was informed by the EU's learning and assessment of contextual changes taking place in Somalia leading to this repositioning. Another example of the evolving flexibility is reported from the resilience domain, from the EUTF co-funded project on "Innovative durable solutions for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees in Mogadishu through enhanced governance, employment and access to basic and protective services (T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-03-4.3)." According to an external end-term project evaluation, the EU played a central role. It allowed flexibility to be built into the project design, which in turn enhanced responsiveness to the priorities of the beneficiary communities. The Action Document for the EUTF funded engagement via the UN MPTF in the justice system states a number of implementation issues to be remedied, including the streamlining and simplification of governance and decision making, a more effective balancing and allocation of financial resources for service delivery, etc. Concerning PFM, the MTR of the EUTF stated that the EUD has shown flexibility to respond to changes which was partly reflected in the number of addenda to the Financing Agreement for the budget support. And the Somalia ESDP evaluation found that the Horumarinta Elmiga III (ESDP III) was based on various learnings from the previous phase (Horumarinta Elmiga II). Interviews also confirmed that the EUD and headquarters generate and absorb lessons by commissioning and consulting think tanks to provide reflective inputs, for example via the research facility of the EUTF implemented by the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. Findings from macro-area III, however, highlight that the implementation of multiple small-scale projects and lack of coordination mechanisms have contributed to a rather siloed approach with little opportunity to learn or to build on lessons learned across different sections. EU officials outlined the need to better capture how joint internal efforts can contribute to mutually leveraged sectoral outcomes.

3.4 EQ4 – Synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors

<p>To what extent has EU support been complementary with other dimensions of EU external action in Somalia and has added value to the support provided by EU MS and other donors?</p>	
<p>Summary answer to the Evaluation Question</p>	
<p>Across the sources consulted, there is agreement that the promotion of an EU integrated approach for Somalia is necessary and that this approach has led to better internal collaboration and better results. There is also a shared understanding among all EU stakeholders about the problems at hand and the priority actions that need to be taken. Experiences in promoting this integrated approach have overall been positive. EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI and the EUD have worked very closely together since the introduction of the integrated approach, during strategic exchanges as well as programming. The collaboration between the political and the cooperation sections of the EUD was described as greatly positive and productive. Relations with ECHO have developed today into a very constructive collaboration with regular and meaningful exchanges, as highlighted under EQ2. Publicly available studies from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute critically report about CSDP missions (which are not part of this evaluation, but which the EUD collaborates with in the security sector), as their mandates shape a different understanding about priorities and how to address them. Evidence of functioning coordination mechanisms and exchange resulting in joint action among EU institutions is strong. Since the last two years, more regular exchanges with staff from CSDP missions take place which was lacking during the other years of the evaluation period. Problematic are the high turnover of EUTM staff and the unfilled positions in the EUD's political section over the last year, including the military and police positions (the first is vacant since 2022, the latter was filled until 2020 but does not exist anymore). Both cause pressures on EUD cooperation staff as time and energy needs to be spread over too many areas. The risk of duplication among EU services is recognised and acted upon today, in particular with regard to the work of FPI and ECHO, but this has mostly</p>	

not been the case during the earlier years of the evaluation period (before 2018/2019) when interventions in sectors such as education or security happened rather in parallel.

The EUD support clearly complemented the work of EU MS and other international partners. There is policy coherence and a division of labour along major sectoral engagements, such as education, PFM, governance and security, also with regard to the different regions of Somalia. But there is no joint programming. Division of labour is less evident concerning macro-area III (resilience and economic development) especially during the 2014-2017 period. Coordination is today overall good, although the EU comparatively deals more with the WB, UK, USA and the UN than with EU MS due to the nature of the portfolio. In the cooperation with other actors, high attention was given to pressing issues like peace and security, political matters and governance. In comparison, private sector development received less attention but EU/EU MS coordination and joint action in this sector has taken off and, most recently in November 2022, translated into the creation of the “EU-Somali Investment and Trade Platform” which is in its inception phase at the time of writing. In the political domain, which equally informs the EU’s international cooperation, finding an agreement between different EU institutional actors and EU/MS on how to deal with the political impasse under the Farmajo regime took too long. The promotion and planning for TEI guided interventions for the MIP (2021-2027) and has created an additional momentum to the EU/EU MS collaboration but it is too early to see the effects resulting from the TEI for Somalia. The EU’s interventions in PFM, education, security (support to institutions and security forces), governance and to some extent the international support to constitutional reform/political processes created synergies with the support of other international actors. Most of these were shaped with the interventions of non-EU partners (WB, UK, USA, UN, and to a lesser extent with Norway) and with some EU MS (Sweden and Germany, and to a lesser extent with Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands). The EU’s scale of support (including financing) and the type of its support (strong focus at the macro-reform domains and statebuilding) created an added value and benefits to what EU MS could have realised on their own over the entire evaluation period. There were no synergies noted with the engagements of Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, China, Egypt or other so-called non-traditional international partners of Somalia though limited exchanges took place with Turkey and the UAE in the security sector.

In terms of visibility and image of the EU in Somalia, the EU is perceived overall as a good friend in Somalia among state and civil society representatives, albeit with some deviations (Turkey’s role and way of engagement appears to be more appreciated by officials working in the FGS compared to the EU and other traditional international partners). The EU’s visibility was promoted by the EUD and adapted to context and there is good evidence that project implementers followed the EU visibility guidelines and shared information about their activities during a multitude of media channels and meetings. General budget support helped to create this positive image of the EU among government and civil society leaders because it communicated trust in Somali capacities to deal with such funding by their own institutions. But it did not add much to the visibility of the EU among the broader public. The evaluation also found that UN partners did not adequately credit the EU’s support and that the EUD did not have enough capacity to counter this via a strong communication department. The participation of EUD and other EU staff in coordination was constructive and adding value, but several development and humanitarian partners would have appreciated a stronger technical presence. However, the comparatively limited number of EUD staff did not allow for this, as mentioned under EQ3.

3.4.1 Arrangements are in place to ensure the application of the EU’s integrated approach between the EU development cooperation and other EU services, including DG ECHO, the EUSR and CSDP missions (JC4.1)

There is today an overall good understanding between the EU’s development cooperation and other EU services about country priorities and how to address them. This joint understanding was gradually shaped over the years thanks to the EU’s introduction and promotion of the integrated approach as of 2017/2018. But the path to reach this point has been somewhat bumpy during the first part of the evaluation period (I4.1.1)

Today’s understanding between the EU’s development cooperation and other EU services about country priorities and how to respond to them has clearly improved. But, according to interviewees, there is still a lot to be done in terms of understanding and agreeing on the outcomes and impact to be achieved collectively. The understanding is shaped ongoing via regular knowledge exchanges during which staff from the EUD, FPI, DG INTPA and the EEAS participate (mostly via video conference) and missions. External expertise is mobilised to feed this exchange. Cooperation between the EUD’s cooperation section and the political section, the EEAS and DG INTPA was described as highly positive during the years 2018 to 2019 already, an asset which is as much valid today. In view of little guidance obtained from headquarters on the integrated approach as of 2017 (and mentioned above, JC2.1), the different EU actors got together at field level and shaped a path of interaction and cooperation via intense exchanges and trust building, as EU officials remembered. Today, the joint understanding between the EUD and FPI on how to approach stabilisation is particularly good and

the understanding about ECHO's mandate has been shaped via regular exchanges. These exchanges also take place with EU military actors fielded via CSDP missions but guidance on how to collaborate needs to be updated as the evaluation team was made aware. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) Somalia Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines date back to 2014 and do not – for example – cover guidance on the interaction with the Somali National Armed Force (SNAF).⁴⁸ There is also a common understanding about country priorities between EU services, including CSDP missions, but complementarity of actions with EUCAP and EUTM were suboptimal as further presented below.

This overall positive assessment of the EU's development cooperation with other EU services and missions concerning country priorities and how to address them has come a long way. The collaboration between the EUD and EUCAP has improved with the placement of an EUCAP liaison officer within the EUD in Mogadishu, as of 2020. An overall joint understanding approach between the EUD and ECHO was also difficult to reach in the past. Today, there are still open questions on how to interact during engagements concerning stabilisation while humanitarian needs are high. Those are generally dealt with on a case-by-case basis, as implementing partners of stabilisation projects explained, based on an understanding that they have to move into such areas first and once the SNAF has cleared these areas and controls them, invite humanitarian actors to follow. The understanding about the mandate of humanitarian actors has clearly improved, though certain actors, including representatives from the AU, the military, and also EU MS, need to be reminded regularly that humanitarian assistance cannot be confused with stabilisation efforts. To further enhance the understanding between the EUD and ECHO at field level, as one EU official suggested, ECHO should participate in EUD staff meetings – similar to the EUCAP liaison officer who now joins these meetings.

Coordination mechanisms are in place to ensure complementarity of analysis and joint action though these are hampered by different mandates and institutional bottlenecks, including high rotation of staff and gaps in replacing them. (I4.1.2)

Regular and good mechanisms for coordination are today in place between different EU services at headquarter levels and at field level between the EUD, ECHO and the CSDP missions. Coordination and collaboration with FPI, in particular with regard to projects in support of stabilisation and governance, was also reported as very intense and good. In the domain of PFM coordination and knowledge management, problems were mentioned in the period 2014/2015 (coordination mechanisms did not work well and the multi-partner fund produced high quality knowledge products, but those were not always shared in time, thereby shaping a disconnect from planning and (strategic) decision making). But the MTR of the EUTF-funded budget support found evidence of regular dialogue and discussion between the EU, EU MS and the wider donor community, though arguably more often through personal relations and informal exchanges than via formal fora. The Somalia Rule of Law evaluation (2021) commented that programme interventions have a successful record of coordination with a multitude of significant actors, including the three CSDP missions/operation.

While a broadly positive relationship has developed between the EUD and the CSDP missions over the years there is scope to further improve coordination and complementarity of action in the security sector. Despite the "EU-wide Strategic Framework to support the Security Sector Reform" (EU SSR policy)⁴⁹ that provides practical solutions aiming at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU's engagement in the security sector, and the 2020 specific guidance for the analysis of the security sector (developed by the EU Inter-service SSR task force)⁵⁰, the EUD has not been able to develop an overall "EU" logic of engagement in the security sector in Somalia. A comprehensive review undertaken by EU headquarters on existing and potential new opportunities of engagement in the defence and police sectors (including maritime security) was finalised early 2022. It concluded that there are competing objectives pursued between the EUD and CSDP missions, leading to incoherence. Different opinions, for instance, prevailed regarding support to Daraawiish Police Forces at FGS and FMS levels; the limitation of deployment of missions would prevent ability to monitor trained troops afterwards. The high turnover of missions' personnel was also identified as preventing an in-depth understanding of the country situation, the EUD functioning, nor its development cooperation, which hinders joint understanding, coordination and collaboration. This puts additional workload on EUD staff.


Good coordination exists between the EUD and EUCAP regarding the JPP, but support approaches for the justice sector differ. While EUCAP focuses on the drafting of legal reform articles, the EUD focuses on bringing legal services to the people – funded under the JJP. Meanwhile, in the spirit of the integrated approach, the EU has been providing a comprehensive train and equip approach for the SNAF. This is complemented with support provided via different funding as explained before. Figure 8 summarises the EU's comprehensive integrated approach to peace and security in Somalia.

⁴⁸ African Union (2014): Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines for Humanitarian Actors Engagement with AMISOM. 24 November 2014.

⁴⁹ EU (2016): Council conclusions on EU-wide strategic framework to support Security Sector Reform (SSR) - (13998/16).

⁵⁰ The EU Inter-service SSR task force is composed by relevant services of the EEAS, INTPA, NEAR and FPI.

Figure 8 EU's Integrated Approach to Peace and Security in Somalia



Source: DG INTPA. NB (*): Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), EUTF, EDF, NDICI-GE, African Peace Facility (APF), EPF.

Today, the EU's development cooperation efforts strongly support and complement the cooperation and joint action with other EU services, FPI and ECHO in particular, but shortage of EUD political and military staff puts additional workload on EUD cooperation staff impacting negatively on the extent to which EU development cooperation projects can be implemented. (I4.1.3)

The integrated approach is translated to the implementation level, as highlighted in several project related documents. This has, for example, been the case for an EIDHR project (on enhancing the role of Non-State Actors (NSAs) in monitoring human rights delivery within the criminal justice system) where complementarity was sought with interventions implemented via FPI and DG ECHO, but also EUCAP. Another evidence originates from the Saferworld-implemented strengthening of NSA platforms to promote decision-making on peace, security and development which was partially linked to an EU funded project on elections in 2016/2017. In the education domain, Horumarinta Elmiga Education II and III (part of the Education-SWAP) was complemented by an EU-funded regional protection programme (implemented via the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR) and an ECHO-funded support to IDPs and refugee camps, which invested in school construction among several other support areas.

Interactions between DG INTPA, the EUD and ECHO are regular, very constructive and in search of complementary. The EU's recent evaluation of humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa⁵¹ found that "fault lines exist between development and humanitarian assistance, making joint programming towards a nexus complicated at operational level." However, there is a potential at the EU level to work together for better bridging programmes to create resilience. The evaluation notes that ECHO's framework is aligned with DG INTPA's multi-year projects within the education in emergency sector, with complementarities through strong child protection and displacement foci, and with those of other international actors. In terms of the humanitarian-development nexus and in the content domain called "durable solutions" by the EUD, ECHO and DG INTPA support the development of social safety net mechanisms via short-term cash-transfers, DG INTPA plans to pick this up via long-term support once ECHO has to exit.⁵² Complementarity is principally shaped at the strategic level but more could be done operationally on a day-to-day basis, for example to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian assistance and education, as commented by EU officials.

Most recently, as per Council Decision, EUTM Somalia has been assigned, among others, to provide support to EU operations in the security and defence area in Somalia, including the EEAS and EU MS.⁵³ While this is

⁵¹ European Commission (2022): Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the International Committee of the Red Cross. Final Report. September 2022.

⁵² Due to the current humanitarian crisis in the country, plans on how to transfer from ECHO to DG INTPA are on halt. In the meantime, the EUD aims to support FGS to enhance its capacity to deal with drought/ emergency via funding from the RESTORE and RE-INTEG interventions.

⁵³ European Union (2022): Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/2443 of 12 December 2022, amending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali Armed Forces.

an important step to solidify the integrated approach in Somalia, and to some extent offsets the CSDP mission lead's accountability requirements (they do not report to the HoD, but to the Council), this does not compensate for the absence of a long-term EU military attaché in the EUD (as well as the cancelling of the EUD police attaché position). This absence has put a considerable additional workload on one EUD staff dealing with the defence sector, as different EUD staff members described. Half the time of two EUD staff members who deals with the overall security sector has to be spent on coordinating with EUCAP and EUTM in the absence of EU military and police attachés. Moreover, attention of the EUD's political staff is drawn towards the security sector at the expense of attention on governance and constitutional/political issues. And a senior official of the FGS, noting the absence of an EU military attaché, commented that the EUTM's short term deployment does not really help because the limited knowledge of the country's political context does not allow to fully inform the EUD's policy dialogue with the FGS. Experiences with the EU military attachés since 2019 were described as highly positive in this regard.

Cooperation and complementarity are also sought between the EU's regional support and the EUSR (see also JC2.2). The EUSR's job is to produce analysis on the region, to see – for example – what Somalia exports in terms of potential threats and what is imported in this regard into Somalia. Exchanges are principally informal but both, the EUSR's office and the EUD, are structurally understaffed to cooperate more intensely. There is scope for more complementarity, according to findings, but it depends to what extent the EUSR's work will be connected to the political work of the EUD. The EU's DG for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) has been invited to the EU's Somalia coordination meetings because there are possibilities to connect on engagements relating to 'Blue Economy' and the new FGS' interest in illegal fishing. The current position of DG MARE is to not further engage with Somalia until commitment in fighting Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing is actively demonstrated.

There is currently a good understanding between the EU's development cooperation and other EU services of potential areas of duplication and how to avoid them. (I4.1.4)

There is an awareness of the risk of duplication between EU services and missions, as well as with regard to the combined EU engagement vis-à-vis other international actors. This is for example mentioned in a report of an IcSP support to the Somalia security architecture (2015/2016) which mentions risks of duplication of efforts undertaken by the EU/FPI, EUCAP and efforts led by the USA, UK and Turkey. Concerns exist also regarding possible duplications between the EU's development cooperation support and the engagements by FPI and ECHO. At times, lines are blurred, as one interviewee mentioned, between what is "live saving" and what is "development" (EU cooperation/ECHO) and what areas FPI should support which – by way of FPI's mandate – can be rather fluid. At times, the dividing lines between these activities also appear rather theoretical. As for possible overlaps with FPI, the EUD and FPI recently agreed to refocus FPI's attention on complementing EUD's interventions in peacebuilding and reconciliation. Earlier on, there were overlaps, as FPI and the EUD engaged with the same organisations and people in parallel. Awareness about possible duplication is also noted from the collaboration between the EUD and ECHO, presented above. And the Somalia RoL evaluation underlines that the EUTM was an entity which provided valuable advice on military issues to the EUD and implementers of stabilisation interventions. This was in line with the integrated and coordinated approach for which the EUD uses EDF funding for capacity building/training and equipment in support of the SSR while exchanging with the EUTM and EUCAP on a regular basis.

Finally, in terms of collaboration between the EU's development cooperation and other EU services, the EUD engaged as of 2018/2019 with European Development Financial Institutions (DFI), including the European Investment Bank (EIB). A DFI roadmap was prepared in 2020 and a first ever mission of the EIB to Mogadishu and Hargeisa was organised in 2022 which the EUD facilitated – thereby also responding to strong Somali government and non-government actors' wishes to gradually move away from the current grant-based development support of international cooperation. Thanks to the EU contribution to the Investment Fund for Developing Countries (IFU, Denmark), the IFU has become the main investment fund in Somalia, joining forces with the Norwegian Investment Fund for developing countries (NORFUND) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) which are also funding this innovative small and medium-sized enterprises financing vehicle. In addition, the EU is funding other (smaller) projects to facilitate inclusive finance and address structural weaknesses in the financial sector at national and regional level. Though conditions to massively engage via DFI's are limited due the absence of some considerably basic conditions, such as an off-limit banking system due to Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism.

3.4.2 EU support and the actions of EU MS and other donors complemented and reinforced each other (JC4.2)

Overall, the EU's cooperation policy and analysis vis-à-vis Somalia and its situation is coherent with those of EU MS. (I4.2.1) The degree of complementarity, coordination and division of labour in response to country priorities between DG INTPA/EEAS and EU MS is high, though more limited compared to the EU's cooperation with non-EU actors from the international community. (I4.2.3)

The overall EU development policy vis-à-vis Somalia is largely coherent with the policies of EU MS (and other international partners, as further presented below). The coherence dates back to the formulation of the Somali Compact (2013) and the Mutual Accountability Framework, which was agreed during the London Somalia Conference 2017 (see also EQ1). The EU's spending (EUR 1 617 million), compared to the spending of EU MS is significant as highlighted in Figure 10, further below. The most important EU MS supporting Somalia are Germany (EUR 1 006 million) and Sweden (EUR 639 million) for the same period, 2014 to 2021.

In terms of EU/EU MS joint analysis, coordination and collaboration, the EU works closely with those EU MS active in Somalia, though to various degrees. This has not always been the case as one former EUD staff member recalls. During 2014 to 2016/2017, the EU MS did not share any information with the EU making coordination difficult. This changed as of 2017/2018 when coordination started to improve. Today, broader level EU/EU MS coordination is shaped via regular HoD and Head of Cooperation meetings. Collaboration was described as close with Denmark, Sweden (with its strong focus on governance), Finland and Germany in the domain of governance; with Germany and Finland in the education sector; with the Dutch in the justice sector; and with Germany, and to some extent with Italy, on security. Italy is the only EU MS with an embassy in the MIA area, while other EU MS, such as Sweden, are now more regularly present (by co-locating its offices in the EUD compound). Sweden, Italy, Germany (KfW) and to some extent the Dutch were mentioned as relevant donors for the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (next to several non-EU funders; FAO is the biggest implementer in agriculture, livestock, fisheries and water). Concerning support to governance and electoral oversight in Puntland and Somaliland, Sweden leads on Puntland and the EU leads on Somaliland.

In terms of joint analysis, there is broad agreement about the overall situation of Somalia and what needs to be undertaken, but views can differ if key strategic decisions need to be taken. This happened in the context of discussions on postponing or continuing with the provision budget support (see JC2.1). From the EU MS' side, an opinion was shared that the EU should have reacted earlier to the policies implemented under the Farmajo Government. But EU and EU MS were not capable to do so, because it took a long time to align different views. In terms of interacting at the political level with the FGS, another EU MS representative criticised that relations are principally siloed and that there are no coordinated EU/EU MS positions, for example in the so-called C6+ group in which core security partners, plus Italy and Germany are represented.

More generally concerning the support provided to Somalia, there appears to be a certain fatigue among some EU MS vis-à-vis their further interest in investing in Somalia. Some, like France, have already taken steps back, others do not know yet whether they will stay, and some do not want to pull out – an issue that needs to be figured into the future EU planning for Somalia, as one EUD staff member communicated to the evaluation team. The UK, separating its support to Somalia from the EU as of 2016, is now also reducing its support to Somalia drastically – by some 50 per cent, as communicated informally. Different EU stakeholders commented that the UK's departure from the EU is felt politically, as the EU has no member any more who was leading on the definition of policies and strategies vis-à-vis Somalia (with reference to the budget support issue, mentioned above). All those interviewed acknowledge that the EUD has lost its closest ally in the EU context, thereby creating some distance because the UK is not part of any EU/Head of Missions' meetings any more. Yet it was noted by several interviewees, that there is still a remarkably close collaboration with the UK and other international partners in key domains, including PFM, peace and security, constitutional reform and rule of law which was described as excellent.

While EU staff members described their interaction on development cooperation with EU MS as intense with regular meetings, comments received from EU MS representatives suggest that there is room for some improvement. Two interviewees expressed the view that the EU's political coordination with EU MS can be improved, referring to other countries where the EU and EU MS work together. It was also felt that the EUD tends to work comparatively more with the USA, UK and WB than with EU MS. There is a regular coordination with EU MS via multiple coordination mechanisms, either via dedicated EU/EU MS working groups, via bi-lateral meeting formats or as part of wider groups and sub-groups, such as the WB MPF donor advisory group. Exchanges on private sector development take place in the context of other coordination formats but could benefit from a dedicated EU/EU MS working group in view of the increasing attention this-sector enjoys - among others via the TEI⁵⁴ on the Green Deal which has triggered a more intense interaction with EU MS as commented during interviews. Different EU MS are active from different entry points, e.g., Sweden, which leads of World Trade Organisation (WTO) matters; Denmark works with the IFU; Germany via TVET; the Netherlands support youth entrepreneurship, and Italy is active in fisheries and agribusiness. A more specific coordination mechanism between these EU MS and the EUD was absent though several other fora were used to discuss and agree on private sector related matters. The TEI⁵⁵ also helped to trigger a more intense interaction with EU MS, as observed by EUD staff members, benefitting also the productive domains. In

⁵⁴ EC (2022): Green Deal Somalia: Climate Action through Clean Energy Initiatives and Climate-resilient Economy. Available at: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/tei/somalia-green-deal>.

⁵⁵ EC (2022): Green Deal Somalia: Climate Action through Clean Energy Initiatives and Climate-resilient Economy. Available at: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/tei-jp-tracker/tei/somalia-green-deal>.

November 2022, an “EU-Somali Investment and Trade Platform” was set up signalling the increasing importance given to the development of the private sector. This platform is still in its inception phase but it provides for a place to engage more jointly and more structurally in this domain.

This TEI is on clean energy and climate resilience economy. It is ongoing and supported by Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and Italy with some engagement by the EIB and KfW. The TEI intends to support sectoral governance, private sector development, TVET, natural resources management, and disaster management, all fitting under the Europe-Africa Green Energy Initiative, the Great Green Wall and the Global Gateway. Regarding private sector development, plans will match with Somalia officials’ expectations to further stimulate the economic potentials of the country. According to a recent interview with the new President,⁵⁶ this domain needs to be given more priority so that Somalia is not only seen as a country of never-ending conflict and crisis but also as a country with opportunities. This message which was also shared during several interviews with FGS officials on the EU’s engagements in the financial sector and the private sector.

Overall, the EU’s cooperation policy and analysis vis-à-vis Somalia and its situation is coherent with those of non-EU actors from the international community. However, differences exist with other non-EU actors, notably Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, China and UAE. (I4.2.2) The degree of complementarity, coordination and division of labour in response to country priorities between DG INTPA/EEAS and non-EU actors from the international community, in particular the WB, UK, UN and IMF, is high. (I4.2.4)

The overall EU development policy vis-à-vis Somalia is largely coherent with the policies of the traditional non-EU donors, i.e., UK, USA, UN, Norway, Switzerland and WB. In term of amounts spent, the EU institutions were the third funder of Somalia for the period 2014 to 2021 (see Figure 10) following the USA and UK. EU institutions plus EU MS supporting Somalia clearly surpassed the USA’s spending for the same period (see Figure 9). Turkey, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt and China also provide support, but this is not coordinated with other international donors. Their cooperation model with Somalia is principally bilateral and working with them was described as difficult by EU stakeholders. More recently, however, Turkey and UAE joined a new security sector coordination group in which the USA, UK, and EU are represented, but the UAE’s presence in Somalia was qualified by FGS officials as extremely limited. The EU coordinates its position vis-à-vis Somalia at high-level exchanges such as more lately during the meeting on HIPC Completion Point in Washington (see JC 2.3) in which the EU participated. The EU was also consulted for decisions on Somalia in the context of the UN, for example on the arms embargo where the traditional international partners of Somalia (USA, UK, France, Switzerland, Japan) voted coherently.⁵⁷


Coordination, collaboration and division of labour between the EU, some EU MS, non-EU bilateral funders (Norway, UK, Switzerland, USA), the UN and the WB has been intense around a number of macro-reform issues. Core partners in the “inclusive politics” domain (i.e., support to an all-Somalia inclusive and sustainable political settlement via constitutional agreement which also includes parliament and elections) were Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland, Germany, UK and the USA. Debates and analysis around this domain among international partners have shaped the programmes which the UN then formulated. The EU has also worked very closely with the WB and the IMF around the HIPC/debt relief initiative which was linked to the successful conclusion of the elections (see JC 2.1). This combined international coordination contributed to the resignation of the Farmajo Government and the election of a new President in May 2022. The MTR of the EUTF (2020) also found that there is strong coherence between the EU and IMF/WB through the link between the EU’s budget support and the HIPC process.

Different interviewees mentioned that coordination and collaboration with the UN (UNDP and FAO) and the WB was already strong between 2014 and 2018 and enabled the EU to enter into different sectors via smaller projects. Also, the EU’s coordination with the UN and the AU in the context of the support provided to AMISOM was qualified as positive. But, as one former UN partner of the EU described it, the UN was not able to manage the development support provided properly (until 2021) which put off several donors and has led to international disengagements in the UN’s MPTF, also by the EU in selected areas. According to several EU stakeholders as well as implementing partners, UNDP did not work as expected, structures were perceived as heavy, managed from far away and were only slowly adapting to the situation on the ground.

⁵⁶ The Guardian (2022): Somalia is not just a story of violence and state failure. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/commentisfree/2022/dec/09/somalia-is-not-a-single-story-of-violence-and-state-failure-focus-on-our-strengths>.


⁵⁷ To enforce the arms embargo on Somalia, the Security Council decided to reauthorize maritime interdiction of illicit weapons imports, charcoal exports, and improvised explosive device components. By 11 votes in favour, 4 abstentions (China, Russian Federation, Gabon and Ghana). United Nations (2022): Adoption of Resolution 2662 (2022) of Security Council Sanctions Regime on Somalia. <https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15110.doc.htm>.

Figure 9 Top Donors of Gross Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Somalia (EUR million) – 2014 to 2021



Source: OECD (2023), Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2023: Disbursements, Commitments, Country Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/12757fab-en-fr>.

Figure 10 Total contributions by donor 2014 to 2021 (EUR million)



Source: OECD (2023), Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 2023: Disbursements,

Commitments, Country Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/12757fab-en-fr>.

A number of synergies were created between the EU's support and the interventions of EU MS (I4.2.5). Evidence concerning synergies is strong concerning the EU's support and linkages made with interventions funded by traditional non-EU donors of the international community. There were no synergies noted with the engagements of the so-called non-traditional international partners of Somalia. (I4.2.6)

Many sectors get support from EU MS as well as non-EU partners making it difficult to separate synergies created by EU MS and by non-EU funders when collaborating in areas supported by the EU. As such, synergies are presented per support area. Synergies created with engagements funded by EU MS have overall been more limited compared to synergies created with non-EU partners. This stems principally from the EU's engagement in big reform—trajectories - in particular, PFM and security and the macro-level constitutional reform and policy discussions and the education sector - where EU MS are less active. Coordination and collaboration were described as intense for the JJP and the JPP, both supported by the EU, several EU MS and non-EU funders. The latter programme has become an important forum for coordination and the identification of demands expressed by FGS and FMS. The MTR of the EUTF qualified the JPP as the best example of coordination whereby UNOPS is managing funding from EUTF, UK and Germany, and where quarterly meetings take place with FGS and FMS security ministers. It was described as a highly unique and constructive coordination forum. Stakeholders interviewed perceived these meetings more effective than the broader Common Approach to Security meetings with its various strands and the multitude of complementary formal and informal coordination meetings in the security sector. In PFM, synergies are also strong given the coordination between the WB and IMF to push forward the HIPC completion process and the delegated funding from the EU to the FCDO CRATES / PREMIS project. There were no synergies noted with the engagements of Turkey, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, China, Egypt and other international partners of Somalia.

Aside the funding of other big initiatives, such as the UN's Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) or the WB MPF which the EU and various EU MS contribute to, there are some examples of synergies created, though to varying degrees. In the rule of law domain, the funding of INGOs from the EU and EU MS (Denmark and Netherlands) complemented each other. Here, CARE forged partnerships with Saferworld, Oxfam Novib, Diakonia and UNDP in the context of a CSO-LA-funded intervention to strengthen the interaction between CSOs and the public sector (2015/2016). Activities implemented under the BRIDGES projects (on resilience) showed close links with the German Development Cooperation Agency (GIZ) implemented TVET and road maintenance project but further evidence of collaboration and the creation of synergies in this domain is limited. In the past, an IcSP-funded support to youth employment and peacebuilding showed a lack of coordination with other organisations active on TVET, according to a TPME report from 2016. More generally, synergies are sought after where possible – also in the steering of sectors such as via the joint EU-FCDO co-chairing of the displacement working group. The evaluation of the SESSP (2021) was critical on coordination and complementarity (the EU funds 90 per cent of the Horumarinta Elmiga III intervention) because of limited coordination among education donors. As many were new, collaboration appeared fragmented. This contrasts the evaluation's findings where clear synergies were found between the EU's support to the sector (via projects funding the education-SWAP and budget support), its managing role of the Global Partnership for Education, its collaboration with FCDO's Girls Challenge Fund and with USAID, the second major supporter of the education sector.

Considering the scale and type of EU engagement in Somalia, the EU support provided added value and benefits to what would have resulted from actions taken by EU MS on their own. (I4.2.7)

The EU's added value in engaging with a multitude of partners in Somalia is not questioned and findings suggest that the EU is well appreciated for the support it provides. Its added value compared to the EU MS engagements is demonstrated by the scale and longevity of the support it is able to provide, the predictability of its funding, the risks it can take – such as the provision of budget support highlights – the weight it has in high-level political and policy related processes and the lead it is able to take in some areas. The education sector is one example, but the EU is also strong on PFM and governance. Beyond that, the EU is able to maintain a (very costly) embassy in the Mogadishu International Airport area (Italy is the only EU MS which has a permanent embassy in this area) and can run an air-shuttle service which connects Mogadishu very regularly with Nairobi, Garowe (Puntland), Hargeisa (Somaliland) and other locations in Somalia. Answers to the eSurvey confirm these findings.

3.4.3 EU support has strengthened coordination among key stakeholders and EU visibility in Somalia (JC4.3)

EU participation in coordination fora was noted by development and humanitarian partners as constructive and adding value, also regarding policy dialogue, but the comparatively limited number of EUD staff did not allow to follow all relevant working groups and sector processes adequately. (I4.3.1)

The EU's participation in coordination fora is regarded as selective in some areas falling under the governance I cluster of this evaluation. Interviewees observed that the main attention of the EUD under this cluster is devoted to peace and security. But wherever the EU engaged in coordination, its participation was referred to as very welcome, regular and constructive. It was noted that the EU made contributions during various meetings and policy dialogue fora in the area of statebuilding, security, education and building system capacity based on their global experience. And international partners stated that the EU was a particularly useful partner at the technical level regarding macro-reform issues based on their strong expertise.

And from desk research, there is some evidence that the EU's participation in coordination fora or public events was appreciated. One example was noted from the EIDHR funded intervention to support the ending of violence against women and children in South Central Somalia and Puntland. The EU ambassador attended a session on the occasion of the International Women's Day Celebration 2016 to initiate discussions on the relevant regional and international treaties in relation to Somalia and the observation of the 2016 elections (stated in the Final Project Report, 2019). These varying findings are also reflected in replies to the eSurvey where respondents commented that the EU's participation in coordination forums contributed only "to some extent" to improved policy dialogue between the EU and the FGS while others expressed appreciation for the EU's contributions leading to improved implementation of actions in Somalia.

The EU's visibility was promoted by the EUD and adapted to context. Nonetheless, several interviewees mentioned that the degree and quality of the EU's visibility was inadequate in view of the EU's significant role in Somalia and that UN partners did not adequately credit it, in particular. (I4.3.2) The provision of budget support did not add much to the visibility of the EU among the broader public. (I4.3.3)

Interviewees from the EUD, international partners and government were rather critical about the EU's visibility and that it required a lot more attention.⁵⁸ While there is widespread appreciation for the EU's engagement and investments, the EUD itself was not strong in promoting what the EU was doing. Comments received also noted that the EU could be more strategic in its communication towards government, partners and the wider public, also to counter growing disinformation and fake news about the EU on social media. Visibility did contribute to awareness raising about the EU's role among implementing partners and their associates. In the case of the Horumarinta Elmiga III education intervention, for example, a TPME report finds that the EU is well recognised as the project donor and held in high regard by different regional stakeholders. However – as stated in one case (the 'Improving genetic quality of seeds in Somalia – Somaseed' project) – it was reported that the majority of the beneficiaries were unaware of the EU's involvement and believed that the implementer (FAO) and to some extent the Ministry of Agriculture were the donors of the project. The latter appears to be a broader problem. Several interviewees were extremely critical about other UN partners the EU works with. While references to the EU's support are noted in public, for example when new projects are started and the media covers it, the EU engagement is often overshadowed by implementing actors from the UN family who do not credit the EU's financial support appropriately, or not at all. Stakeholders from the FGS commented that the visibility of the EU is overall low and the UN profits from it.

There is evidence, however, that projects – overall – made efforts to take visibility on board and that visibility was not dogmatically approached. It was adapted to context and according to the orientations provided. In the case of a civil society and media support project, for example (as reported in an interim narrative report in 2021) a report was not published on the DG DEVCO (now DG INTPA) website due to security concerns. An IcSP-funded stabilisation support project implemented in 2018/2019 in South Central Somalia followed a low visibility policy throughout the project stages due to concerns the project identity could be wrongly perceived as non-Somali by the general population. And a CSO which had received EU funding to promote human rights was glad about the EU's understanding that a strong referencing to the EU might work against their engagement because this might be perceived as 'westernised' and not going down well with the authorities. There was only one example found, where a communication and visibility plan got only partially implemented. This was the case for an EUTF funded project to promote innovative and durable solutions for IDPs and returnees in Mogadishu. The TPME report for this intervention found no evidence that e-bulletin newsletters, joint press releases and quarterly case studies were compiled.

The provision of the budget support has shaped additional visibility of the EU's support among Somali decision makers and senior staff members of FGS, international partners operating in Somalia and informed national stakeholders – such as advisors to ministries, members of think tanks or leaders of civil society platforms – but has not translated into additional EU visibility among the larger public according to the evaluation team's observations.

⁵⁸ There is a slot for a local communication officer, but the salary scale the EU can offer has not attracted the right candidates so far. Given the complex context the EUD would need a full communication officer, plus a local assistant according to the EUD staff member.

Perceptions about the EU and its functioning in Somalia among state and civil society stakeholders is mostly positive, though with some exceptions. (I4.3.4)

According to the specific eSurvey for this evaluation, the overall perception of the EU in Somalia is positive. The EU has been crucial in tackling socio economic, humanitarian and security challenges, it ensured a degree of stability and actively responded to the changing priority needs of government institutions and local communities. The EU has also helped build state capacity, in particular the capacities of FGS and ministries through support on policy formulation and legislation development. Moreover, the EU has played an important role in the introduction of gender-related policies. However, some respondents noticed that *“despite important progress through years of international assistance around counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, humanitarian efforts, and statebuilding, peace and stability remain elusive in Somalia”* (CSO respondent). Responses from IDPs in Mogadishu show that efforts were made to assist and that this was well appreciated by beneficiaries, but the needs are enormous making it impossible to respond to all expectations.

This broadly positive picture about the EU was reflected during interviews with stakeholders from civil society in Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland, including think tanks (*“EU is seen as a friend;” “EU seen more as a benevolent and neutral player, not like the USA;” “EU is taking a big role in supporting the promotion of governance via civil society organisations;” “project interventions helped to address basic needs;” “unemployed youth living in IDP camps were assisted”*); but a couple of critical comments were shared deserving attention. There are those who would expect from the EU a more proactive engagement in Somalia (*“EU should pressure for more reforms and work more via conditionality;” “EU provides big money but which is not accounted for by FGS;” “EU should hold FGS more accountable to counter corruption”*) and those who see that the EU is present in many areas but that this is not communicated well (*“the EU consists of many organisations which is complex and to some extent confusing;” “there is a need for an EU spokesperson who can talk with authority about what the EU is doing”*). The EU was also critically compared to other international partners, Turkey and Qatar in particular. Both countries *“have a different cooperation method: their primary partner is the Somalia government contrary to the EU, which works via other organisations, like the UN or INGOs”*, as one FGS interviewee noted, and a Somali member of civil society commented that *“the EU has much less relationships with society in Somalia contrary to Turkey, whose nationals are present in Mogadishu town and who connect culturally – for example by celebrating Eid together with Somali people”*.

To counter wrong perceptions about the EU, fake news needs to be watched carefully, as one Somali citizen underlined. For example, questions were raised in Somali social media about the EU’s anti-piracy operations, whether these were really meant to protect international sea routes or to protect European fishing ships and thereby helping to plunder maritime resources.

3.5 EQ5 - Cross-cutting issues

<p>To what extent has the EU cooperation managed to mainstream cross-cutting issues relating to conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, human rights and the strengthening of CSO engagement throughout its cooperation efforts?</p>	
<p>Summary answer to the Evaluation Question</p>	
<p>Overall, the EU paid attention in programming and implementation to cross-cutting issues relating to conflict sensitivity, gender, youth, human rights and the strengthening of CSO engagements and mainstreamed them into cooperation efforts, though at different levels of intensity. Conflict sensitivity was taken on board more routinely and there is some room for improvement as it was not always addressed explicitly in project documents and during implementation. Gender is well mainstreamed across interventions, but youth issues did not feature as strongly. Human rights are promoted but more via specific projects in support of human rights instead of mainstreaming it across projects, also due to pragmatic considerations because the topic is highly sensitive in the Somali context. The EU has shown to be a strong supporter of strengthening civil society actors and it acts on the needs of vulnerable groups.</p> <p>As for conflict sensitivity, the EU and its implementing partners pay attention to conflict and do no harm. This was often done routinely based on contextual familiarity, mostly by implementation partners who have been working in Somalia for a long time. Such conflict sensitivity can be noted at macro level and at micro level where attention is paid to political realities and where activities are adapted accordingly – also framed as context analysis. This is an aspect of conflict sensitivity, but it lacks systematisation and deliberateness and cannot compensate for the need to conduct a more explicit conflict analysis to inform interventions on a regular basis. As such, conflict is recognised as a risk factor in most interventions but a clear roadmap or a dedicated approach on how conflict sensitivity commitments should be achieved during project implementation is absent. Often, risk assessments and mitigating measures are reflected in project documents, summarised in tables and are rather generically formulated. Conflict sensitivity is more</p>	

integrated under macro-area III (resilience and economic development) but is less prominently formulated as part of project interventions under macro-area II (PFM and education).

On gender, most interventions – almost across the board with the exception of PFM – include varying degrees of gender sensitivity and objectives related to gender equality. Almost all aim for sensitisation on gender issues and women's inclusion in project activities, tend to be limited to activity and output levels, and focus on quotas and gender parity. This is also the case in the CSDP missions and also the JPP programme where the gender objective is related to increasing the number of women in police training or in the security sector in general. But only few projects aimed at altering the roles of and decision-making powers of women. Those were found in the education sector (TVET), the rule of law sector (justice support) and local governance development (support to local authorities and civic engagement). It should be noted, however, that the EU's own understanding of gender equality during the evaluation period was guided by the EU's Gender Action Plan (GAP) I (2010-2015) and GAP II (2016-2020) documents which were directed more towards women's inclusion and participation and less on gender transformative approaches, which were only included in GAP III (2021-2025). In several projects which highlighted the importance of gender in their conceptual documents, there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate the extent to which these objectives were achieved during implementation. Indicators to monitor progress were not properly formulated, nor were specific budget allocations for this made, which points to limited attention paid to the monitoring of gender sensitivity.

Concerning youth, attention is not as evident as attention to gender. Stakeholders recognise the EU as a partner that promotes youth inclusion and empowerment. But youth empowerment and projects to address the needs of young people was pursued mostly through stand-alone projects (mostly in macro-area I and to some extent in macro-area II) and was not visibly mainstreamed across sectors and projects. Interventions which are not youth-centric by design do not seem to be explicit about their considerations of youth – with some exceptions. Nonetheless, most projects across the sectors were relevant to youth by virtue of many young people in Somalia, slightly over 70 per cent of Somalia's population.

With regard to human rights, evidence suggests that human rights were treated as a topic of intervention rather than a cross-cutting issue that needs to be mainstreamed across projects and themes. Yet, the EU is widely recognised as a strong human rights supporter. Aside from stand-alone projects that focussed on human rights, the EU has also supported organisations whose mandate is solely human rights. Most attention to human rights was given to interventions under macro-area I (governance, rule of law/ justice sector). Deliberate attention was also paid to promoting human rights values among Somalia's security forces and ensuring the principles are upheld including in the JPP and EUTM. Interventions under macro-areas II and III either did not make any reference to human rights or included human rights more indirectly. Overall, the EU appeared to support human rights issues with care and caution. This was due to potential risks (potentially dismissed as a Western agenda and to prevent project implementers from putting it in danger) and the need to approach this topic with respect and pragmatism concerning the cultural and political context of Somalia.

On strengthening the engagement of local NGOs and the strengthening of civil society, the EU is recognised as an outstanding supporter of civil engagement in Somalia. In the past few years, the EU has taken tangible steps towards supporting local NGOs and civil society strengthening directly without the intervention of INGOs as intermediaries (thereby following some other international Somali partners). This shift was appreciated by many and was driven by several developments: policy guidance from Brussels as part of the localisation agenda, changing realities in Somalia in relation to access to certain areas and the gradual development of the local NGOs sector. The growing realisation by the EU that local NGOs are better positioned than INGOs to work on issues such as accountability, governance, or gender where local ownership and legitimacy are key has also contributed to this shift. However, engagements with local NGOs are so far still limited as the EU is wary of potentially overloading such local organisations with too many responsibilities.

On support to vulnerability: Projects across the board and sectors made references to addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, though the details of how the support specifically addresses those needs varied by context and was not always clear or substantiated. There were, however, substantial and focused interventions – in particular under macro-area III – which focussed on IDPs and other vulnerable groups, thereby showing that the EU is a strong actor in support of the needs of vulnerable groups.

3.5.1 EU efforts to promote conflict sensitivity are visible and consistently embedded throughout EU interventions (JC5.1)

There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the EU and its implementing partners are sensitive to local context and adapt their interventions and strategies accordingly. Contextual familiarity allows implementing partners to be conflict sensitive but in a more routine – rather than systematic and deliberate – manner. (I5.1.1, I5.1.2, I5.1.3)

Most projects across sectors display context knowledge and undertake a risk analysis as part of the design (see also JC2.1). Implementing partners that apply conflict sensitivity thoroughly do it as part of their daily praxis more so than in response to EU requirements. For example, in recognition of the political tension between the FGS and FMS, some EU partners adapted differentiated approaches to their project implementation at FGS and FMS level. As the FMS also varied in their level of institutional capacity and policy objectives, projects had to adjust their activities and objectives when implementing in multiple FMS. Similarly, in recognition of social (clan) diversity and fragmentation, some projects opted to include multiple and diverse stakeholders in their consultation, community engagement and project activities according to clan affiliation.

Most organisations and implementers in Somalia have been operating in the context for several years and know their context hence some of their assessments and analyses are rather implicit and not written down. While no serious shortcomings were reported as a result of failure to systematise conflict sensitivity, biases and assumptions, intricacies cannot be tested and unearthed without a deliberate analysis, reflection and conflict sensitive strategies. Political sensitivity and adaptive project implementation also cannot be taken as a substitute for conflict sensitivity. The EU's Council conclusions related to the comprehensive and integrated approach, the legal basis on the NDICI-GE and operational guidance spell out that conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity in contexts like Somalia is not an optional extra.

Conflict is recognised as a contextual risk factor in most projects but dedicated roadmaps or approaches on how to convert conflict sensitivity concepts into practice are largely absent. It is more explicitly integrated in some sectors (resilience and economic development) than in other sectors. Conflict sensitivity was more clearly and visibly embedded in project design and in project implementation in projects related to food security, economic development and resilience building. (I5.1.1, I5.1.2, I5.1.3)

The EU conducts conflict analysis ahead of its programming and the do-no harm principle is standard in its programming and implementing agencies and NGOs whose interventions are financed by the EU are required to present an update on the conflict situation. The EU has supported various projects and processes that aim at conflict resolution, mediation and reconciliation at the local level, and is in fact well recognised as a primary actor in this regard. In some cases, generic commitments to be conflict sensitive and to apply the do no harm principle are made but without sufficient specificity on how these commitments will be achieved during project implementation. Evidence on mainstreaming conflict sensitivity more systematically across projects is thin, as confirmed by MAXQDA data (see Box 5 below).

Most of these projects were awarded through calls for proposals for which the EU's template for proposals contains a request to explain how to proceed in a given conflict context, how a proposed action is conflict sensitive and how it will take into consideration the do-no harm principles. On the other hand, risk assessments and mitigation measures are – as a standard – reflected in project documents, often summarised in tables in such proposals. Some of these are rather generic and are geared towards safety and security risks or the buy-in (or the lack thereof) of authorities that could endanger project implementation. But they did not include sufficient analysis of how the intervention could exacerbate existing tensions, or how they could endanger partner NGOs and other actors (and how to mitigate such risks).

3.5.2 EU efforts to support gender equality and women's empowerment, youth and human rights are visible and consistently embedded throughout EU interventions (JC5.2)

There is strong evidence to suggest that gender equality and women's empowerment – comparatively more – than youth and human rights - have assumed an important place in EU's support to Somalia. Most projects supported by the EU – almost across the board with the exception of PFM - include varying degrees of gender sensitivity and objectives related to gender equality at the level of project conceptualisation. In line with GAP II, the focus is largely on women's inclusion and representation in projects. (I5.2.1, I5.2.2, I5.2.3)

Gender features strongly in most project documents consulted (at the level of conceptualisation). The majority of interviewees also mentioned that the EU is a champion of the gender equality agenda, and its implementing partners by and large take gender equality and most notably the inclusion of women in their conceptualisation and implementation of projects. The same is evident from the eSurvey and MAXQDA (Box 5 below) results. EU calls for proposals for CSOs also require analysis and discussion around how interventions contribute to gender equality or women's empowerment. There were, however, notable exceptions such as the project "Strengthening the Participation of Somali NSA in Decision-making on Peace, Security and Development" as well as the TA under Budget Support programming, where gender considerations were minimal or absent. The first project mentioned, presented good opportunities to promote women's empowerment by enhancing the participation of women in decision-making.


At the national level, a noteworthy effort was made towards assigning a 30 per cent quota for women which despite not being fully met (women are 20 per cent in the Parliament, the House of the People, and 26 per

cent in the Upper House, the Senate) has an arguably transformative impact in the context of Somalia. At the local level, there are also projects that work to enhance women's representation in decision-making and their ability to lead social or political change in their communities. For example, the project "Civic Engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia" (CSO-LA-369559) challenged social norms and promoted women's inclusion in leadership positions. Projects that focus on local peacebuilding also aim at and have been partially successful in enhancing the interface and influence of women among clan elders, enhancing their role in mediation and reconciliation. Similarly, the EU has also supported organisations whose focus is women's right and gender equality, including oversight of security actors

While the above shows that gender sensitivity and gender awareness has taken root in EU's support to Somalia, documents and interviews reveal that the level of ambition often does not go beyond gender representation and women's participation. This is partly owing to the limited scope of guidance provided in GAP I and II for gender transformative approaches (which is only captured in GAP III, starting in 2021). It is also partly a result of the very difficult context in Somalia, where gender inequality is high and achieving gender representation and meaningful participation of women in project activities itself is a challenge. As a result, the most common strategies used to contribute to gender equality are ensuring women's participation in training, education opportunities, in security forces, etc. Instead, several projects focused on quotas/numbers of women in activities but did not sufficiently analyse (and monitor and report) gender dynamics and promote women's decision making.

Few projects, such as TVET development (see Box 4), go beyond women's/girls' representation in events, activities, training opportunities and the likes to address structural or cultural issues that promote or limit women's role in society (e.g., gender sensitive budgeting, women's representation in decision making, etc.) or their relationship with men, a finding also confirmed by MAXQDA data. Other notable examples are the JJP of the UN led MPTF which had a strong emphasis on gender, especially in the form of work to improve sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) responses. It engaged traditional justice actors including elders along with other strategies to transform societal perceptions of women's roles and their agency. The project Civic Engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia also challenged social norms and promoted women's inclusion in leadership positions and the project "Local authorities supporting local economic development in Somaliland and Puntland" (CSO-LA-393118) contributed to gender mainstreaming in policies in Somaliland and Puntland, according to quotas mentioned in the staffing of the Association for Local Government Authorities for both regions.

Box 4 *Promoting Vocational Education in Somalia and Somaliland – an "Award for Girls"*

	<p>This TVET project implemented by GIZ with support of the EU is promoting gender equality and built into the project activities which should help to ultimately create the desire among young girls to choose vocational training and to actively apply for a place at school to get educated. To this end, the "Award for Girls in Vocational Education in Somaliland" was designed with authorities and the vocational school in Somaliland, an intervention that is easily scalable to other regions of Somalia, both for trainees and TVET schools. This award is given to the best performing female students and is part of the comprehensive communication strategy adopted by the Ministry of Education in Somaliland in March 2021 with the aim to get a higher percentage of skilled (male and female) workforce that meet the demand of the labour market. The award enjoyed enormous popularity. More than 170 female trainees and 17 TVET schools applied in Somaliland.</p>
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According to various stakeholders, the gender gap in Somalia is so wide and the exclusion of women from public life is deeply cultural that even objectives around gender representation and women's inclusion can seem overly ambitious. And document findings show that implementers are not always able to achieve gender parity or set quotas in training, project activities, education opportunities and politics due to the severe time demand put on women and girls at home, as well as their cultural exclusion from activities in the public sphere. Moreover, for projects that deal with gender in one way or another in their conceptual documents, there was not sufficient evidence to substantiate the extent to which these objectives were achieved during implementation. While societal change takes time and could be measured past projects' lifetime, project documents did not display progress towards gender goals throughout the project cycle. This was the case of IcSP projects reviewed and also of projects related to institutional reform, state functions and budget support (EUTF, Somalia Partner Fund, Budget Support) which had good ideas about how gender will be considered in the respective projects at the level of conceptualisation and program/project design. But there is limited evidence that supports this has been carried through in the project implementation as there were no indicators formulated, nor specific budget allocations which points to limited attention paid to gender sensitive monitoring (see also JC3.2).

A dedicated age sensitivity or youth mainstreaming is not visible across sectors and projects even if young people benefit from EU projects by virtue of representing a significant segment of the Somali population. This indicates an implicit, rather than explicit, deliberate consideration of youth in projects. Yet, there are a few youth-centric projects whose main objective is to promote youth empowerment or addressing the needs of young people. Attention to how multiple and overlapping identities affect people in the same category (intersectionality) has been low so far. (I5.2.1, I5.2.2, I5.2.3)

In the eyes of diverse stakeholders, the EU is recognised as a prominent actor in youth empowerment and inclusion across sectors. More than 70 per cent of Somalia's population are considered young.⁵⁹ The EU has indeed supported various projects with a standalone youth empowerment and development objective. Investments in education and TVET training are also largely about youth beneficiation and economic empowerment. The EU has further supported youth-led CSOs that work on enhancing young people's contribution to politics and social life. However, the extent to which youth considerations were given attention more systematically across interventions are not as visible as those around women. Youth participation, inclusion and empowerment are strongly felt in standalone projects regarding the rule of law sector (governance, human rights, political participation). However, evidence – from documents and interviews – is rather weak in terms of deliberate and systematised mainstreaming of the needs, participation and structural challenges of youth. Nonetheless, most projects across the sectors are relevant to youth by virtue of youth's representation in the general population of Somalia.

The concept of intersectionality – or the fact that overlapping identities affect how people or groups are empowered or disempowered – is relevant in determining the extent to which gender, youth and vulnerable groups (see JC5.3) are mainstreamed in EU's support to Somalia. So far, attention and reflection on intersectional gender considerations, for example, have been very limited. The evaluation team sees this as a reflection of the conceptual gaps in GAP I and II. Intersectionality is explicitly mentioned as a guiding principle in GAP III (2021-2025) of the EU's programming.

Given the country's context, human rights are promoted more indirectly resulting in a lower visibility of the EU's human rights agenda across its support to Somalia compared to other cross-cutting issues. Human rights are supported via a number of dedicated NGO projects. Human rights appear to be concentrated in projects relating to rule of law (security and justice) but there is scope to pay some more attention to human rights in other sectors. (I5.2.1, I5.2.2, I5.2.3)

In view of the political and security situation of the country and the EU's position in Somalia, the EU appears to support human rights issues with care and caution. A very proactive promotion of the human rights agenda could be dismissed as a Western agenda and endanger project implementers. Findings from interviewees and survey respondents show that the EU is well regarded not only in its ability to support human rights initiatives but also in its approach to human rights promotion which is perceived as respectful of and pragmatic vis-a-vis the cultural and political contexts in Somalia (see also JC3.2, on visibility). The EU also funds human rights-based organisations working on justice, gender rights, such as the Human Rights Centre in Somaliland. Some interviewees mentioned that the EU encourages the monitoring and reporting on human rights issues though more could be done in this regard which respondents also mentioned in the eSurvey. References to human rights are more visible and systematically referenced in projects related to the rule of law area (security and justice). The EU's support to human rights training and monitoring within the SNAF – for example in the JPP – is notable and well appreciated. Projects in other sectors may address human rights by working on gender, service delivery or resilience but they do not make clear and systematic references to human rights, nor do they refer to or apply a deliberate human rights approach (confirmed by MAXQDA data, see Box 5 below). Here, some attention to human rights would be welcome according to interviewees.

Box 5 Quantitative word analysis of cross cutting issues from EU documentation

- EU projects pay a **strong attention to gender and youth yet in an unbalanced way**. There is a stronger emphasis on gender than to youth in project documents; and while certain documents include many references to gender and youth, others have none.
- Results suggest a **tendency to group women and youth together, equate gender with women, and a limited application of gender analysis** to inform programming. This poses a risk that EU projects do not account enough for differentiated needs and challenges based on gender and age.
- Results confirm that **including women and youth** in projects was strongly emphasised, but approaches that challenge women's social standing and decision-making power were rarely adopted, in part due to a difficult context. Projects focused on training women and men and spurring institutional change but gave less attention to changes in gender norms and behaviours at community level. Young people seemed rarely involved in project design.

⁵⁹ UNFPA (2015): Youth in Somalia plan for a better future. Available at: <https://somalia.unfpa.org/en/news/youth-somalia-plan-better-future>.

- Human rights are **not fully mainstreamed** in EU projects and treated as a **topic of intervention rather than a cross cutting issue**, in line with EQ5 findings. A structured, rights-based approach to projects is rarely mentioned, and while projects on justice, security and CSO support mention human rights consistently, they are mostly missing from projects on education, PFM, food security and economic development.
- EU projects that include human rights are often focused on training and institutional change, like policy advocacy but **community-level change and other identity factors** alongside gender (children, IDPs, detainees) appear to **merit more attention**.
- EU projects apply **conflict sensitivity not via an explicit systematic approach, but rather implicitly and organically** relying on NGOs familiar with implementation in conflict settings. This would explain why mentions of conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm were rare.
- The EU pays attention to Somali ownership, with a higher emphasis on national, than local ownership and especially FMS ownership. However, attention to Somali leadership of projects seemed limited, as most mentions of leadership referred to leadership training and skills.

For the supporting statistical evidence collected with MAXQDA, see Annex 7.

3.5.3 The EU supports the engagement and strengthening of CSO and pays attention to vulnerable groups across its focal sectors (JC5.3)

An overwhelming majority of interviewees agree that the EU’s support to strengthening (local) NGOs, either directly or via INGOs, is considerable and highly relevant. At times they are beneficiaries of EU support while at other times they are change agents through which social or policy ends are met. The EU’s gradual shift towards funding national NGOs – as opposed to relying on INGOs and UN agencies - is highly appreciated though is undertaken cautiously to avoid an overload of local organisations with too many responsibilities. Attention to the needs of vulnerable groups is regularly mentioned in project documents, though details about how these are going to be addressed are not always clear or substantiated. Vulnerability, however, is strongly addressed via dedicated interventions, mostly under macro-area III. (I5.3.1, I5.3.2, I5.3.3)

Throughout interviews and clearly mentioned in the eSurvey, the EU is recognised as a key actor providing funding to (local) NGOs and civil society capacity strengthening across sectors in Somalia. The EU follows a multifaceted partnership that goes beyond state relations, but it is recognised that its support – due to the EU’s increasing cooperation with the FGS and FMS – favoured the government since the period 2015/2016 at the expense of NGOs. Nearly one third (29 per cent) of the EU’s support to Somalia during the period 2014 to 2020 was implemented via NGOs. The considerable support provided via NGOs and their capacity strengthening was informed by the EU Roadmap for Engagement with civil society in Somalia as well as the low capacity of FGS and FMS, which prevented a higher portion of aid to be channelled via government. In terms of strengthening local NGOs, an important innovation as of 2016/2017 was the gradually increasing move towards localising the support via dedicated calls for proposals and lower thresholds for own contributions (see also JC2.1), though the number of projects supported so far via local NGOs is still low – the EU is wary of potentially overloading such local organisations with too many responsibilities, thereby also running a reputational risk to the EU. In the governance sector, in particular, there has been a gradual yet increasing relevance of local NGOs in place of INGOs. Various capacity building initiatives were funded to establish networks and platforms among CSOs in different parts of Somalia. The project “Strengthening the participation of Somali NSA in decision-making on peace, security and development, support to civil society platforms” was assessed as successful. This is because it was leading to more engagement of local civil society groups in mediation, advocacy, participation in decision making, safeguarding human rights and dialogue with authorities and international actors well after the end of the project.

Projects across the board and sectors make references to addressing the needs of vulnerable groups, though the details of how the support will specifically address those needs varies by context and is not always clear or substantiated. Oftentimes these were identified as women, pastoralists, IDPs, children with disability, orphans. While the systematic reference to addressing the needs of vulnerable groups by most projects is positive, there are a few critical observations: i) identification of vulnerable groups is not followed by (written or systematised) analyses; ii) overlapping or intersecting vulnerabilities are not explicitly identified; and iii) with some exceptions – such as the BRIDGES project where the “*most vulnerable*” groups of IDPs, young women, pastoralist youth were given an educational TVET opportunity which can lead to employment – most projects tend to see vulnerable groups as mere beneficiaries and not agents of change. There are, however, substantial and focused interventions – in particular under macro-area III – which focus on IDPs and other vulnerable groups, thereby showing that the EU is a strong actor in support-of the needs of vulnerable groups.

3.6 EQ6 - Strategic outcomes

To what extent has EU support contributed to achieving the intended strategic sector outcomes of the EU-Somalia cooperation in the main cooperation areas?



Summary answer to the Evaluation Question

The EU, in close collaboration with other international partners, contributed to achieving strategic sector outputs and outcomes with regard to four of the six major areas of the EU's engagement. These are i) peace & security, ii) RoL/(local) governance, including the strengthening of relations between civil society and local governments, iii) PFM and iv) education sector. Outcomes from the RoL/justice sector support were overall limited with questions raised about the extent to which this support can contribute to transformational change. Support for TVET has delivered mixed results so far. Despite numerous positive findings across these sectors, the challenges to overcome the more fundamental problems in Somalia are huge whereby achieved outcomes have only very modestly contributed to transformational change. Support to v) resilience and vi) the productive sector (including the promotion of food security and (local) economic development), while contributing to sector capacities and despite good forms of collaboration between diverse implementing actors, led to mixed results. Key outcomes are presented along the following four major clusters:

Under macro-area I, on peace & security, significant investments in civilian security (police), along with more limited ones on P/CVE, contributed to developing and strengthening institutional and human capacities at FGS level which helped to develop national ownership and leadership. At FMS level, investments in civilian security were initiated during the latter part of the evaluation period showing pointers of improvement but without any strategic outcomes so far – mostly due to the unsolved constitutional relationship between FGS and FMS impacting strongly on the police sector. Across most of Somalia, police coverage, including community policy, was not achieved. The EU's significant support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), via the EU's integrated approach, enabled some improvements in the provision of security services across the country, in particular in relation to the comprehensive package to the army (from 2020 onwards). This contributed to clearing areas from Al-Shabaab control in Central-South and rebuilding trust between citizens and the state/security services more generally thanks to stabilization efforts. Attention to maritime security can be noted but its results are elusive due to the limited priority given to this sub-sector by the FGS.

Macro-area I, governance & RoL: the EU has contributed to the strengthening of the justice sector, invested in projects that enhanced access to justice and supported - with some success - processes which targeted the relationship between local authorities, communities and citizens. In some instances, EU supported mechanisms allowed citizens to express and channel their voice vis-à-vis (local) authorities, thereby contributing to a gradual strengthening of the social contract. In conflict-free places, women and vulnerable parts from the population benefitted from enhanced access to justice supported by primarily smaller interventions. Improvements realised from EU supported projects also originated from a strengthening of institutional mechanisms and human capacities, enhanced leadership and ownership. The EU support to justice was substantial and part of a more comprehensive international aid process supported by multiple bilateral and multilateral funders, agencies and NGOs. Outputs and outcomes of the support are reported from several programmes and projects implemented in different parts of Somalia though instances of success and sustainability were comparatively few and geographically scattered considering the scale of the country. A critical momentum to improve and sustain the rule of law and statebuilding more fundamentally across the country was not achieved. Furthermore, the emphasis on combating corruption across RoL entities was insufficient, despite reportedly extremely high corruption levels.

As for macro-area II, covering PFM/macro-economic management and the education sector, including TVET, several strategic outputs and outcomes were realised in support of longer-term statebuilding processes. The EU's support to PFM has contributed to improvements in macroeconomic management in Somalia (Somaliland excluded) through improved fiscal discipline, domestic revenue generation and better budgeting and execution. While the capacity of Somali authorities to implement PFM reform has improved, more challenging PFM reforms have been, and are likely to remain constrained by unresolved political issues, limiting the extent of PFM reform unless the political and constitutional situation has improved. Little progress has been made in politically sensitive areas such as intergovernmental fiscal arrangements. General budget support, although amply ambitious, has proven useful for focusing on key measures to be implemented and supporting the HIPC process, but again has not been able to move forward on politically sensitive PFM issues. EU support to education in Somalia and Somaliland has been the most successful in expanding access to primary and secondary education, for example through equipping and constructing new classrooms and a focus on inclusion, resulting in increased attendance for girls and children in rural and pastoral communities. There have also been some successes in education sector governance and in

increasing institutional and human capacities as well as ownership. While efforts were made to provide TVET services, which has increased access to technical and vocational training for youth, there was limited success so far in improving the quality of TVET services and building a coherent system in support of TVET.

Macro-area III – Resilience and (local) economic development: throughout the evaluation period, the EU has focused its support on the productive sector and on its institutional capacity building in a highly politicised and fragile context which was continuously challenged by evolving intergovernmental arrangements and tensions. The EUD was progressively embarking towards sustainable agri-food system transformation, but evidence related to the use of political economy analysis in programming was limited. Until 2018, when the Inclusive ILED flagship programme was launched, promoting a territorial integrated approach, there was limited synergy between small-scale EU interventions supporting agriculture/livestock, advisory and social services, nutrition, gender, youth, (road) infrastructure and the environment to strengthen the resilience and livelihoods of vulnerable communities. FAO, a major implementing partner for the EU, realised complementary programmes within the EU-FAO large portfolio contributing to value chain development, delivering public goods, such as improved land and water information systems, and strengthening institutional capacity. If good synergies have been developed between EU-FAO interventions, this synergy did not extend to capacity development on the Somali side. EU programmes were also set up to develop public-private partnerships, however the involvement of the private sector actors has remained particularly challenging due to a range of hindering factors such as the lack of conducive legal frameworks, and weaknesses in design of projects and their implementation. EU support to the governance of natural resources was modest including, for example, to land tenure issues which are critical underlying drivers of conflict and food insecurity. EU funding towards a more sustainable management of natural resources was also limited in a context where trade-offs between productivity and sustainability are increasingly critical because of climate change, COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine. Grasping the effects of the EU's support to infrastructure were difficult due to the widespread investments across interventions and sectors. Finally, food and nutrition security objectives were not mainstreamed in EU projects, including in the EU resilience portfolio, for which lasting effects are still to be captured. Women, young people, IDPs and returnees remain extremely vulnerable groups in a context where access and tenure issues around natural resources remain critical and the EU's HDP nexus approach is still at an early stage.

3.6.1 EU support to security, peacebuilding and preventing violent extremism has contributed to the improvement in the provision of security services and a more secure public space (macro-area Governance I – Security and Peace) (JC6.1)

The EU contributed to developing and strengthening institutional and human capacities, leadership, and national ownership of services responsible for civilian security (police) at FGS level. (I6.1.1)

EU's support to the civilian security forces (police) benefited from coordination between the EU and EU MS, in particular Germany (e.g., within the JPP) and Italy (training of the Daraawiish police unit, equipment provision). From fully EDF-funded (until 2016, benefiting only the FGS), EU's police programming began investing substantially in the FMS with the EUTF.

Often seen as a 'success story', the JPP is a EUR 55 million joint programme, mostly funded by the EU (at 60 per cent), UK (FCDO) and Germany, which built on the former EU programme. The EDF-funded program resulted in a functioning payroll system at FGS level (in contrast with the human resources system), thus enhancing ownership by the national authorities. The EUTF-funded JPP differentiates from its predecessor by adopting a more comprehensive approach (encompassing stipends, equipment and uniforms, infrastructure, training and costs related to the recruitment of new police officers) and benefiting equally each FMS. It further supports the (federal) Daraawiish and continues the highly contested modality of stipend payment now to FMS. The JPP also provided an important forum bringing together FGS, FMS and donors (see JC2.3). As stated by a source, the FGS was forced to hear what FMS had to say, while it also gave the FMS the 'right' to have access to a budget directly. However, FGS/FMS frictions about the formation of the security apparatus at FMS level have prevented some FMS, including Puntland, from advancing and delivering on their work projects. Furthermore, JPP's MTR conducted in 2021, concluded there was a perception about a lack of ownership by FMS. This could be explained by the institutional set-up of the program, including UNOPS' perceived fast-paced implementation and the overall review of work requests by the JPP board.

While EUCAP's mandate did not allow it to provide support to the EUD on a structural basis, the JPP provided an opportunity for the EUD to make use of EUCAP's expertise on working with the police. Like other CSDP missions, EUCAP has an extremely limited mandate but was expanded in 2019 to include support to the Federal Police. EUCAP then participated in the JPP, one of the few engagements which supported the work

developed and funded by the EUD. In Puntland and Somaliland, EUCAP's activities included training to the police, including maritime, but without any significant complementary support provided by the EUD.⁶⁰

During the evaluation period, EU's support contributed to the reform of the police sector as per the New Policing Model (NPM). However, it was insufficient to reach a full coverage of police services and to guarantee the provision of related services across the country, including community police. (I6.1.2.)

Long-term institution building and continuous support to the security sector remains crucial to guarantee a fully operational and sustainable civilian security force. The EU made an important and timely contribution to enhance capacity and systems of the Somali Police Force. According to findings from the TPME II evaluation report on Rule of Law in Somalia, *"the stipend support interventions were designed to encourage, support and maintain federal policing at FGS level at a time of sensitive stabilisation and in a parlous financial environment for the FGS and they achieved just that."*

The EU also took initial steps to expand that support to FMS through a comprehensive multi-donor support program (JPP) targeting FMS and FGS. The NPM was approved in 2016 and recognised by the 2017 Security Pact as a key element of the federal model for security provision. However, it provided an overly broad framework, which contributed to limited progress in its implementation.⁶¹ Moreover, the NPM is not widely accepted by all stakeholders, thus hampering ownership. As stated in an analysis of the current EU logic of engagement in security assistance, a report commissioned by the EU and led by the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (2021), it has been difficult to increase the capacity of FMS' police units outside of Mogadishu and to provide for community policing. To date, a main outcome of the JPP has been the promotion of dialogue between FGS and FMS, as well as with donors. The JPP also allowed the recruitment of new police officers and to deploy them in locations significantly exposed to attacks by Al-Shabaab. Moreover, payment of stipends and overall support helped to increase the morale amongst police officers to some extent. The JPP went through a recent process of revision aiming at ensuring its design reflected a bottom-up approach. It continues beyond 2022 through a non-cost extension. It is expected to have a follow-up program for which there is a general consensus about the need to exclude the payment of stipends.

EU's interventions to prevent and counter violent extremism showed mutual coherence but have been limited in scope in light of other national and regional programmatic EU priorities (I6.1.1, I6.1.3)

The EU's direct contribution to P/CVE was limited but showed coherence within the few dedicated projects funded by IcSP and EUTF. Starting in 2016 with the IcSP-funded TA contract 'Blueprint Somalia' (from the Global Centre on Cooperative Security), the EU's work in this field was implemented in coordination with ongoing efforts from the UK for the development of National P/CVE Strategy and corresponding Action Plan.

Blueprint Somalia was followed up via initiatives channelled through the UN MPTF or funded via the IcSP and EUTF. It included the regional STRIVE Horn of Africa, implemented by Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), which, in Somalia, covered only Somaliland and Puntland. Then, from 2020, the European Institute for Peace started implementing a first P/CVE project, "Strength Through Tolerance", in partnership with Elman Peace Centre and Africa's Voices Foundation aiming at implementing the national P/CVE strategy and FMS action plans linking institutions at FGS and FMS level (including P/CVE focal point in the FMS), while also targeting local communities in Puntland, Galmudug and Jubaland. The institutional component, in particular, could not start before mid-2022 due to the political situation.

The Blueprint P/CVE strategy is generally criticised as it seemed to ignore existential elements, including the absence of a functioning legal system. One point mentioned during an interview, for example, was that it did not recognise Al-Shabaab explicitly as a threat. The ongoing "Strength Through Tolerance" project has started supporting its revision ensuring an inclusive process with the FMS. P/CVE programming did not prove appropriate for conflict settings. The regional STRIVE program targeted Somaliland and Puntland only, mainly due to difficulties in defining what P/CVE would look like in Central-South Somalia and how to find appropriate entry points to implement activities. As such, the remainder of the STRIVE programming, focused mostly on learning and to inform future EU engagement in the field.

Overall, given EU's contribution to the UN MPTF⁶² and dedicated funding to the "Strength Through Tolerance" project, it remained the major donor supporting the operationalisation of the P/CVE national strategy. Stabilisation programmes, such as the ones implemented by IOM under IcSP, are also expected to contribute indirectly to P/CVE at community level. There is the perception, according to some respondents, that, the EU is doing a lot in this domain and that its support is considered genuine. Yet, the EU could have further

⁶⁰ Exceptions include the EUD's support to EUCAP's training of police for security elections in Somaliland. Furthermore, the EUD provided EUR 500 000 to purchase equipment for the Somaliland Coast Guard, which had an important impact in view of EUCAP's very limited funding for purchasing equipment to complement its advisory and training role.

⁶¹ The Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance study assessed that, by 2020, *"some progress had been made in the implementation of the NPM as each entity reports to the respective federal and state-level Ministry of Internal Security and is responsible for recruitment and training of police personnel."*

⁶² UNDP-led program for the operationalisation of the Somali National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, implemented in Benadir region and FMS in Central-South.

developed its contribution to this field of peacebuilding by exploring synergies with EU MS in related domains. This is the case, for instance, of the multi-donor program (funded by, among others, the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands) targeting the reintegration of former extremists. That said, towards the end of the evaluation period, the scope of the EU's work on P/CVE expanded by prioritising projects in support of media and CSOs targeting freedom of speech and tackling 'fake news'.

The significant investment in the (military) security sector enabled some improvements in the provision of security services at FGS level and, to a limited extent, to build the capacity of security forces for counterterrorism and stabilisation operations particularly in Central-South Somalia (I6.1.4)

For most of the evaluation period, the EU's direct support to Somali military actors was restricted to the CBDSD initiative since 2017 (under IcSP, covering infrastructure, equipment, and capacity building) and the work of CSDP missions (in particular training and technical advice via the EUTM). Still, the EU's support was successful in bringing an end to the disconnection between the SNA General Staff and the Ministry of Defence, e.g., by promoting civilian oversight. Both benefited from infrastructure, training, and capacity building via a joint effort of the EUD, FPI and EUTM. Outside of Mogadishu, similar support started to be provided at the end of the reporting period (via the CBDSD initiative), but the implementation pace has been slower mainly due to a less enabling working environment.

Despite internal challenges, which included high staff turnover and the fact of being restricted to the capital Mogadishu, EUTM has gained relevance by ensuring a complementary role to the APF and EPF through further provision of specific training to the SNAF (e.g., counter-IED, search and detect). This has evolved from the isolated provision of training in the past (which likely involved duplication of training) to a comprehensive train and equip approach, now focusing on specialised units. This was combined with additional actions mainly under the CBDSD initiative.

In fact, the sole training of the mission did not have a significant impact on conflict dynamics before 2019. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's assessment of EUTM Somalia (2020) and comments from some interviewees, it was only in 2019, at the occasion of "Operation Badbaado" in Lower Shabelle region, that a direct link could be established between EUTM support and the deployment of SNAF units trained in counterterrorism and stabilisation operations. From 2020, the EU is supporting the SNAF through the delivery of non-lethal equipment (APF and EPF funding) and field visits are planned to monitor the use of that equipment – a requirement for EU MS' support. Although EPF is an instrument that cannot be used flexibly and on short-term notice, recently adopted initiatives, such as this train and equip package is expected to contribute to the EC's long-term support to the security sector and the transition process with ATMIS. Overall, the complementarity of support and diversified funding streams illustrated the EU's growing role as a strategic security partner in Somalia.

Little evidence has been found of strategic outcomes originating from the EU's investment in maritime security. Whereas EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta has fulfilled its role, interviewees judged that maritime security is not a locally owned priority though it is now listed as one of the new FGS's priorities. At present, however, the focus goes into defeating Al-Shabaab on land, as FGS officials stated. Despite the continuous lack of a proper national normative framework, maritime security and governance remains one of the pillars of the EU's strategy for Somalia. The sector is crucial for regional stability and the Somali statebuilding process. This can be illustrated by the recent 'Red Sea regional programme' launched early 2022 and managed by the EUD. This regional project encompasses six countries of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden region, but, in Somalia, it can only operate in the northern part of the country (Somaliland and Puntland) due to its geographic scope, while working with the federal level on legislation to make it compliance with international frameworks and standards.

The EU's support helped to build trust between security services and citizens at local level mainly through stabilisation-related activities. There was also some improvement in terms of commitment to and respect for human rights by security actors, not least by guaranteeing awareness raising. (I6.1.5)

The EU's programming on stabilisation had an important role in building trust between security forces and citizens, particularly in newly recovered areas from Al-Shabaab, by ensuring security and introducing high-impact activities benefiting the population, while investing in institution building. Stabilisation initiatives were also clearly linked to higher-level/national peace processes. The IOM implemented stabilisation program provided a good example of general perception about improved security by the population resulting from these initiatives.

In this context, the EU also supported the local governance process, namely through the Finnish Church Aid (FCA)-implemented project (IcSP and EDF-funded) for the formation of local governance structures. These were deemed slow, to a large extent due to the lack of political support, but relevant. The current Wadajir framework relies substantially on political support from local authorities, but governance is weaker in Central-Southern FMS, particularly when compared to Puntland and Somaliland. Still, the project provided a good example of coordination between partners (e.g., with the Nordic International Support Foundation, NIS Foundation) and complementarity between soft and hard components of EU's stabilisation programming.

The role of civil society in promoting human rights and overall oversight of the security actors was fairly addressed during the evaluation period. An EU source identified it as a rather specialised field, where the EU

may have a limited role to play. The main project in this specific field was carried out by a group of implementing partners led by the Somali NGO IIDA during the period 2016-2018. Funded by the thematic line EIDHR, according to interviewees, the project's final report and final external evaluation report, it successfully contributed to raising awareness of safety and security of women and children and laid the foundation for institutional arrangements related to human rights in Somalia.

Forward-looking, despite continued advocacy by CSOs, some of the required laws were never approved. Yet, under the JPP, the modality of stipend payment enabled some leverage in terms of ensuring accountability of security actors towards human rights violations. However, in close collaboration with the EUD's cooperation section, EUTM could have played a greater role. For example, in the context of the EUTM's support to the SNAF in drafting its code of conduct. In light of EU's integrated approach, support to civil society is rather disconnected from CSDP missions, which have a substantial role to play within EU's overall engagement in peace and security in Somalia. One exception was the promotion of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda in the maritime sector, where EUCAP and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (commonly known as UNSOM) collaborated with CSOs.

3.6.2 EU support to rule of law and statebuilding has contributed to the strengthening of the justice sector, access to justice and the strengthening of local authorities and their relations with communities and citizens (macro-area Governance I – Rule of Law) (JC6.2)

The EU's support to rule of law and statebuilding helped to strengthen the country's justice sector and also the wider constitutional reform of Somalia. This support was well appreciated but the reforms lost momentum during the Farmajo government. While there is clear evidence of strengthening the rule of law domain, including the justice sector, in various areas, a transformational effect originating from this support could not be noted. (I6.2.1)

The EU is a major funder of rule of law interventions, including the justice system and constitutional reform. Support started already prior to the evaluation period with UNDP supported training activities throughout the country, with investments in legal education particularly paying off in Somaliland (UNDP, Final Narrative Report, 2015). During the more recent years of the evaluation period, support was channelled via various smaller shorter-term projects, financed via thematic budget lines (mainly EIDHR and CSO-LA), and longer-term via the UN MPTF and Max-Planck Foundation for legal capacity building of the Somali Federal Parliament. The UN MPTF supports, among a range of sectors, access to various justice initiatives, namely, legal aid, support to community dispute resolution mechanisms and mobile courts, and is aligned with several of the goals in the FGS's Roadmap to Security and Justice 2017-2020. This led to the strengthening of institutional and human capacities of the justice system via multiple activities with, partially, good results in diverse areas. Examples include outcomes such as the reduction of land grabbing in local communities; reduction of the detention period before trials and slight improvements of detainee conditions; SGBV units at Attorney General Offices strengthened capacity to coordinate justice chain institutions and improved the technical cooperation with FMS; increased membership of the Somali Bar Association; improved administration and functioning of courts in the Banadir region; training and deployment of judges, prosecutors and registrars in Kismayo and Mogadishu; strengthening of investigation and prosecution capacities with regard to trafficking human beings; etc. However, a focus on combating corruption across RoL entities; and on articulating the links between formal and informal legal systems more clearly was lacking according to the 2017 Evaluation of the Joint Rule of Law Programme.

As part of the justice support, efforts were made to strengthen correction services with mixed results. Correction services were supported via the Joint Correction Services Support Programme under the lead of UNODC, co-funded by the EU via the UN MPTF. There are positive achievements, such as the rehabilitation of infrastructure, improvement of hygiene and successful training of prison officers. Also, the payment of prison officers by the Ministry of Justice, paid by international partners in the past, is positive. But limited progress on reaching an agreement on a federated Justice and Corrections Model (either with more devolved authority given to FMS, or with more powers at FGS level) left several programme objectives pending.

The EU supported the constitutional review process as of 2013 as part of a parliamentary support project but this lost traction after the election of the Farmajo government due to a lack of political will and tensions between FGS and FMS about their relationship, in particular division of power and responsibilities. In the absence of such traction, attention went mainly to the strengthening of executive powers at the expense of the legislator and judiciary as some interviewees noted critically. More recently, with the change of government in 2022, there appears to be a renewed attention to the institutionalisation of legislative structures and procedures.

The degree to which justice services and access to these services across the country could be provided, also for women and the vulnerable parts of the population, varies greatly. Where access could be realised, results were positive and well appreciated by the population, but sustainability – also because of the costs of maintaining justice services - is unlikely for some of the initiatives, mobile courts in particular. (I6.2.3)

Shaping institutional arrangements and creating capacity to facilitate access to justice and to enhance justice service delivery were important objectives of the various rule of law and justice support initiatives. The UN, with offices in all FMS, could implement the programme across the different regions but due to the security situation, access to justice could not be realised across all areas of the country. Access was realised via legal aid, Alternative Dispute Resolution centres and mobile courts. On the latter, the TPME RoL evaluation commented that *“these have proved to be an extremely effective method of bringing formal justice solutions to communities which in the past could not access them”* (2021). And the UN MPTF Annual Reports say that these methods have provided in 2020 some 13 000 individuals access to justice. The key challenge of these initiatives is to get them continued after the project support stops. This appears to be the case with Alternative Dispute Resolution centres but mobile courts – despite their usefulness and positive feedback from beneficiaries – are not likely to sustain because judges need to get their per diem paid.

Particular attention was given to women and marginalised communities by – for example – enhancing the capacity of justice institutions to respond to cases of sexual and gender-based violence via the creation of SGBV units in Attorney General offices. It is also reported from the Baidoa area, that women now sit with traditional elders on the decision panel at the alternative dispute resolution centre to hear and solve cases together. And, via justice partners, a media awareness campaign was launched on the Puntland Anti-Rape Act to shape increased community awareness on SGBV risks. Overall, and despite cross-cutting issues not sufficiently mainstreamed across interventions in the RoL domain, the TPME RoL Evaluation (2021) comments that the programme has made significant and evidenced contributions in respect of access to justice for women and marginalised groups.

Support to the justice sector is judged as costly compared to what has been obtained from all the investments made. This relates partially to the expensive services of the implementing organisation (UN more expensive than NGOs and consulting firms) and the need to build up relationships, trust and a social contract between the state representatives and communities gradually along step-by-step processes. Opportunities to monitor all aspects of the justice sector development are limited.

Useful support with positive results, in particular via the funding of INGOs and local NGOs, was provided to strengthen the relationship between local authorities, communities and citizens and to build human capacity and support local leadership and ownership for strengthening the social contract. But there is a need to pay more attention to supporting bottom-up approaches and, as part of this, to the strengthening of local authorities. (I6.2.2)

Complementary to the EU’s support to the justice sector, several projects funded from the EDF, IcSP and other thematic budget lines financed activities to strengthen the relationship and interaction of local authorities and communities with the objective to build the capacities of rights holders (communities) and duty bearers (government) to participate in defining models of development and to hold the authorities accountable. This was also noted by the evaluation team during various interviews with civil society and local government representatives in Puntland and Somaliland.

The interventions entered primarily at the level of FMS or below and targeted communities across Somalia, including regions in Southern and Central Somalia, Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, Puntland and Somaliland. A considerable portion of this funding was also channelled via the UN MPTF to complement related activities on strengthening justice authorities, enhancing local governance and local economic development. Different external evaluations were overall positive about this support and what it had achieved. Across these interventions, a strong focus was noted on awareness raising of local communities. Very positively assessed were interventions which strengthened existing local and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Xeer) to make them more inclusive. They were received with enthusiasm by community members according to one external evaluation (2018). Another project strengthened platforms in Southern and Central Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland through which local authorities and communities interacted on a variety of issues, ranging from discussing constitutional issues to mediating disputes to human rights issues. *“Their profiles have grown to such an extent that the platforms are now regularly approached by various stakeholders on a number of issues, either to mediate or to advocate on their behalf,”* found another external evaluation of this intervention (2017). It is evident across the sector that smaller NGOs/local partners operating at service delivery level have the greatest immediate positive effect on people and communities. These interventions are also cost-effective.

Results from field level interviews show that more needs to be done in this domain, in particular support that strengthens the connections between communities and local authorities and their relationships and interactions with government at the FMS level. Experiences from the EU support provided via FCA shows that progress is possible, albeit very slow. Seriously hindering factors have been unsolved constitutional issues and accompanying political sensitivities and an outdated Wadajir National Local Government Framework. Also, stakeholders from non-EU agencies judge that there is scope to improve and further develop such bottom-up approaches in support of local government strengthening, their interaction with civil society and the enhancing of inclusive and democratic processes.

Despite broadly positive findings highlighted above, one needs to realise that there are huge challenges arising when statebuilding and the RoL is supported via justice sector reform and the

strengthening of relationships between local authorities, communities and citizens. Moreover, challenges to sustainability in the Somali context are also big. (I6.2.1, I6.2.2, I6.2.3; I6.2.4)

Interventions are limited in time, the coverage of the interventions across Somalia is limited and capacities to carry on after project termination are limited, all hindering impact. In Puntland, as one source mentioned, access to justice and human rights remains a challenge – a finding which holds true for all regions across Somalia. There are also considerable challenges for women, minority clans and IDPs in accessing justice, including predatory behaviour by police, endemic corruption in the formal legal system, a lack of enforcement for judgements on land issues and interference by elders in cases within the formal system. The TPME RoL Evaluation concludes that formal government structures are problematic across the justice chain and, wherever there is a void in formal courts or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, have increased the demand for arbitration via the Al-Shabaab Courts. The reason being, Al-Shabaab courts are swift, seen as fair, impartial and relatively standardised in their approach. More importantly, they are recognised as almost incorruptible. All attributes which formal justice mechanisms were considered not to be (TPME II, RoL Evaluation). Overall, there is much to do in terms of enhancing community conversations, information provision via the media and community awareness to address concerns which impede the promotion of a social contract. In terms of sustainability, as mentioned above and further explained under EQ7, results of most of the projects are difficult to maintain after projects end.

3.6.3 EU support to public services, including PFM and education, has contributed to improved macro-finance management and the improvement of access to education and quality of services (macro-area Governance II – PFM/macro-economic management and Education/ TVET) (JC6.3)

Evidence indicates that there has been an increase in the institutional, human capacities and ownership within the education sector, although there are still significant barriers to ensuring that capacity has been consistently raised and increases are sustainable. The frequent turn-over of staff, low salaries and inter-governmental conflicts have clearly hindered ownership. (I6.3.1)

The EU has supported this through targeted project support and a country wide TA programme to enhance teacher training, the development of a new curriculum and capacity building for teachers and management in education institutions. In addition, EU funding through the WB MPF has funded teacher salaries and globally via the Global Partnership for Education. This is confirmed by several reviews and evaluations with the SESSP evaluation (2021) noting that teacher performance and school management has improved in the target schools through capacity building for teachers and management and the efficiency of the education ministry's new curriculum and provision of textbooks. In particular, the Horumarinta Elmiga III was stated to have effectively engaged and increased the ministries capacity to lead, manage and monitor the education system.

Those in leadership positions tend to change positions frequently and often educational institutions are not well staffed, while low salary levels decrease motivation. The non-resolution of intergovernmental issues blocks progress as sometimes FMS, Somaliland and Puntland do not want to be part of a Somali-wide education TA programme of support or undertake joint initiatives. There is also a lack of funding to the education sector from the FGS as funds do not flow from the central level to FMS, Somaliland and Puntland as intergovernmental fiscal arrangements have not been resolved and therefore all normal functions cannot be undertaken by education institutions. In addition, the majority of EU support has been through projects, with funding through INGOs as implementers. Although this has been the only option to date in the education sector due to low government capacity and concerns related to fiduciary risk, this also in practice hinders capacity building of the national education sector.

There have been exceptionally good results achieved in terms of access to primary and secondary education, as well as non-formal education. But the sustainability of education services without continued donor funding is unlikely. (I6.3.2, I6.3.3)

All EU project evaluations point at excellent results in terms of access and the EU is recognized as a strong partner to deliver education through comprehensive support at school-level. Key to this has been the magnitude and reach of EU-funded SWAP projects as the ESDP III is covering all regions of Somalia. The SESSP was found to have increased access to equitable and inclusive basic education for children and improved learning outcomes for boys and girls in school, while the Horumarinta Elmiga III was noted to have increased access to inclusive, equitable and quality education for the children and young people in Somaliland, through equipping of classrooms, leading to an increase in the number of girls accessing education, as well as pastoral and rural communities. In addition, ECHO through emergency education support has been able to provide educational services for displaced children.

This is due to several reasons, but primarily as the key elements such as running costs of schools and teacher salaries are supported by projects and not at a country wide education system level. Schools supported by the EU SWAP projects are continued from one project phase to the next, while examination costs are high and mostly financed by the EU. This is exacerbated by the large number of INGOs operating EU and donor projects with activities spread across all sub-sectors of education that increases fragmentation. The same applies to

institutional capacity building which remains currently fragmented and lacks a comprehensive approach. For example, teachers trained with EU support are not part of any human resources system nor structure (recruitment, deployment, retention, career path, etc.). There are also external factors such as the extent to which progress has been sustained in the education sector, particularly related to access, has been constrained due to drought, floods and the COVID-19 pandemic, which has led to a reduction in school attendance in many instances.

There has been mixed success with EU TVET projects and little success so far at building a coherent and sustainable TVET system overall. (I6.3.4)

Evidence indicates that for example the Horumarinta Elmiga III programme has been relatively effective and has strengthened the capacities of TVET institutions and provided skills training and scholarships for vulnerable youths and adults in their training centres. On the other hand, the Rehabilitation of TVET (RTVET) project was perceived to have achieved little according to the SESSP 2021. There are various obstacles presented by TVET as it has been difficult to get FGS ownership on TVET as it has a low image in Somalia, although in some areas there was reported to have been support from education authorities and there has been little FGS or FMS funding for TVET. Most TVET courses have been run by NGOs as short courses, but this is often an area where NGOs have less expertise, and the provision of courses is free. The costs for salaries and equipment are paid by the project which has implications for sustainability, as the courses cease once the project is completed. There has also been a lack of participation of the private sector including employers' involvement, agreed common curricula, assessment, certification and accreditation and little quality assurance. This is primarily as the informal sector dominates in Somalia, therefore there are few larger companies who could participate and pre-war TVET structures, which featured private sector participation, no longer exist. A key recommendation of a 2019 review of EU TVET programming pointed to the need to move away from emergency TVET provision to supporting a more sustainable system. A new TVET project (RTVET) was developed by the EU in response to this, which appears to have had limited results to date. Key bottlenecks concerning implementation of the RTVET project have been the very low basic education levels, the need to clarify the division of labour within Somalia's institutions, and volatile security situation in several of the regions where the project is implemented.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the employability of Somalia youth trained via TVET has improved due to a lack of tracer studies or follow-up of students. (I6.3.5)

Training via TVET has taken place, as indicated under I6.3.4, though it is not known what the impact of this training has been. However, there have also been doubts raised in various reviews about the appropriateness of training, particularly given the lack of employer involvement. Under the Horumarinta Elmiga III project the final evaluation notes that the skills provided matched those identified as demanded by local employment markets, which was confirmed by key stakeholders, suggesting that employability has been improved. Although the evaluation caveats this by raising concerns regarding the extent to which TVET teachers are appropriately qualified and technically trained, and notes the need for systematic follow-up of students after course completion. Also, even though the employment of youths after TVET training was a SESSP indicator it appears that this was not monitored by the SWAP and as noted in I6.3.4.

PFM and macroeconomic management have improved, although the overall macroeconomic and fiscal situation remains difficult with sustainability of PFM reforms dependent on the political situation and the overall reform environment. The main obstacles to PFM reform have been the lack of agreement on a framework for resource sharing between the FGS and FMS, assignment of revenues and the functional roles and responsibilities of the different levels of government for service delivery. (I6.3.6)

There has been good progress made in technical PFM reforms supported by the EU and other PFM donors with the MTR of the WB MPF highlighting that there had been 'substantial and persistent progress towards the primary aim of strengthening core state institutions, focusing on the budget framework and PFM systems.' The main improvements occurring in improved fiscal discipline, revenue generation and cash management. The increase in the Somali authorities' role and capacity in PFM was also noted by the MTR of the EUTF and by stakeholder interviews. The EU has not only supported this capacity building at FGS level but also in FMS through the PREMIS and CRATES programmes which were noted by final reviews as being successful PFM capacity building programmes. Key achievements were the assistance provided to the development and promulgation of legal frameworks related to PFM and their underlying systems and procedures and improvements on the quality of customs processes and data, and the creation of a cadre of customs professionals.

However, the failure to resolve difficult political questions concerning equitable resource-sharing across States has been a particular issue, which has prevented the transfer of budgetary resources to FMS and Somaliland and as a result the creation of an efficient and effective PFM system. It has also undermined trust between the FMS and the FGS which has in some instances made FMS Somaliland and Puntland less willing to be involved in EU PFM initiatives that are perceived as FGS focused. Overall, this lack of a political settlement has undermined attempts to implement some technical PFM reforms that touch on political issues.

Budget support provided a momentum for change in a different way than was originally expected when the budget support was designed. (I6.3.7)

This was due to a decision to use budget support funding to support the HIPC process in conjunction with efforts made by the IFIs, which was important for creating the conditions for Somalia to qualify for the HIPC “decision point”, thereby paving the way for effective debt relief by 2024 (when HIPC “completion point” is anticipated). This in turn is a game changer as it will unlock funding from the IFIs increasing Somalia’s fiscal space and Somalia’s financial credibility. The budget support mechanism itself was overly ambitious with a large number of indicators, which, as it turned out, were not all possible to achieve. Some actions were successfully achieved and supported the implementation of actions within the education sector by other EU projects such as the introduction of the new curriculum and domestic revenue mobilisation, which was being addressed by the EU delegated funding to CRATES, while EU TA supported other complementary PFM reforms. In this way, budget support was important for ensuring ex-ante agreement on actions that were being implemented by other EU projects and also other PFM donors. Less successful were actions where, as mentioned under I6.3.6, the variable tranche indicators touched on politically sensitive issues such as agreeing and implementing a viable framework for intergovernmental fiscal transfers, where progress was mixed. Another element that was not anticipated was the extent to which the goals and objectives of the FGS, FMS, Somaliland and Puntland differed as they did not always have similar agendas. This sometimes undermined the achievement of budget support indicators, as for example FMS might ensure an action was not completed if only the FGS rather than themselves received the funding.

3.6.4 EU support to the productive sector has contributed to improved food security, strengthened resilience and economic improvements yet this was unevenly realised across the portfolio of interventions (macro-area Resilience and economic development) (JC6.4)

The EU mainly relied on FAO and BRCiS / SomReP consortia to support Somalia rural economic fabric (I6.4.1).

During the period reviewed a myriad of interventions particularly strengthened the capacities of smallholders’ groups and communities (which were amongst the primary partners and beneficiaries) and improved their access to natural resources and engagement in more economically viable agricultural activities. Among the UN family, the EU built on FAO partnership with the government which has increased across sectors. Overall, FAO past investments amounted to more than 95 million (2014-2021) while on-going projects total more than USD 168 million (2017-2024). The EU mainly channelled its funding in the agro-pastoral production and livelihoods sectors to support FAO efforts towards improved food and nutrition security information systems (via the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit); land governance and natural resources management (SWALIM; Integrated Land and Water Resources Management, ILWRM); maize production (smallholders’ access to markets project), seed supply chain (Somaseed); or livestock value chain (Enhancing the Somali Livestock Trade, ESOLT; Approach for Integrating Food Security, Nutrition and Resilience among Pastoralist Communities in Somalia, MILK). Collaboration between the SomReP consortium and the BRCiS consortium was praised as exceptionally good.

The EU has contributed to improve sectoral governance and to strengthen value chains with a focus on upstream segments (I6.4.3).

Confronted with a difficult context, the EU followed a more prudent approach in terms of its engagement which was illustrated by small-scale investments in value chains development including improved access to inputs, services, and markets. From 2017 onwards, the EUD sectoral approach shifted towards a more integrated programming with scaled up interventions such as the ILED flagship programme (budget EUR 93.3 million). Evidence from the desk study and interviewees often outlined the need to embrace more innovative approaches with the private sector. The EU improved the income of targeted pastoralists and contributed to export trade through increased capacity for disease control for example. Few EUTF activities also contributed to short and medium-term job creation to relieve the most immediate basic needs of IDPs and returnees. Most of the projects reviewed developed or rehabilitated infrastructures with a focus on water management, however, getting a clear grasp of EU support to infrastructures proves to be challenging (including from the EUD) as investments are spread across interventions and sectors.

Resilience building interventions present mixed results while concerted action contributing to the HDP nexus remains limited (I6.4.2).

During the period reviewed, the EU support was planned, designed, and implemented in a fragile context facing recurrent dramatic shocks. EU partners have been able to reach communities in geographical areas and communities sometimes difficult to access but working in such environment proved to be incredibly challenging for certain partners such as FAO with teams confronted to a limited clarity regarding corporate HDP nexus policies and framework approach, as highlighted in the 2021 Evaluation of FAO’s contributions to the HDP nexus. In the same vein, the operationalization of the EU approach to the nexus remained rather

limited but recently gained momentum⁶³ through the implementation of a shock responsive safety net programme assisting 44.000 households with cash assistance (ILED programme), an ambition that must be praised in a landscape massively supported by the WB. Indeed, the EU funded Social Transfers for vulnerable Somali people, SAGAL project (EUR 27 million), focuses on urban areas while The WB funded Baxnaano programme (USD 300 million) supports 200 000 rural households. The EUD has stepped up efforts to harmonise social transfers with other donors⁶⁴ and to improve coordination mechanisms⁶⁵, though its nexus strategy and modus operandi across programmes/sectors remain unclear. A range of broader issues remain to be addressed such as, for example, the reconciliation between humanitarian principles and the development of digitalised safety nets schemes.⁶⁶

The collaboration between BRCiS and SomReP critically contributed to EU achievements (I6.4.1, I6.4.2).

It was pointed out during interviews that an increased competition was taking place between INGOs and UN agencies in access to funding to implement the same activities. Partnerships with NGOs improved crops and animal husbandry and productive livelihoods with start-up grants for example. Communities have strengthened their capacities in preparedness and resilience through better early warning systems and plans, natural resources management (e.g., pasture improvement and afforestation), and environmental conservation (I6.4.2). The EU also contributed to better address conflict management over resources but assistance to IDPs and returnees' communities was more challenging given notably to shortcomings in the analysis of clan dynamics and socialisation patterns. While clans represent the authority most looked to for accountability, understanding the many and overlapping social contract relationships in targeted communities and learning from projects' implementation proved to be critical.

At FGS and FMS level, the institutional capacity was strengthened to a certain extent (I6.4.1).

Interventions contributed to national ownership in a context challenged by governance issues with systems at FMS level still evolving. Evidence shows that despite the achievements made in building public sector assets, the implementation of projects such as Reinforcing Animal Health Services (RAHS) and ESOLT was hampered by poor sectoral coordination, weak capacity, and a rather negative perception amongst communities towards Government's ability to deliver services. Despite the efforts made in policy development and animal health campaigns, concerns also remained regarding possible threats of bans on livestock exports from Saudi Arabia and Gulf countries which are capturing the largest share of exports – the Saudi Arabia livestock ban in 2018 was for example cited by traders in Puntland as a clear example of the failures of effective institutional coordination.

The EU missed an opportunity to mainstream food and nutrition security issues in economic development objectives (I6.4.2).

There is scarce evidence of EU impact on food security and nutrition which remained critical issues.⁶⁷ Some reports assumed that food security would implicitly derive from an increased access to job opportunities or income, stating, for example, that *“it is reasonable to assume that the impact of developed value chains on food security and nutrition of the beneficiaries has been significant.”* Research indicates that such cause-and-effect link is not systematically the case – especially in terms of nutrition intake since many influencing factors trigger dietary changes from both the supply and demand sides of local food systems. Carried out in 2022, a food system assessment outlines clearly the interactions between food security and value chain development but this exercise could not inform the MIP 2021-2027 which provides an avenue for translating the transition towards agri-food systems into improved chronic food security.⁶⁸

Evidence is patchy regarding EU contribution to sustainable and resilient livelihoods (I6.4.2, I6.4.5).

⁶³ See Somalia case study produced in 2019 by the EU initiative “Guidance package on social protection across the humanitarian-development nexus”: <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/sp/documents/span-2019-case-study-somalia>.

⁶⁴ DG ECHO (2022): Combined evaluation of the European Union's humanitarian interventions in the Horn of Africa, 2016-2020, and DG ECHO's partnership with the international committee of the red cross.

⁶⁵ Cash Alliance set up in 2017, Resilience pillar Working Group in place since 2018 and HDP nexus Task Force implemented in 2020.

⁶⁶ Concerns have been raised for example around the private sector's involvement in data management vis-à-vis the potential risks of weakening humanitarian principles. See: i) European Union (2021): EU Council Conclusions 20 May 2021; ii) European Parliament's Committee on Development (2021): The future of humanitarian aid in a new context full of challenges.

⁶⁷ The evaluation team found a missing link between EUD investments in rural development and food and nutrition security (FNS) stated objectives. This situation derives from the programmes design. Mainstreaming a set of specific FNS indicators would have helped to better grasp FNS results at outcome level. See: European Union (2018): An Intervention Logic and Catalogue of Indicators for Food and Nutrition Security and Sustainable Agriculture (FNS&SA). Available at: https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/system/files/documents/sector/p2688_devco_because_results_count_v5.pdf.

⁶⁸ The 2021-2027 MIP features two expected results related to access to drinking water and to the nutrition status of women and children under five.

Lasting impact is often yet to capture as building resilience is a long term and inherently dynamic process. However, the EU improved information systems such as Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit contribution to early warning and crisis response including the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification.⁶⁹ Little evidence has also been found regarding EU support to the effects of climate change and environmental degradation, but land and water information management systems were improved (e.g., SWALIM and ILWRM projects) and focused mainly on preventing natural disasters in a context of weak governance and limited sustainability due to limited knowledge transfers. Few projects also supported a better access to water (e.g., via infrastructures rehabilitation and construction) and climate smart adaptation or green activities (e.g., solar panels; alternatives to charcoal production from wood) but the latter present little evidence related to behaviour change in targeted populations.

EU support to roads infrastructures has faced a range of significant challenges (I6.4.4).

Weak legislative framework and institutional capacity, limited effectiveness of coordination mechanisms, and competing interests have negatively impacted the design and implementation of road infrastructures interventions. The sustainable Road Maintenance project implemented by GIZ for example aimed to rehabilitate up to 400 km in Somaliland and Puntland and to support the establishment of a Road Authority at the FMS level. Its implementation was confronted with various issues from the national counterpart's side (weak coordination between Somaliland and Puntland public services and the FMS) and GIZ side (management change and poor project design in terms of risk analysis and mitigation measures). Following the suspension of the GIZ project, a partnership with UNOPS also faced significant delays⁷⁰ but contributed to the rehabilitation of 54 km roads in the Jalam-Harfo Section of the Gaalkacyo-Garowe Road (in addition to the 50 km previously rehabilitated). This intervention reflects gaps in technical expertise and institutional capacity to support reforms, issues well acknowledged by the EU Regional Corridors Infrastructure Programme recently launched with the African Development Bank.

There is little synergy between country and regional programmes and mixed results in terms of strengthening IGAD capacity (I6.4.1).

Equally funded by the EDF and the EUTF, regional programmes present budgets varying from EUR 3 million to EUR 60 million. EUD staff had a limited view on the web of regional interventions, but facilitated centrally managed initiatives (e.g., the Horn of Africa Initiative) or managed country components of regional programmes acknowledging that efforts are needed to break through institutional communication channels and to find out where the EUD space is for these programmes. Among the latter, there is little evidence of EU support to the development of borderlands (critical for both formal and informal trade) and mixed results regarding institutional capacity strengthening: IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (also known as CEWARN) improved its ability to collect, analyse, and disseminate data, while EU support to IGAD capacity to implement its "Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative", suffered from a limited ownership and a focus on outputs rather than on strategic outcomes.

Projects have mainstreamed gender but faced challenges in achieving results, especially in areas where women are not traditionally involved (I6.4.2).

Evaluation reports underline the key role of community-level organisations – which are mainly informal – notably in resources and conflict management and prevention (evidence indicates that women were underrepresented in Community Disaster Management Committees, raising the question of the extent to which they can play a recognized role in DRR peacebuilding activities. Lessons learned from a Pro-Resilience Action (PRO-ACT) funded project implemented in Lower Shabelle outline an interesting nexus approach linking water and conflict management, with a strong participation of local actors (committees, government, contractors, youth groups etc.) and the need to advocate for the acceptance of women within existing consultative spaces to ensure that they play a key role in decision-making.

⁶⁹ Used in more than thirty countries now, the IPC provides a common scale for classifying severity into five phases (none/minimal, stressed, crisis, emergency, and famine) and causes of food Insecurity - thus contributing to a relevant, transparent, and shared analysis for both emergency and development responses.

⁷⁰ UNOPS (2021): Internal audit report of Somalia Country Office. December 2021.

3.7 EQ7 Broader effects (Impact and Sustainability)

<p>To what extent has EU support contributed to enhanced conditions for stability, improved resilience and sustainability?</p>	
<p>Summary answer to the Evaluation Question</p>	
<p>The overall outcomes and impact of the EU's support to shaping enhanced conditions for stability, improved resilience and sustainability are modest. These findings should not come as a surprise given the very precarious situation of the country in terms of its security, governance, statebuilding processes and food insecurity, compounded by natural disasters like severe droughts and floods. But these outcomes and impact fall far short of the ambitious goals which the EU had formulated in the NIP 2014-2020. This finding does not take away, however, the probability that without the EU support the downward trend of Somalia pre-2012 might have continued.</p> <p>Despite this overall status quo mentioned above, the EU has contributed to elements of statebuilding and peacebuilding in Somalia with substantial resources with some areas showing signs of improvement and outcomes, such as the enhanced capacity of the FGS in central sectors, in particular the police, PFM and education. Selected government-internal systems have been strengthened, some essential state functions were re-established and there is more territory controlled by the security forces. As such, more regions are in the process of being stabilised – despite Al-Shabaab still being present throughout the country and not having been defeated – and efforts to strengthen the social compact at local government and community level have born some fruits. But the massive international contributions, which the EU support was part of, could not help to bring peace and development back to Somalia in the absence of fundamental constitutional reforms, which have to be generated and governed by Somalia's citizens and their representatives. During the recent three years, the reform process was also impacted by the worsening relations between the Farmajo Government and the FMS, the break-down of the political and policy dialogue between this government and the international community and the COVID-19 pandemic. At the technical level, however, the EU has contributed to improved sectoral governance in the education sector by facilitating sector policy dialogue, improving the policy environment, strengthening service delivery in the education sector and enhancing linkages between early recovery and long-term engagements. As for resilience, food security and (local) economic development, achievements have been made in value chains development and DRR. But there is little evidence of lasting improvement as a result of the EU's support in these domains. Food security objectives have not been mainstreamed and a systemic nutrition sensitive approach was not developed. While critical support was provided to develop a DRR strategy and better coordinate early and long-term recovery, the impact on building the resilience of the most vulnerable groups, including women, young people and IDPs, was limited.</p> <p>In terms of sustainability, few findings suggest that EU funded initiatives in relation to peace, security, statebuilding, including constitutional reform, rule of law and local governance, have lasted on after the support was terminated. The major bottleneck is the high dependence on international support and the very modest domestic tax collection capacity of Somalia. However, some areas were noted where the effects of the EU's external support will continue after the ending of a project – findings in this regard come from interventions supporting local economic development and smaller scale support for communities, local-level dialogue platforms and rule of law. In the domain of resilience and food security, most EU contributions have faced limited prospects in terms of sustainability and in overcoming the drivers threatening economic development and resilience building.</p>	

3.7.1 With the contributions provided by the EU, overall peace and security have improved and the reconstruction of the state, including its governance has advanced (JC7.1)

The EU has contributed with significant investments to shaping peace and security and to the reconstruction of the state, including its governance, amidst the lack of an appropriate national political and legal context. Some impact was achieved in selected areas, institutional strengthening in particular, but the EU's support, as part of a wider international effort, could not help to let peace and security unfold broadly across the country. (I7.1.1, I7.1.2, I7.1.3, I7.1.4, I7.1.5)

Comparing 2014 and today, there is evidence to state that the overall situation concerning peace, security and statebuilding has improved, though only to some extent. Fundamental issues in relation to the constitution, the electoral system and the security of the country have remained unsolved to date which are necessary to organise all legal, societal and developmental frameworks and agreements necessary to get Somalia on a path towards peace and development. The EU, in close collaboration with other international partners, has invested intensely into this process but the impact of all these efforts has been – overall – very modest. Notwithstanding these underwhelming findings, there are plenty examples to confirm that the EU's support

contributed to achieving impact in selected areas, but these were not strong enough to generate a momentum towards a more substantial change – a finding which should not come as a surprise in the absence of a conducive and supportive Somali political environment.

As presented under EQ 6, the EU was able to contribute to strategic outcomes in the security domain resulting in a strengthening of exchanges between FGS and FMS in the police sector and contributing to the consolidation of peace and security in some areas of the country. The EU – in close collaboration with other international actors (the UN, USA and UK in particular) – engaged under the heading “*inclusive politics in Somalia*” in political and policy-related dialogue with the FGS to promote inclusive and sustainable political settlements and democratisation processes. Other international partners the EU worked with in this domain were Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Norway and Switzerland. While this is a politically sensitive topic to which international actors – being outsiders to the intrinsically country-internal governance process – can only contribute modestly, some progress can be recorded. This concerns the period leading to the elections in 2016, which were held successfully with outside support, and the difficult FGS-donor relationships as of 2020 resulting in a temporary close-down of dialogue because of continuous delays in relation to the electoral process, the stepping down of the Farmajo Government and the election of a new President of Somalia in May 2022. The EU contributed to this most recent development with the postponement of budget support as of 2020 and the resumption of budget support once federal elections were concluded and a new administration sworn in, putting an end to a prolonged political and constitutional crisis.

The impact and sustainability of EU’s-heavy investment in the security sector - along with other donors’ contribution – were seriously hampered by the absence of much-needed political and constitutional agreements between FGS and FMS on security-related policies, models and the implementation of structural reforms. This can be exemplified by EU’s inability to disengage from its support to the AU mission given the prolongation of the 2018 Transition Plan from AMISOM (now ATMIS) to the SNAF. Despite close coordination and enhanced synergies between different EU services, including DG INTPA and FPI, stabilisation efforts fell short on improving local governance. The outdated Wadajir Framework (launched in 2016) is partly to blame for it, along with limited commitments from FGS and FMS. One of the EU projects in support of local governance, namely through the FCA-implemented project (EDF) to form and strengthen local councils, was deemed relevant but slow. Yet, it provided a good example of coordination and complementarity between soft and hard components of EU’s stabilisation programming working towards peace dividends and state reconstruction, which also included the provision of basic services to the local populations.

Support to statebuilding and the re-establishment of state functions and country systems was provided throughout the evaluation period with some success in selected areas. Support to PFM was channelled via the WB’s MPF, the EU’s budget support and accompanying TA and delegated funding to the FCDO CRATES and PREMIS projects that contributed to improvements at the technical level, thereby helping to shape preconditions for wider reform once the political situation allows. This included support to the IMF Somalia Country Fund for Capacity Development and the Financial Governance Committee mechanism, which became an innovative tool for managing fiduciary risk and supporting politically sensitive reform, while CRATES and PREMIS supported customs reform and PFM system development. Somalia also graduated to become a formal WB member in 2020 which follows PFM reform and serious steps taken to reach HIPC Completion Point. But reviews have noted that the international support so far has done less well in support of overall statebuilding efforts and the strengthening of accountability mechanisms to the Somali public. While progress has been made on the technical side of PFM reform, the impact it has realised is so far still fragile and if intergovernmental fiscal transfer issues are not resolved fully, will effectively undermine other reforms. Also, the FGS is still not delivering services on its own, unable to raise taxes beyond 5 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or paying salaries. There was not sufficient evidence to conclude whether long-term legitimacy of the government and its accountability has been improved as a result. It was noted, however, that support to local economic development has been instrumental in improving capacity at local level, resulting also in some improvement of service delivery – the education sector is the most prominent example. There is only anecdotal evidence about the extent to which the Somali society, as a whole, became more inclusive and the extent to which civil society has acquired a capacity to hold the FGS and FMS to account. Though, as mentioned under EQ 6, there are pockets of success at the local level where dialogue and problem-solving processes took place via platforms which brought local government and civil society together.

This overall gloomy picture does not take away the fact that in selected areas, results were achieved in politically sensitive domains. Noteworthy are projects which brought about political agreements at FMS level. The EU also provided support to IGAD via an IcSP-funded project aiming at consolidating state formation and political dialogue through shuttle diplomacy. Results of the project implemented by IGAD’s Special Mission to Somalia led, inter alia, to an agreement established between the Galmudug FMS and ASWJ groups (Ahlu Sunna Wajjama’a: Somalia-based paramilitary groups consisting of moderate Sufis opposed to radical Salafism) to implement two power sharing arrangements. One between Galmudug and ASWJ and one between South-West Administration and Upper-Bookol Community, to de-escalate tensions related to power sharing agreements and to the representation in different FMS.’ A success story of a quite different nature is the rehabilitation of the soccer stadium in Mogadishu which had been used by clan militias in the past but

today, with broad international support (including the EU and FIFA) is the place for soccer teams hosting national tournaments – a small step towards shaping state legitimacy and inclusiveness.

3.7.2 With the contributions provided by the EU, targeted communities and their population are more resilient, less vulnerable to shocks and able to sustain their living (JC7.2)

Little evidence points to EU achievements in food and nutrition security as a result of its contribution to resilience building and economic development. Malnutrition was mainly addressed by ECHO with missed opportunities to develop a systematic nutrition sensitive approach. Critical support was provided to better coordinate early and long-term recovery priorities and, at community level, DRR strategies were developed. However, this approach tended to have a limited impact on building the resilience of the most vulnerable groups such as women, young people and IDPs. (I7.2.2, I7.2.3, I7.2.4, I7.2.5)

While the EU support has contributed to enhance resilience and to develop market-driven value chains, evidence and interviews show that this support has not induced a positive change in addressing chronic food and nutrition security. The objectives pursued towards economic development have indeed focused on food availability and food access, which were at the core of the EUD portfolio, while the NIP 2014-2020 also aimed to improve food consumption. During the period reviewed, EDF programming did not follow a systematic nutrition sensitive approach and EUTF interventions resulted in few improved nutrition results, including for IDPs, while displacement exacerbates vulnerabilities – especially for young children confronted with difficult access to nutritious food and basic health and education services. Opportunities have been missed to better understand and address malnutrition which was mainly addressed by humanitarian players in a context of critical deterioration resulting from structural and conjunctural issues. In 2022, Somalia faced its worst drought in four decades affecting nearly half of its population and leading to massive displacement while food imports have decreased by half and inflation turned the Somali food basket into the most expensive in Eastern Africa. During the period reviewed, the meagre gains derived from the EU support to enhanced resilience have been constantly jeopardised by natural disasters leading to women, youth, IDPs and returnees' inability to better cope with and bounce back from shocks. Little evidence presents a lasting impact of the EU support to these groups including a steady improvement in their access to basic social services - a situation also stemming from the Government's capacity problems and budgetary constraints. Evidence is also scarce regarding the impact and sustainability of EU investments towards women and youth economic development, social inclusion remaining a great hurdle that needs to be overcome. Efforts have been made, at project level, to increasingly implement an HDP nexus approach and the EU has stepped up its support in resilience building approach by supporting critical tools such as the 2017 Drought Impact Needs Assessment (undertaken by the FGS with support of the UN, EU and WB which has allowed it to collect data across eighteen sectors). The exercise has delineated early and long-term recovery priorities and informed the Recovery and Resilience Framework providing for policymaking and financing. At community level, DRR strategies were developed, as well as Early Warning Early Action Committees linked to relevant authorities, but evidence points at a limited impact in building the resilience of the most vulnerable groups such as women, young people and IDPs. The situation of the IDPs in Mogadishu remains of utmost concern with very limited prospects of returning due to prevailing insecurity and loss of livelihoods and hardly any opportunities to develop a new life in Mogadishu. A major problem for IDPs is their struggle to integrate due to limited income opportunities, limited access to services, curtailed housing, land and rights, and the exploitation by landowners and gatekeepers.

3.7.3 With the contributions provided by the EU, effects and results of development efforts are being sustained and likely to continue to yield benefits in the targeted outcome areas (JC7.3)

Macro-area I (RoL, governance & security): Most of the interventions were not deemed sustainable under macro-area I, in particular the larger investments into Somalia's institutional environment in support of wider reforms. Some smaller scale interventions, however, show signs of continuation though it is too early to say whether these will sustain (I6.2.4, I7.3.1).

These were also the conclusions of the RoL evaluation (TPME, 2021) which stated that *"long-term sustainability [is difficult to envisage] without an enabling and robust framework of laws, policies and independent institutions designed to deliver to that framework. No matter how much support and development is given to the organisations which deliver RoL and justice, it can only survive and prosper within a defined framework. After 9 years of investing in individuals, a provisional constitution and few enabling laws passed in the RoL sector in that period, it is difficult to see where that framework is coming from."* More specifically, the factors impeding sustainability were the following: i) the clarification of rights and responsibilities between FGS and FMS under a federal agreement; ii) the very low capacity of institutional structures within some of the FMS; iii) the absence of a long-term financial planning by the Government and the absence of financial resources to maintain infrastructure, equipment and buildings; iv) the limited constructive and problem-solving dialogue among Somali key stakeholders to broker agreements; v) the perceived lack of direct ownership and leadership by Somali stakeholders; and vi) the ability to retain (trained) staff and their knowledge in positions where change can be effectuated.

An external assessment of the JPP, for example, noted that, despite being a ‘Somali-led project,’ it did not have a transformational role due to issues of ownership and leadership by the Somali state actors (see also JC2.1). The EU’s support allowed the FGS to build a biometric payroll system which works, and which can help the police apparatus to function properly once the current funding of stipends ends in 2024. Yet, as stated by several interviewees and the TPME RoL evaluation, the payment of stipends remained “*the most pressing individual area of sustainability,*” since “*it is not a long-term solution nor an alternative to salary payments.*” In this regard, the FGS, Puntland and, to a lesser extent, in Jubaland, governments reached some level of sustainability in terms of ensuring the payment of salaries/stipends to their police forces. But the main question is whether the FGS and other FMS can mobilise enough domestic resources to cover these costs. This will only become clear as of 2024.

The extent to which the provision of justice services across the country can be sustained is limited. Support in this domain is expensive and there are no real partnerships for taking on services after project completion. In the absence of a finalised National Constitution providing a clear and unambiguous national framework which also rules the relationship between FGS and FMS; the lack of laws, particularly across the criminal justice sector; the lack of a Constitutional Court to interpret the law; the lack of suitable and sufficient infrastructure across the country to manage RoL processes and the limited and flawed interactions between the police and justice organs, it is difficult to see how long-term sustainability can be realised without an enabling and robust framework of laws, policies and independent institutions designed to deliver to that framework. More precisely, after 9 years of investing in individuals, a provisional constitution and few enabling laws passed in the RoL sector in that period, it is difficult to see any progress on the creation of such a framework.

Some smaller and shorter-term interventions at the local level, such as the support to platforms and dialogue mechanisms between citizens and local authorities displayed a good level of ownership and were able to continue after the intervention had ended. The EU’s support was successful as explained in more detail in Box 6. For example, the non-state actor platforms in Somaliland (SONSAF⁷¹), Puntland (PUNSA⁷²) and South-Central Somalia (SONSA⁷³) continue to function independently according to the field visit and complementary interviews conducted. The probability of sustainability is also high where implementing partners work with existing structures such as the elders, or a peace committee which will continue to exist long after the project is completed. This was noted in the end-of-project evaluation (2018) of a project on civil engagement in reconciliation and state formation in Southern Somalia. There are also examples from smaller institutions, which have been supported under RoL interventions, such as the Somalia Bar Association or the Alternative Dispute Resolution centres, as noted in the RoL evaluation. They are displaying some evidence of continuance and longer-term future, similar to other efforts of locally self-financed activities for which sustainability are progressing, albeit on a slower pace (TPME, 2021).

Box 6 Supporting governance and RoL via the strengthening of local NGOs

During the period 2015 to 2017, the EU funded Saferworld to assist CSOs to create local NGO platforms in different parts of Somalia and Somaliland and to build their capacities. Collaboration was sought with CSOs/NGOs who had been set up and were functioning before the arrival of EU’s support. Via the platforms, individual CSOs were linked up and became channels through which (local) governance and the social contract between the population and the state were strengthened. Each platform had to come up with its own constitution and planning. The EU has supported them over multiple years, then support was stopped, and they still exist. The strongest are SONSAF (Somaliland) and PUNSA (Puntland). SONSA has started to become a voice for people and worked together with PUNSA during the last elections. SONSA has 20 CSOs, others have around 60 CSO member organisations. The platforms have the capacity to influence the government, publish about their work and the government has called them to mediate when there were troubles. Originally, they only received EU funding, but now they are strong enough and can apply to other funding as well. These platforms and strong local NGOs are also invited when the EU launches Calls for Proposals (see JC2.1) which helps to further localise the EU’s support.

Macro-area II (Education and PFM): There is limited evidence to support potential sustainability of results for macro-area II due to the uncertain political and macroeconomic reform environment for PFM and the heavy reliance on donor funding and external implementers in the education sector. (I7.3.2)

Although access to education has increased, this will not necessarily be sustainable due to high levels of poverty in Somalia and also extreme climatic events such as drought and flooding which impact on access and enrolments. Quality is also likely to be an issue due to a continued lack of ownership and capacity within sector ministries and agencies and a lack of sector financing. FGS funding for the education sector is extremely limited. This lack of ownership has attempted to be addressed in the SESSP through ensuring the Ministry of Education is the lead agency for the programme, while it has been highlighted in more recent reviews that the use of INGOs for implementation also fragments the sector and undermines ownership and capacity building. Management capacity is still undermined by the high turnover of staff, and it is notable that the SESSP 2021

⁷¹ Somaliland Non-State Actors Forum.

⁷² Puntland Non-State Actors Association.

⁷³ Somalia Non-State Actors, previously known as Somalia South Central Non-State Actors (SOSCENSA).

evaluation recommended that a sustainability plan still needs to be developed. The sector is also very dependent on donor funding and teacher salaries are already extremely low which reduces motivation. The EU's focus on building classrooms means additional funding for maintenance is needed and increases the number of schools the respective governments need to fund, when they are already under pressure due to low revenue mobilisation. This situation is likely to remain unless political issues relating to intergovernmental fiscal transfers are resolved.

The level of PFM reform throughout the evaluation period has been limited by the lack of a political settlement which also impacts on the extent to which PFM reforms undertaken to date will be sustained as it depends on the political will to maintain the macroeconomic reform environment and the capacity of Somali authorities to continue using PFM systems that have been developed. Although there have been some successes in technical reforms, due to this, there is no guarantee that these reforms will be maintained at either FGS or FMS level. It is also notable that the EU is stepping back to some extent from PFM reform and is limiting support to some very targeted TA, to ensure an efficient division of labour between PFM donors, with the expectation that new WB programming will be sufficient to meet gaps. This may also have an impact on sustainability given the high value that both donors and government have placed on EU support in this area, particularly regarding EU technical expertise and policy dialogue. Given this, it is difficult to assess the extent to which reforms will be sustainable, as they will continue to depend on the overall political and macroeconomic environment.

Macro-area III (resilience & local economic development): Most of the EU contributions have faced limited prospects in terms of sustainability and critical challenges in overcoming the drivers threatening economic development and resilience building. The main reasons behind this situation have been presented at length in the report, including the poor enabling environment and missing political economy analysis, weak institutional and individual capacity, and a fragmented EU sectoral portfolio constantly adjusting to evolving contexts. (I7.3.3)

EU projects in most cases did help communities to manage shocks and vulnerabilities (even when the scale of these interventions was small compared to the scale of the needs). However, the sustainability of these projects is questionable when projects: i) required government's regulatory efforts (ESOLT and RAHS); ii) relied on the delivery and maintenance of public goods (e.g., Somaseed), or iii) had expected the government to coordinate/take over activities after the project terminated (e.g., SWALIM). One of the major limitations that undermined the sustainability of EU interventions was government ministries' lack of technical and financial capabilities, as well as the lack of coordination between the FGS and FMS which was partly a result of the evolving federal system in Somalia. In addition to factors relating to government institutions, sustainability was undermined by recurring natural/environmental occurrences such as droughts and flash floods (e.g., SomReP - Lower Shabelle Project) whereby shallow wells developed by the project came short of addressing community needs. These examples, in essence, indicate that the projects have not been able to overcome the drivers threatening the resilience of targeted communities. However, the EU should be realistic about the limited ability of (relatively short) projects⁷⁴ to overcome macro-level phenomena such as systematically recurring natural disasters, especially in the case of Somalia which is in fact a structural issue related to geography, but also on the state of politics for the past three decades.

Interestingly, there is an example from the BRCiS intervention where supported communities improved their food consumption and adapted to healthier coping mechanisms to shocks not only because of the project but also due to their reliance on family members (even more so than the international community). Such actions that are based on existing capacities (social capital in this case) are likely to be more sustainable. The extent to which a similar observation can be captured in other projects and how long after the action this behaviour and social networks are able to sustain gains should be further investigated. Most projects did benefit communities in terms of livelihood creation, diversification, behavioural change, institution building, etc. As was found (EQ5), the socio-economic situation of women in particular could have arguably improved. However, there is insufficient evidence to indicate that these changes outlast specific activities of a project let alone the project itself. Moreover, findings under JC 5.2 indicate that interventions did not adequately aim to address structural or cultural barriers to gender equality – which further negatively affects the sustainability of project gains. The same observation was made on youth beneficiation under JC 5.2. While youth employment was one of the objectives of some projects (e.g., BRIDGES), there is insufficient evidence to show that the training and employment gains that were achieved during the project will go beyond the project's lifetime. This is largely due to market conditions, which cannot fully absorb trained TVET graduates, and despite the project's well thought-out sustainability strategy, anchored on the government (on regulation and qualification framework) and the private sector (which was seen to provide employment).

⁷⁴ See, for example, Pro-Resilience Action PRO-ACT project implemented by FAO in Lower Shabelle.

4 Overall assessment and conclusions

4.1 Overall assessment

Considering the complex environment, the overall assessment of the EU's external action in Somalia, across the services and in partnership with like-minded donors, is positive. It has consisted, not surprisingly, of a learning process in which hurdles had to be overcome and the engagement adjusted. The EU, despite previous engagement with Somalia, had to 'learn by doing' in the form of supporting a mix of projects and the multilateral funds managed by the WB, UN and the AfDB. These early years, 2014 to 2015, were the time when the aims of the New Deal (2011) and its tailored version for Somalia, the Somali Compact (2013), had to be converted into concrete action. The EU's engagement in Somalia, with the NIP 2014-2020 being largely based on the statebuilding ambitions and objectives of the Somali Compact, became a prominent EU test-case for putting the New Deal into practice. Taking these objectives as the reference and comparing them with the real results achieved today (after nearly EUR 1.6 billion of international cooperation funding plus humanitarian assistance channelled into Somalia between 2014 and 2021 by EU institutions), the outcomes and impacts of this investment has however been considerably less than expected according to the ambitions laid out in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020. Despite the EU's best efforts to tailor an appropriate engagement strategy, these have been overwhelmed by political and clan conflicts, unsolved constitutional issues, the conflict with Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in the northern part of the country, and the humanitarian crisis caused by natural and man-made disasters.

The period 2017-2018, following the London Somalia Conference 2017 and preceded by the launch of the EU's Global Strategy (2016), made the EU's cooperation more comprehensive and strategic in its engagement with Somalia. Additional funding of EUR 200 million via the EUTF could be programmed, which was complemented by innovations such as the provision of EUR 100 million general budget support (also funded from EUTF), needed changes in EU staff, and the opening of the EU representation in Mogadishu in 2017 - the EUD's political section moved from Nairobi to Mogadishu while the cooperation section stayed in Nairobi. Contributing to these positive developments were the Somali change of government following the elections in 2016 and an initial constructive engagement by the EU and other international partners with the Farmajo government until the end of 2019. The worsening relationship of the international community with this government, due to the government's anti-federalist approach and the disregard of the existing (provisional) constitution which led to the postponement of the general budget support, was compounded by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.

The unforeseeable COVID-19 crisis led to the emergence of fault lines in the EU's engagement with the Government of Somalia and national NGOs. EU staff travel was restricted, cooperation partners withdrew their staff from the field and the implementation of projects was delayed. During this period, the EU maintained contacts with the Farmajo government at the technical level and, despite these difficult times, manoeuvred its cooperation with various partners successfully through the pandemic, the end of whose phase wave broadly coincided with the change of government in May 2022. This most recent period saw also the formulation of the MIP 2021 to 2027 for Somalia with NDICI- GE funding, considering lessons from the past and setting out new directions such as a strong focus on climate via the TEI.

In terms of thematic and sectoral engagement, the EU supported inclusive stakeholder processes and gradually developed over the evaluation period into one of the major five international partners for political and policy dialogue with the Farmajo government on constitutional issues, macro-economic reform, peace and security and the education sector – for which the EU, without EU MS, was the third largest donor next to the USA and the UK (over the period 2014 to 2020). The EU's engagement via the NIP 2014-2020, formulated for the implementation of a EUR 955 million budget, was significant. But the EU's strategic engagement was particularly increased as of 2017/2018, not only due to the provision of general budget support but also by a structural shift (informed by the integrated approach and the move of the EUD to Mogadishu) to become more of a strategic player. Collaboration with international partners was described as very good and Brexit at that moment did not have a major impact on the EU cooperation with Somalia, though the UK's absence from the EU family was noted during the time when discussions took place concerning the postponement of general budget support due to the political crisis in Farmajo's government. However, EU MS felt that the EU, being one of the big five international partners, dealing with statebuilding and macro-reform issues, including the security sector, paid only limited attention to its collaboration with EU MS. Contributing to this was the limited number of staff at the EUD, a result of the fact that wider EU/EU MS governance and financing decisions were taken at levels much higher than the EUD. Comparing the three macro-areas of the EU's support, most of the positive sector results were achieved under macro-areas I and II, i.e., peace and security/ RoL/ governance, macro-economic support/ education. Results under macro-area III, resilience and (local) economic development, were more mixed, as further explained in the conclusions section. These results broadly match

with findings from other evaluations on support to highly fragile states.⁷⁵ Finally, looking at the many domains the EU is supporting, and considering the limited number of staff it can mobilise to accompany these interventions beyond the managing of contracts, the intended breadth of the EU engagement appears to have been overambitious.

4.2 Conclusions

Building on the findings of the seven EQs, the team developed eight overarching conclusions as summarised in the table below.

Table 2 Overview of conclusions

Key area	Conclusion	Main linkages to the EQs	Evaluation criteria
Design & implementation of EU support	C1. A responsive programming	EQ1 & EQ5	Relevance, effectiveness and coherence
	C2. An appropriate set of instruments and modalities	EQ2 & EQ6	Relevance, effectiveness and, coordination & complementarity
	C3. A progressively integrated approach	EQ2 & EQ4	Relevance, EU added value, coherence and, coordination & complementarity
	C4. Institutional setting and dilemmas	EQ3 & EQ4	Efficiency, EU added value and coherence
	C5. Effective synergies with other cooperation actors	EQ1, EQ2 & EQ4	Relevance, efficiency and EU added value
Effects of EU support	C6. Overall effective support to civil society and cross-cutting issues	EQ1, EQ5 & EQ6	Relevance and effectiveness
	C7. Achieved results and systemic change	EQ 5, EQ6 & EQ7	Effectiveness, impact and, sustainability
	C8. Overall engagement	All EQs	All OECD/DAC criteria

In some of the conclusions, the team discusses the findings of this evaluation in light of the general guiding programming principles, which the EU intended to apply when transitioning from the EU external action financing architecture in place under the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014-2020 to the new architecture established through the NDICI- GE instrument for the MFF 2021-2027 – see Box 7 below.⁷⁶ These guiding principles are highlighted under each conclusion and provide a bridge to the recommendations of the evaluation, which focus on forward looking elements relevant for the implementation of the current programming framework.

Box 7 Guiding principles for NDICI-GE programming

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy first: Rather than being driven by a variety of instruments, EU External Aid should be guided by EU (geopolitical) policy priorities; in particular, this requires a stronger articulation of EU priorities as well as stronger political and policy dialogue with partner countries and regions. • Geographisation: EU External Aid should have a stronger emphasis on bilateral/regional cooperation, while also using complementarity means of international and development cooperation (e.g., through thematic programmes or rapid response interventions). • Partnership approach, including engagement with civil society: Strengthening alliances and inclusive partnerships with a wider scope of international and local stakeholders (incl. civil society, local authorities, private sector), covering all countries regardless of the level of development. • Interlinked responses: The EU should adopt an integrated approach, using more interlinked responses, including across different sectors of cooperation, and going beyond traditional development cooperation, including by bringing together different areas of EU external action and the external dimension of EU internal policies. • Institutional setting: A proper institutional setting will ensure that the different EU services and their entities will work along clear decision structures and procedures, divide labour according to their mandates and delegate responsibilities to EUDs in coordination with headquarters. Also, EU MS as well as the European Parliament and the Council will be duly consulted and associated to the programming exercises.

⁷⁵ IOB (2022): Impact of Aid in Highly Fragile States. A synthesis of three systematic reviews of aid to Afghanistan, Mali and South Sudan, 2008 - 2021. Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands.

⁷⁶ The NDICI-GE instrument represents key aspects of the Council decision negotiated between the EC, Commission and Parliament establishing these programming guidelines and distillation of priorities for international cooperation in a new geopolitical context for the EU. Available at: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/947/oj>.

- **Financial leverage and using other forms of aid:** The EU should make better use of the full range of external policies and forms of aid, including the ones relying on innovative financing; this implies a stronger policy steer for the use of EU blending and guarantees.
- **Priority areas and related sectors:** MIPs will be designed around broad priority areas, moving beyond the traditional focal sectors. According to the policy-first principle, priority areas should embrace wide domains for engagement and should be informed by the strategic objectives identified for the cooperation.
- **European joint initiatives for a stronger EU in the world:** The ‘working better together’ approach and the promotion of joint initiatives involving the EU, EU MS and other European actors (including EU Financial Institutions) should be promoted in EU External Aid, while continuing ensuring EU Added Value.

4.2.1 Conclusion 1: A responsive programming, but with need for updates

EU support to Somalia was broadly aligned with country priorities, adapted to local context and responded to the policies and strategies set for its engagement at global, regional and country levels, including its guidance for fragile contexts. But, country strategic guidance, linkages with the regional level and civil-military cooperation guidance are mostly outdated and, in some aspects, not clear. Moreover, linkages with the regional level appear selective.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1 and 5.

This conclusion is related to two guiding principles in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: “Policy first” and “Geographisation”.

The EU cooperation with Somalia was designed and implemented in line with Somali national priorities the EU’s policy guidance regarding the country, the region and its thematic priorities. The EU also responded to the needs of the country and its population, and the objectives set – though overly ambitious – targeting priority issues to help the country find its way towards stabilisation and development. As such, the EU’s engagement as of 2014, as laid down in the NIP 2014-2020, was characterised via an inclusive approach and followed the global Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals, which the EU committed to in 2011, when the New Deal was internationally agreed. The Somali Compact included a Special Arrangement with Somaliland and was followed in 2022 by the Partnership Framework for Somaliland (SCDF), which was endorsed by international partners, including the EU. The EU also updated its strategic engagement following the EU Council Conclusion on Somalia (2016) and the formulation of the NPS endorsed at the London Somalia Conference 2017. The 2017-2020 EU Development Cooperation Strategy for Somalia was broadly built on the priorities of the Somali Compact, but it was seeking to move the EU’s cooperation towards a more integrated support, better linking the different EU services, sectors and interventions. This update process went along with the opening of the EUD in Mogadishu (but without its cooperation section, which remained in Nairobi) and the provision of general budget support.

All these steps and changes are witness to an ongoing and intense EU-internal learning process on how to bring the aims of the New Deal into practice. Regular context and conflict analysis at the strategic level was undertaken and taken up. This progressive learning, however, has been interrupted by the difficult relationship of the international partners with the Farmajo government as of 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic. On the side of international partners, a certain “donor fatigue” had developed concerning Somalia due to the enduring political and security crisis in the country. The UK, a major partner for Somalia during the evaluation period, reduced more recently its support to the FGS substantially due to overall change in its political direction and budget cuts for international cooperation. As of 2022, a new momentum is unfolding in Somalia with the election of a new President, but this has been overshadowed globally by the start of the war in Ukraine, which is shifting international priorities largely with unknown consequences for the future international support to Somalia. Moreover, a newly elected Swedish government in 2022 raised questions about Sweden’s future attention to Somalia in view of the Ukraine crisis and Sweden’s new international priorities. The new Swedish Government announced global budget cuts for international development cooperation from 1 per cent to 0.88 per cent, annually – Sweden is today the second most important EU MS supporting Somalia.

Given all these developments and changes, the EU’s strategic guidance for Somalia at the political level is outdated and does not sufficiently clarify how the EU’s engagement at country level needs to connect with the strategic goals set out in the EU’s Regional Strategy for the Horn of Africa (2021). As findings show, the strategic linkages of the Somalia programme with the regional level are not fully clear, which also translates to the implementation level. An updated strategic guidance should further clarify the ambition level of the EU given its human resources on the ground for such a complex engagement, as further discussed under Conclusion 4. In terms of strategic guidance on civil-military coordination – relevant for the EU’s promotion of the HDP nexus – the available UN-OCHA documents for Somalia from 2014 were considered outdated by stakeholders. This resulted from the increasing focus of the international community, including the EU, on stabilisation and recurrent questions on conflict sensitivity and on how to connect with humanitarian actors across different sectors at the implementation level.

4.2.2 Conclusion 2: An appropriate set of instruments and modalities

The EU successfully developed and deployed its support via a variety of financing instruments, modalities, channels and the promotion of cross-cutting issues. The innovative introduction of budget support in combination with TA and sector support in 2017 strengthened its position vis-à-vis national and international stakeholders as a major strategic international actor, able to promote policy dialogue, macro-level changes and sector-level reforms.

This conclusion is based on EQs 2 and 6.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "Increased financial leverage".

The choice of particular intervention modalities, channels of implementation and financing instruments was mostly based on sound analysis, but very much constrained by the country context, which provided limited opportunities in terms of choosing experienced, cost-effective and performing organisations. Pragmatic considerations had to prevail in a number of cases, as can be observed in the collaboration with the UN in certain sectors, like justice, where it is the only organisation present in all parts of Somalia. The project modality was predominant given the limited capacity of Somali governments at FGS and FMS level and among local NGOs. However, the EU took an important and well appreciated step when introducing the provision of general budget support as of 2017/2018. This considerably enhanced the EU's role as a strategic partner in the country, since it provided additional access and leverage to macro-reform policy dialogue with the FGS and international partners in key areas like constitutional reform, security, PFM and the education sector. Support to the latter sector, in particular, shaped ownership and was well designed via the combination of project support under a sector-wide approach with budget support linked to four key variable tranche/ performance indicators on education. However, Somaliland's strong demands for general budget support were not viable for the EU politically and the FMS (Puntland in particular) got increasingly frustrated about EU PFM initiatives, which were seen to be focused mainly on the FGS. The support to resilience and food security via FAO and sizable NGO consortia was overall well set up, yet strategic dialogue with FGS and FMS on how to engage more effectively was limited because of insufficient orientation, priority setting and capacity from the Somali government side. Finally, attention to exit strategies across sectors was very modest suggesting that options for exit need to be more explicitly discussed and formulated when projects are designed.

In early 2022, a proposal was submitted to fund a successor contract to the existing budget support / State and Resilience Building Contract operation (ending in 2023) in combination with other support to PFM reform, notably via TA and assistance to the Auditor General Office and the Financial Governance Committee. The new contract will be smaller in size (EUR 20 million spread over two years, 2024 and 2025) with a smaller number of variable tranche targets (12 in total, focusing on fiscal federalism, PFM and the education sector). This recent decision is coherent with the evaluation team's conclusion that a continuation is important to maintain a relevant role in policy dialogue and for leveraging policy reform at (education) sector level. It is also relevant for strategic reasons as it reinforces other EU engagements in support of PFM, one of the founding elements for statebuilding in fragile contexts in particular.

Concerning the EU's engagement with the private sector, a more specific coordination mechanism – such as an EU/EU MS working group on the private sector – has not been established so far, though there are various exchanges ongoing in this area via other meeting formats. In this regard, efforts are underway to engage more strongly with the private sector via the TEI on the Green Deal for Somalia (see also Conclusion 5 on TEI).

4.2.3 Conclusion 3: A progressively integrated approach

Over time, the EU adapted its support to a changing context via lessons learnt and advanced its comprehensive EU integrated approach with success, though with room for improving the collaboration between missions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EUD. Strong EU inputs were provided into policy dialogue but got stalled during the second part of the Farmajo government, as explained under Conclusion 1.

This conclusion is based on EQs 2 and 4.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "More interlinked approaches".

A key lesson learnt by the EU over the years was that working together is indispensable to be successful in a complex environment like Somalia. This can be clearly noted as of 2017/2018, when the EU's cooperation with Somalia – following the launch of the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security (2016) and the promotion of the integrated approach to address conflicts and crises comprehensively – started to make a quality shift in terms of EU internal complementarity and comprehensiveness which is visible until today. There is strong evidence of successful collaboration between the cooperation and the political sections of the EUD, between these sections and FPI, between the cooperation section and ECHO (which was not optimal until some two years back), between FPI and the EUSR and between headquarters and the field. Also, the move of the political section to Mogadishu, which went in parallel with an updated strategy, additional funding and the start of budget support should be seen as part of an integrated approach. A relative outlier has been the collaboration between the EU services and the CSDP missions (EUTM and EUCAP). Both were deployed to

promote peace and security in Somalia but without any close collaboration or coordination with EU services over several years. This issue has been noted by the EU and EU MS and steps were taken more recently to address this situation. Those include the placement of a EUCAP liaison officer at the EUD since 2020, and the Council Conclusions 2022/2443 stressing the need for EUTM to collaborate with the EUD, EUCAP, EEAS and EU MS. Future performance will depend a lot on the human resources fielded, the duration of their deployment and the directions provided via updated Council Decision spelling out the mandates for these missions. The collaboration between the EUSR and the EUD is positive, but not all possible gains from working together have been explored so far.

Already before budget support started the EU, by virtue of its track-record, technical expertise and financial weight, was able to shape and improve the dialogue, and to maintain a constructive and intense exchange at the technical level. Approaches and structures to foster higher-level policy dialogue with FGS and FMS were also in place since the early years of the evaluation period. Those disintegrated and partially stopped during the second part of the Farmajo government – reinforced by the COVID-19 pandemic – and needed to be re-energised after May 2022 with the election of the new President. Technical sector dialogue with the government, however, continued throughout the period 2020 to 2022 as well as multiple formats of macro-dialogue and sector working groups among Somalia’s international partners. The EU-internal and EU/EU MS dialogue on the postponement of budget support (due to the Farmajo government’s stalling of constitutional reform and elections) was described as lengthy and difficult due to unclear strategic orientations provided by EU headquarters and different views within EU headquarters and among EU MS on stopping, modifying or continuing with the provision of this support. The principal dividing line between these different views was, in short, about how to use budget support: as a development tool or also as a (complementary) political tool to leverage change. The issue was eventually solved to the satisfaction of all parties concerned but the absence of a clear and updated EU-wide strategy on how to engage with Somalia, as stressed under Conclusion #1, was also felt in this regard.

4.2.4 Conclusion 4: Institutional arrangements display several dilemma’s

The EU’s current institutional set-up is the outcome of a generally successful monitoring, evaluation and learning process resulting today in more attention given to location, human resources, synergy between the different EUD sections, and a need for flexibility and visibility. However, considering the scope of the EU’s engagement in this overly complex environment, there is room to improve on staff numbers, work conditions and their placement, but also a more sophisticated visibility of the EU in Somalia overall.

This conclusion is based on EQs 3 and 4.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: “Institutional setting”.

The early years of the evaluation period, as mentioned under Conclusion 1, are noted as “discovering years” during which the EU had to go through a process of exploring and adapting on what it means in practice to translate the ambitious aims of the New Deal for a highly fragile context into effective operations. The timely mobilisation of appropriate staff was the key factor to make an efficient implementation work. Yet the EU headquarters was not always able to manage this successfully. The location of the EUD Somalia in Nairobi led to additional challenges regarding the EU’s position vis-à-vis the Somali governments. This notably changed as of 2017/2018 when the updated strategy, mentioned under Conclusion 1, was implemented – a change which was introduced by the opening of the EUD in Mogadishu (2017) while keeping the cooperation section in Nairobi. Whereas this was an important change, at that time certain dilemmas of having a split EUD remained. In support of the present situation speaks the family positing of Nairobi, making the recruitment of qualified staff easier (Mogadishu is a non-family posting), the lower costs (mainly due to the security situation, which would be even higher with the entire EUD based in Mogadishu), the presence of many international partners supporting Somalia in Nairobi and the longer contracts for EUD staff based in Nairobi, allowing for institutional memory to stay longer (compared to two and three years for colleagues based in Mogadishu – depending on contractual status). Several national and international non-EU stakeholders, however, would welcome a permanent presence of all EUD staff in Mogadishu assuming that this would lead to a closer contact with national institutions and other international partners based in Mogadishu, also sending a strong (political) message that the EUD is fully embedded in Somali realities. All staff being based in one location would also enhance professional interactions among colleagues and would allow to overcome the split in terms of working days causing Mogadishu-based staff, following the Islamic week, to work regularly six days per week.

Despite these delays, funds were overall disbursed for the objectives set over the years, though COVID-19 left its trace for the years 2020 and 2021, when lesser amounts were paid versus planned amounts. Disbursements performance were partially realised via an overall flexible approach, allowing for adaptations where needed, but complex procedures, required by EU financial regulations, had to be observed. Operational delays, also caused by cooperating partners, which several implementing organisations complained about occurred regularly. Those should not come as a surprise for an environment like Somalia. Attention to monitoring, evaluation and learning, supported by TPME facilities, was overall good enough to keep track of sector, programme and project developments and to intervene where necessary.

Another finding in relation to the EU's strategic positioning and engagement in Somalia is the EUD's staff number for its cooperation section and serious delays in placing staff, including the military and police advisors for its political section. This has led to a situation where cooperation staff was increasingly drawn into aspects connecting with political and security related matters at the expense of time for cooperation-related work. Overall, the lower number of EUD staff (if compared to some other international partners) to provide technical advice does not allow to accompany sector developments sufficiently closely. The UK, for example, has more advisory and technical capacity within its own ranks which allows them to accompany and inform change processes more directly and more intensely. Roughly speaking, the ratio for cooperation staff is one EUD staff member per sub-sector area against some two to three at FCDO office.

As for visibility and public imaging, the EU is broadly perceived as a 'good friend' of Somalia but, like other international partners, when it comes to transparency and accountability requirements, its approach contrasts with that of some other players like Turkey. The latter was often rather positively mentioned by senior FGS interviewees despite the latter's non-transparent and non-accountable cooperation approach. The EU's attention to visibility is noticeable, although our findings indicate that it is not good enough. A local communication expert position could not be filled due to the low compensation offered. The insufficient EU communication capacity led to insufficient EU visibility, for example in the context of projects implemented via UN organisations because they did not flag EU support appropriately. Overall, the quality and intensity of the EU's visibility shaped by the EUD was inadequate despite the prominent role the EU plays in Somalia.

4.2.5 Conclusion 5: Effective synergies with other forms of cooperation and other donors

Besides working closely with Somalia officials, the EU collaborated and coordinated successfully with different multilateral organisations (except for certain downsides in working with a few UN agencies), bilateral partners, INGOs and national NGOs. The development cooperation with EU MS, when it occurred, was equally successful and the EU showed its added value compared to the engagement of EU MS, but strategic and targeted EU policy collaboration has been insufficient in some areas (e.g., the private sector).

This conclusion is based on EQs 1, 2 and 4.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "Partnership approach".

Similar to the EU's learning on the integrated approach, the EU understood that working closely in partnership with a variety of actors was indispensable for an environment like Somalia. Partnerships were intense and mostly positive with EU MS, multilateral and non-EU bilateral organisations and INGOs and local CSOs (see Conclusion 6). The overall positive findings on the EU's integrated approach when working with a variety of EU services were presented under Conclusion 3 and the intense development partnerships with Somalia were discussed under Conclusion 1. Partnerships with the so-called non-traditional partners of Somalia, such as most Gulf states or China could not be established due to the exclusive bilateral character of their engagement, though some limited exchanges were realised with Turkey and the UAE in the domain of security.

The EU, with substantial resources to programme and a long-term commitment, was from the beginning of the evaluation period an important institution to a range of international partners and clearly developed as of 2017/2018 – when budget support started – into a key strategic partner for the FGS, but also to the WB, USA, UK and the UN. The EU generally coordinated and worked successfully with these partners, in particular on macro policy reform and on strategic sector policies, including constitutional reform, elections, security, PFM and the education sector. Through these strategic engagements, the EU contributed to create leverage for change though, as mentioned above, the level of change was overall modest and piecemeal in view of the complexity of the country. During the initial years of the evaluation period, the UN was a priority partner for the EU to work with, although in several sectors disappointments about the UN's performance during the past years resulted in the EU's contracting of non-UN organisations from the private sector and INGOs for selected working domains.

Collaboration and coordination with EU MS were broadly satisfactory and the EU complemented the work of EU MS like Sweden, Germany and the UK (until 2016) and, to a lesser extent, Denmark, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. Major sectors for joint EU/EU MS work were education, (local) governance, elections, PFM and security. Regarding resilience and the productive sectors, including support to the private sector as mentioned under Conclusion 2, collaboration was not as intense with room for improvement. Overall, representatives of EU MS felt that the EUD put comparatively more energy into its partnership with the other four big players in Somalia, the WB, UK, USA and the UN, also in the political domain. rather than EU MS This was the result of the EU's strong engagement on macro-reform issues (where EU MS are present to a lesser extent) and the limited EUD staff which are unable to cover all development processes on equal footing, as highlighted under Conclusion 4. However, the TEI helped to create a new momentum for EU/EU MS exchanges. This is a very recent development for which no outcomes can be found so far. In terms of added value, the EU's scale of support (financial as well as non-financial) and the type of its support – a strong focus on macro-reform issues – created benefits to Somalia at different levels, macro, meso and micro, which EU MS on their own could not have realised. The added value has been illustrated via various evaluation findings in relation to the general budget support provision, the opportunities this has created for strategic political as well as policy

engagements, including high-level policy dialogue and its ability to contribute to overall sensitive statebuilding processes in relation to constitutional reform, security and PFM.

4.2.6 Conclusion 6: Overall effective support to civil society and attention to cross-cutting issues

Throughout the evaluation period, the EU paid considerable attention to working with NGOs and CSOs to strengthen civil society. Civil society highly appreciated the support given to promoting local governance and the development of a social contract but this was only partially realised due to the inaccessibility of the country and capacity constraints. Cross-cutting issues, like gender and youth, were addressed via CSO support and other partnerships. Strengthening bottom-up development via local governments was recognised as important, yet more could have been done in view of their relevance for the country's further development.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1, 5 and 6

This conclusion is related to guiding principles expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "Civil support & cross-cutting issues".

The EU worked successfully with INGOs, local NGOs and CSOs to strengthen civil society and to promote social contracts at community level. Investments were guided by the EU's roadmap for engagement with civil society in Somalia, which was updated for the current funding cycle. Consultations with civil society actors took place regularly and aimed at inclusiveness though the sheer number of local organisations and communities always demands for more engagement which the EU, given its resources, cannot deliver. Particularly important and highly appreciated in Somalia was the EUD's attention to the "localisation agenda" via Calls for Proposals tailored to local NGOs and NGO-platform organisations and for which only these organisations were eligible. The EU's support for local NGO platforms was particularly effective and appears sustainable, especially in Somaliland and Puntland where it helped NGOs to enhance their capacity as interlocutors with authorities. This type of support is not much favoured by EU headquarters as it does not allow large amounts of expenditure and is labour intensive, but it shows results in terms of ownership and local leadership. So far, a rather limited number of such local Calls for Proposals were launched and rewarded with funding but there is clearly appetite for more.

This support to civil society helped to strengthen the social contract in selected places but this could only unfold where a level of peace and stability prevailed and where sufficient capacities were in place to implement the projects - either directly, via local NGOs, or indirectly, via INGOs (which managed the majority of civil society support projects). Civil society support projects also paid attention to the civil society/local government interface, though mostly from the angle of CSOs and their communities. Attention to local governments, and their role in local governance processes, was comparatively limited – partially because of the highly complex nature of local governments in Somalia, including capacity constraints, but also because a more dedicated approach on how to work with local governments, in which contexts and via which type of channels and funding arrangements was not spelled out.

The cross-cutting issues of gender, youth, human rights and, as mentioned under Conclusion 1, conflict sensitivity was strongly promoted via projects strengthening CSO capacities, but those issues were also included in other projects on macro-areas I, II and III, though with some variations. Various findings suggest that conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm principles were taken on board in projects, although in a less explicit way and more through being organically included by organisations used to work in areas of conflict and protracted crises. Gender, by far, is the most mainstreamed cross-cutting issue. Human rights and youth are homed often in dedicated (sector) projects, such as education or local governance.

4.2.7 Conclusion 7: Results are positive but insufficient to trigger systemic change

The EU was truly relevant for Somalia and – considering the country situation – a relatively effective supporter of peace and security, (local) governance, PFM and the education sector where some reforms were achieved over the years though their sustainability will be challenged. The EU is also valued in the domains of justice sector reform, resilience, food security and (local) economic development though with more mixed results. Overall, however, Somalia is still extremely far away from being a state which could function on its own.

This conclusion is based on EQs 5, 6 and 7.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "Priority areas and related sectors".

The EU, in cooperation with other international partners and several EU MS, was able to achieve strategic effects and outcomes with regard to several macro-area reforms in relation to macro-economic reform and PFM, peace and security, governance and the education sector. Comparing today's performance of Somalia in these domains with the status quo of 2014, when the EU's NIP started, findings clearly state progress with regard to the statebuilding agenda set out at that time. But progress has been slow, piecemeal and not visible in all regions and sectors of the country due to the unresolved constitutional crisis, conflict, significant capacity deficits at different levels of society and natural disasters. In essence, Somalia is still extremely far away from being a state which could function on its own. In terms of outcomes so far, the country could be strengthened regarding its core institutional functions – PFM-related mechanisms and systems were set up and are running, the civilian and security forces were strengthened and can operate more independently in some parts of the

country and the education sector has progressed to a level which Somali stakeholders from the education sector had not expected back in 2012. Puntland – as the most advanced FMS of Somalia – has started a path towards development and thereby follows the steps which Somaliland, meanwhile in full development mode, had taken long before. Yet despite some positive results, political formation, national reconciliation, and dialogue remained an unfinished task in Puntland while the political situation in Somaliland is currently highly instable. Outcomes from investments in the RoL/justice sector are raising questions about the overall effects the support has created and its sustainability, especially considering the extremely limited domestic tax collection capacity of Somalia, including Somaliland. Support for TVET has delivered mixed results though with variations per region where TVET support has been implemented. Several of Somalia's FMS remain extremely weak in terms of their capacity to govern and steer their affairs which can be concluded from the TVET support but also a multitude of other sectors and sub-sectors. Overall, the conflictual relations between the FGS and FMS continue to hamper reforms and affect implementation, explaining in part the sensitivities of the FMS and Somaliland to the EU's cooperation approach, which they claim is marked by a lack of consultation and support and favouring the FGS.

In the productive sectors, the EU was progressively embarking towards sustainable agri-food system transformation and the intense cooperation between the EU and FAO contributed to value chain development, delivering public goods and strengthening institutional capacity. But this support did not extend to capacity development on the Somali side, largely due to continuously changing institutional arrangements, a highly politicised context and a fragmented policy dialogue. Until 2018, mostly unsuccessful attempts were made to create synergies between small-scale interventions funded by the EU. The introduction of the territorial ILED programme attempted to make the EU's support to the productive sectors more strategic and effective but with mixed results so far. Public-private partnerships were promoted but involving the private sector in a highly volatile Somali context remained particularly challenging. Adding to these challenges was the lack of mainstreaming food and nutrition security objectives across EU programming. The resilience and livelihoods of vulnerable communities, including women, young people, IDPs and returnees, remains extremely low. The EU also invested in sector-related regional programmes but only a few synergies were created with country-related investments, partially caused by a web of regional interventions managed across different EU institutional entities.

4.2.8 Conclusion 8: Overall engagement of the EU is positive but a further strategic engagement is required

With the formulation of the NIP 2014 to 2020, the EU committed to accompanying and assisting Somalia long term, on its path out of conflict and fragility. A flexible way of engagement was required in this very volatile and complex context. In particular during the early years of the evaluation period, the EU had to go through a learning curve about what it means to work in Somalia. The EU then gradually evolved into a strategic partner in concert with several other international supporters producing positive results – in as far as the country situation allowed for it. Nevertheless, questions were raised concerning the breadth of the EU's engagement in view of its institutional setting and human capacities in the region. Finally, there is a need for revising a strong EU and EU MS narrative of Somalia being in continuous crisis.

This conclusion is based on EQs 1 and 7.

This conclusion is related to a guiding principle expected in the transition from the past to the current MFF, namely: "Towards a stronger EU in Somalia".

To sum up: the EU had worked in Somalia prior to 2014, but the EU's engagement as of 2014 was strongly motivated by the broad and ambitious peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal which were taken up in the Somali Compact, the key policy and planning document of the FGS when rebooting its statebuilding process as of 2012/2013. The earlier years of the evaluation period were characterised by investments in many areas via, often, smaller projects and the co-funding of multilateral development funds. With the opening of the EUD Somalia in Mogadishu in 2017, the EU started to bridge the earlier political and operational cooperation gap when the EUD was fully homed in Nairobi. Following this locational change, combined with updated strategic orientations and additional funding (allowing the EU also to provide general budget support) plus a successful promotion by EU headquarters towards acting via a more integrated approach among EU services, allowed the EU to become one of the five key strategic international partners shaping qualitative changes at the macro level. Combining several projects under a sector-wide approach in the education sector with general budget support turned the EU also into one of the two international leaders for reforms in the education sector. In the security and defence sectors, in the past few years, the EU successfully combined available services and funding streams from different EU actors, including EU MS and CSDP missions. This example of the EU's integrated approach mirrors the EU's increasingly strategic role and current status as one of the key international actors in the security sector in Somalia.

Despite these overall positive results achieved, there are variations across sectors. Generally speaking, the EU performed more positively with regard to its interventions for macro-reform issues and key statebuilding sectors. This type of support can be accompanied rather effectively with a relatively smaller number of sector-savvy EUD staff members. In other sectors, in particular those where assistance took place via a multitude of


projects spread across different areas, such as food security support, less progress is noted. This is mostly due to the complexity of engaging via (smaller) projects in overly complex change processes at the lower levels of government and society (the EU-FAO portfolio is large but is composed of small-scale projects). Where the EU can work with highly trusted partners long-term (such as with dedicated INGOs in the education sector) which have the capacity to act rather independently and solve problems in line with the policy and operational orientations set, the picture looks differently. Unfortunately, there are not too many organisations of such nature in the Somalia context. International partners, including EU MS, are much better placed to follow and accompany change processes at the sectorial and technical levels due to their higher number of staff posted in the region. The UK, for example, outnumbers the EU by approximately three to one with the staff it has mobilised for its Somalia support. EU MS, however, expect from the EUD to invest in all the sectors and sub-sectors where they are active and thereby to engage jointly with them in areas of support where the EUD has a lesser comparative advantage. As such, focusing the EU's support more to what has been realised over the years, is difficult.

Finally, following several findings from the evaluation but also recent calls by the new President of Somalia, an international (western) perspective prevails which frames Somalia nearly exclusively as a country of never-ending conflict and crises thereby closing space to look at its economic opportunities. In contrast, Turkey adopted a different position, as perceived by Somali stakeholders, via well appreciated investments and economic development projects it has initiated and realised over the past years. Several EU initiatives were taking place as of 2019 to promote responsible and sustainable investments via European DFIs and the EIB. Some progress was made, in particular regarding the support to private sector operations. But without adequate infrastructure, conducive investment climate and business environment, EU's actions towards incentivising DFIs investments will remain challenged.

5 Recommendations

The evaluation team formulated 14 recommendations based on the conclusions and findings of this evaluation. As highlighted above (see also Box 7), to facilitate the application of the recommendations, the team formulated them considering key guiding programming principles and new ways of working under the NDICI-GE, the new financing instrument for EU external action.

Figure 11 Linkages between EQs, conclusions and recommendations



Source: Evaluation team.

5.1 Recommendations on the design of the strategy and operational guidance

5.1.1 Recommendation 1: Policy first and “geographisation”

The EU should continue to frame its support to Somalia under the broad peacebuilding and statebuilding goals of the New Deal but clarify its strategy politically via updated EU Council Conclusions and predated by an EEAS/EC (DG INTPA) Staff Working Document in view of ongoing fundamental changes at the global, regional and national levels.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 1.

Primary follow-up by: EU Council (in particular Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands), EEAS, DG INTPA, EUD, FPI. Other concerned entities: EUSR, EUTM, EUCAP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta.

Considering the ongoing highly fragile, politically unstable and conflict prone situation of Somalia, the five broad peacebuilding and statebuilding goals formulated in the New Deal are still valid for framing the EU’s overall support strategy for Somalia. But several important changes have taken place in the last two years in particular, which require updating the EU’s political guidance via Council Conclusions (possibly to be predated by an EEAS/EC (DG INTPA) Staff Working Document). At the national level, Somalia underwent a change of government and COVID-19 was fading out which allowed it to revive the development momentum. Regionally, the Tigray war broke out in Ethiopia lasting from November 2020 to November 2022 which affected the entire Horn of Africa. At the international level, Russia attacked Ukraine which threatens to impact the future EU and EU MS support to Africa, including Somalia. Additionally, the UK policy change after Brexit caused a severe UK budget cut (for Somalia, approximately 50 per cent less according to informal sources) and the change of government in Sweden, a key supporter on peacebuilding and governance and second biggest EU MS supporting Somalia, might lead to a reorientation of its cooperation priorities with Somalia.

Against this background, it is recommended to update the EU’s Council Conclusions on Somalia (2016) based on thorough strategic ongoing discussions between the EU institutions and EU MS. In this guidance, the EU should invite additional EU MS and their implementing organisations to take up a more active role in Somalia and the political implications of instruments such as budget support and the European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) should be underlined. Specific attention should be devoted in these Council Conclusions to the question of general budget support and how to use it (as a political tool or a development tool), to the prioritisation of the EU’s assistance, to the mobilisation of funding beyond international cooperation, i.e., via DFIs in particular, and to the linkages between the EU’s country support and its regional support. While an EU Horn of Africa Strategy was approved in 2021, specific guidance on Somalia and its link to the regional level is of particular importance in order to maximise complementarities and synergies. An updated Council Conclusion will also send a renewed political signal to the new Somali government that EU and EU MS jointly commit long term to a country which will require substantial peacebuilding and statebuilding assistance in the near future. Without such updated higher level political guidance, the EU’s engagement including the international cooperation dimension is unlikely to be successfully oriented.

5.1.2 Recommendation 2: HDP nexus and civil-military cooperation

The EU should formulate an HDP nexus guidance for its Somalia cooperation to clarify division of labour and type of engagement in view of the EU’s strong support to both stabilisation and humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the EU should connect with UN-OCHA to seek an update of the civil-military guidance for Somalia.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 1.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, ECHO, EUD. Other concerned entities: EUSR, EUTM, EUCAP

EU headquarters committed in 2018 to promote a closer collaboration and interaction between humanitarian assistance, development support and peacebuilding activities. This so-called HDP nexus, or Triple nexus, built on the “humanitarian-development” nexus which was one of the results of the World Humanitarian Summit (2016). Following these commitments, a gradually closer collaboration in Somalia was found between ECHO and the EUD resulting in the constructive and strategic collaboration of today, as confirmed by this evaluation. The necessity for this collaboration under the broadly framed EU integrated approach is obvious in view of intense stabilisation efforts implemented by the FGS and international partners with the aim to push back Al-Shabaab and to regain control over Somali territory. These stabilisation actions result in areas which are partly controlled by the government and partly by Al-Shabaab, so-called “grey areas,” where the provision of humanitarian assistance by humanitarian organisations is difficult to realise in view of their mandate. ECHO, consequently, provides humanitarian assistance in areas which are controlled by government, and which allows, very gradually, to introduce longer-term development support. In these areas or regions, a humanitarian-development nexus is implemented in a context of wider efforts at the macro-level to stabilise the country and to promote peace.

Findings from the evaluation show that the conceptual terms of “HDP nexus” and “humanitarian-development nexus” are used interchangeably, depending on which stakeholders one talks to. Findings further show that a shared understanding among implementing organisations on when and where to engage - either via

humanitarian assistance, or development support – and on how to cooperate is absent. A variety of actors – ranging from the military (international and regional), EU MS and Somali government – have difficulties understanding ECHO’s mandate and why it is exceedingly difficult for humanitarian organisations to engage jointly with the military and international organisations, IOM for example, in stabilisation contexts. Often, misunderstandings need to be solved ad-hoc and on a case-by-case basis. These findings call for conceptual and operational clarification to clearly mark what can be done by the respective EU services and EU-supported actors involved via stabilisation action, humanitarian assistance and development support and how to protect the humanitarian principles. The drafting of a practical HDP guidance for Somalia is therefore recommended, taking into account the insights from a recently accomplished EU study on the implementation of the HDP nexus (2023). Complementary to this, as relevant for the promotion of the HDP nexus, the EU should seek an exchange with UN-OCHA to promote an update to the Somalia Country Specific Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines for Humanitarian Actors Engagement with AMISOM. It was drafted in 2014 and focused on AMISOM’s operation but should become more comprehensive and, ideally, applicable to all support in the military domain provided by international partners.

5.2 Recommendations on implementation

5.2.1 Recommendation 3: Instruments & modalities

The EU should learn from its overall successful and pragmatic combination of instruments and channels of support in the education sector, in particular, and explore how this can be replicated in other sectors and subsectors. General budget support should be further provided as it allowed the EU, in collaboration with other partners, to leverage macro-policy, sector-policy reform and access to policy dialogue which other modalities could not have generated.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 2.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entity: ECHO.

An element of the EU’s learning process during its engagement in Somalia was to understand which organisations could work in the respective difficult contexts and sectors successfully, cost-effectively and timely. At this moment, the EU has gained reasonably good insights which organisations to further partner with and which organisations to replace. The UN, a key partner during the early years of the evaluation period, was replaced by some INGOs and big consulting firms as part of the experiences gained. But pragmatism needs to prevail because the choice of possible partners is limited and not all partners can work in all regions of the country. As such, the continuation of such a pragmatic approach concerning the channels of cooperation is recommended. Though, efforts should be made to further promote the “localisation agenda,” highlighted under Recommendation 8, to engage more local firms and NGOs/CSOs for implementation.

The EU’s move from a range of smaller projects in combination with support provided via multilateral trust funds during the earlier years of the evaluation towards a more strategic engagement as of 2017/2018 needs to be applauded. The latter was shaped via a combination of programme support, most elaborately realised for the education sector, with general budget support (via the EUTF for East-Africa) while multilateral trust funds were further co-financed. Also, the testing of a programme approach in support of territorial development, the big ILED programme, was a bold attempt to become more strategic on resilience and the productive sectors. Learning from this rather ambitious and mixed engagement is ongoing and should result in a more tailored engagement in this regard. Similarly, the relatively new CBDS, a specific instrument under the IcSP to support the military with non-lethal material, was to be implemented under FPI’s management at field level but its implementation had to be taken care of by the EUD. In fact, the FPI did not have the means to accompany interventions under the CBDS, which took much longer than originally planned. Therefore, the approach of testing, learning and combining different instruments and channels of support should be continued as long as serious efforts are undertaken regularly to monitor and evaluate and to adapt the support flexibly.

With the provision of general budget support, the EU made a qualitative step ahead in its international cooperation towards becoming a strategic international actor, as highlighted above. It helped the EU gain a seat at the table for key macro-policy dialogue and allowed it to leverage change in the education sector via its steering of key-policy debates and substantial financial investments. Findings therefore show that budget support has been especially useful from various angles and the evaluation team recommends that it should be continued beyond 2023 when the current contract ends. Experiences from the education sector also provide insights, and learnings should be reviewed and used for the EU’s engagement in other sectors, as far as possible.

5.2.2 Recommendation 4: Integrated and interlinked approaches

The EU should build on its positive experiences gained from promoting and implementing an integrated approach to its Somalia support, between DG INTPA, EEAS, FPI and ECHO in particular, and reinforce efforts to deepen this integration with regard to the EU's missions and operation under the CFSP, i.e., EUTM, EUCAP, Atalanta and the EUSR.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 3.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entities: ECHO, EUSR, EUTM, EUCAP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta.

One of the key lessons learnt among EU services for working in Somalia was that “walking alone,” as presented under EQ4, would not lead to good results. EU headquarters introduced and promoted the integrated approach mid-way through the evaluation period, a timely policy shift helping to make the EU's engagement in Somalia more effective. Multiple positive findings on the implementation of the integrated approach via the collaboration between DG INTPA, DG MARE, EEAS, FPI, DG ECHO and the EUD were recorded, while noting that the path in getting to this point was bumpy at times.

These positive experiences should now be used and capitalised on to further shape an “all-EU” integrated approach, meaning a further integration of EU services with the four EU missions and operation under the CFSP in the Horn of Africa. Concerning one of these missions, the EUSR, collaboration between the EUD and the EUSR office is positive but, in view of evident staff shortages on both sides, further gains could be made via a better teaming up - for example for the joint production of political analyses or conflict studies covering the political and security situations of Somalia, the Horn of Africa and their interrelations.

Concerning the other three missions and operation, a more recent critical review of the two military CSDP missions/operations (EUTM and EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta) and the civil CSDP mission (EUCAP) revealed that the EU was underperforming in its support to peace and security and in need for a more strategic and coordinated approach of all EU engagements in Somalia. The monitoring of the CSDP missions should be continued and come up with a clarification on how the EUD and EUCAP should work together and prioritise their engagement in the RoL/justice sector and how the EUD and EUTM should collaborate with regard to stabilisation efforts. Beyond the work of the EUD, EU headquarters and EU MS should ensure that the mandates of the respective missions are regularly updated to adjust operations to a rapidly changing context and to ensure that the strategic and political directions given can be streamlined and implemented more effectively under the overall coordination of the EUD Somalia. Moreover, to overcome siloed approaches, EU services should make an effort to consult each other informally when strategic guidance is formulated.

5.2.3 Recommendation 5: Institutional setting

The EU should undertake efforts to improve on the timely recruitment and fielding of EUD staff and review the number of available staff so as to ensure an adequate technical accompaniment of different sectors. The EU should also assess the split of the EUD between Nairobi and Mogadishu in 2025/2026 to form an opinion about a possible full move of the EUD to Mogadishu.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 4.

Primary follow-up by: High Representative / Vice President (HR/VP) EEAS & EEAS, DG INTPA, EUD.

Timely recruitment and fielding of staff has been a problem throughout the evaluation period. While attention was given to find qualified EUD staff members, more attention should be given by EU headquarters to field staff on a timely basis. Attention should also be given to the working hours and leave as recommended during the 2017 EU-internal review. In terms of staff numbers, EU headquarters should review the current staffing of the EUD's political and cooperation sections in view of the multiple working areas the EUD has to cover. Generally speaking, the EUD does not have enough staff on the ground to accompany the different sectors and sub-sectors adequately in terms of content discussions, technical advice and process support, compared with other international partners including EU MS. The UK, for example, outnumbered the EU per sector by two, or three persons to one on the EU's side. The EUD's current staffing situation of the political section is of particular concern, with several positions not filled for quite some time. This impacts the work of the EUD's cooperation section because its staff is increasingly connected to work which – in principle – colleagues of the EUD's political section should take care of. Moreover, a military attaché is needed because this position allows to make a better connection between the military/political work of the EUD's political section and the EUD's cooperation section which knows EU procedures and how to programme support. CSDP mission staff members can only function as an interim solution in this regard because of their different mandates and limited networks on the Somali side due to their short stay. In the longer term, when the FGS is ready for it, the EU should also be prepared to mobilise staff with a maritime sector background to help programme support in this complex area, which connects with transnational crime, Blue Economy policies and regional integration.

The EUD's locational split between Nairobi and Mogadishu, an improvement compared to the time when the entire EUD was based in Nairobi, remains an issue which is far from ideal. The pros and cons for a continued EUD presence in two locations have been carefully considered by the EU whereby, from an EU-operational perspective, the advantages outnumber the disadvantages (among others, more easily to find qualified staff

due to Nairobi being a family posting; less expenses for security; many international partners being based in Nairobi; a longer contract period for Nairobi-based staff). Several national and international non-EU stakeholders based in Mogadishu, however, would welcome a merger – a step which would also send a strong (political) message that the EUD is more closely connected and more exposed to Somali realities. The current country situation is not static and might lead to further improvements in a few years. The evaluation team recommends that this perspective is not dismissed and to look at this institutional issue not only from an effectiveness and cost perspective, but also from an arguably emotive Somali point of view as well as geopolitical positioning. While the foreseeable future of the Somalia looks very challenging, it is recommended to review towards the end of the current funding cycle (2025/2026) the earlier drafted plan, compiled by the last EU Ambassador in 2019, to move the full EUD to Mogadishu. The security situation should be the first and foremost issue to be assessed, the (security related) costs, contractual constraints, the likelihood to find qualified staff but also the potential political and strategic gains which the EU could make.

5.2.4 Recommendation 6: Efficiency, flexibility and visibility

The EU should continue to nourish its overall flexible cooperation approach in view of Somalia's ongoing politically fragile, conflict affected and generally unpredictable country, regional and global situation, and it should invest more in the quality of its visibility and outreach to the Somali public.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 4.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, EUD, FPI.

Given the highly variable and unpredictable country and regional situation, the EU should maintain its overall appreciated flexible approach and explore continuously where and how more efficiency gains can be realised across its operations. Insights on flexibility and efficiency were gained throughout the evaluation period at headquarters and EUD level and translated, among others, into an increasingly effective mobilisation of suitable international and local staff.

However, improvements are needed regarding the quality of the EU's visibility in Somalia. At present, an overall routine approach is followed resulting in media articles and interviews about the opening of projects or the overall support the EU provides to Somalia. Communication savvy approaches are needed which should help the EU to become more visible in line with its strong support to the country and to counter public perceptions that countries like Turkey or the UAE are at the forefront of international support to Somalia. Moreover, innovative approaches, processes and facilities are needed to thwart fake-news about the EU and possible hate-speech via social media. But also, via high-level visits of political leaders, engagement with the media of high-level EU representatives and better communication on results. The full relocation of the EUD to Mogadishu would also help in this respect. To strengthen communication and public outreach, EU should create a senior international staff position for communication and a second position for a local communication expert. This change of approach is needed in view of the EU's failure to mobilise a local communication staff member for this work – the payment offered has not allowed to find a suitable local expert for this responsible position.

5.2.5 Recommendation 7: Partnerships and international collaboration

The EU should cherish its positive and successful partnerships with international strategic players, improve its collaboration with the UN where necessary and further strengthen its collaboration with EU MS by seizing the opportunities provided via the Team Europe Approach and specific TEIs.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 5.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS; DG INTPA, EUD, EU MS (in particular Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands).

The EU has gained during the past years a prominent and strategic place in concert with the big four other international partners of Somalia, i.e., the UN, USA, WB and the UK – an achievement which also confirmed its added value compared to EU MS. This collaboration with the four other international partners was successful and, via like-minded approaches, helped to overcome the international political stalemate with the Farmajo government which characterised the years 2020 to 2022. The EU's strategic role was underpinned by the general budget support it provided as of 2017/2018. The evaluation team therefore recommends that the EU ambitions to remain a key political and policy dialogue partner for Somalia – continuing with general budget support will help in this regard, as mentioned under Recommendation 3. The rationale for this position should be founded in the conviction that fundamental changes in a country like Somalia can only be realised if the engagement is strategic, long-term and of a nature which combines political savviness, policy dialogue, substantive funding and a good knowledge of the country and the sectors of engagement. The same applies for the EU's support to Somaliland, a strategic collaboration which should be continued along the same lines as currently practiced.

The collaboration with UN organisations was mixed over the evaluation period, leading to a selective, though not massive, downscaling of the EU's collaboration with the UN and the handing over of certain activities to INGOs and big consulting companies, for example in the domain of stabilisation. This is understandable in

view of sub-optimal performance and reporting, as communicated by different international partners to the evaluation team, but the EU should remain sensitive to steps taken on the UN's side to improve its work. Several EU interviewees also mentioned a willingness to start working again once improvements are realised. Such an approach could lead to continued scant effectiveness and use of resources, hence an in-depth updated assessment of available alternatives in Somalia would be beneficial, informed by international and local experiences. At the same time, the EUD should be willing to comply with the EU's political commitments to work closely with the UN in situations of fragility and conflict, as stated in the EU Council Conclusions on Reinforcing the UN-EU Strategic Partnership on Peace Operations and Crisis Management: Priorities 2019-2021 (2018), but prioritises work with other partners if the UN is unable to deliver value for money.

The EU and EU MS aligned their cooperation vis-à-vis Somalia's priorities. But despite this like-mindedness and overall good collaboration between the EU and EU MS, the EU should make efforts to enhance the quality and intensity of exchanges with EU MS engaged in Somalia. Due to work overload, the EUD had to prioritise allocating available time and resources comparatively more to its engagement in macro-reform processes at the expense of its collaboration with EU MS. This applied to the EUD's political section as well as its cooperation section, which both (also thanks to the good internal coordination) dealt with EU/EU MS affairs from their respective mandates. The recent promotion of the TEI approach and drive to create specific TEI's by headquarters and subsequently the EUD has opened pathways and processes for a closer and more strategic interaction between the EU and EU MS and a common collective EU face towards partners. In a limited number of strategic instances, at the sector level, this should be translated into ambitious plans which should eventually lead to forms of joint programming and implementation.

5.2.6 Recommendation 8: Support to civil society and local governments

The EU should further enhance bottom-up development processes, in particular via interventions to strengthen the linkages between civil society and local governments. Complementary to that, enhanced action should support the "localisation agenda" to further strengthen ownership and effectiveness of interventions implemented by local NGOs and CSOs.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 6.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, EUD, FPI. Other concerned entities: ECHO

The EU supported the strengthening of civil society and the social contract via a variety of interventions implemented by INGOs and local NGOs. For this bottom-up development approach, the EU directly funded some local NGOs. This enhanced ownership and effectiveness of projects and helped to further operationalise the "localisation agenda," i.e., the strengthening of local organisations, NGOs and CSO platforms, and the building of their capacities. It is recommended to widen support to such bottom-up development and explore options to fund more local NGOs and CSOs, potentially also via bigger contracts for such organisations.

With regards to interventions in support of civil society, linkages could be made with local governments. But there was no dedicated attention to local governments, except for some support provided via the UN and some INGOs, was not prioritised. Strengthening the local governments and their linkages with civil society, however, is important to promote local governance, shape possibilities for employment, help to strengthen the local private sector and to enhance the social contract at community and municipal levels. While clearly difficult in the context of Somalia, it is recommended to pay more attention to local governments during the present funding cycle 2021-2027 compared to the 11th EDF and to draft a roadmap (similar to the civil society roadmap) to stipulate what can be done with local governments, under which conditions, how to channel the support, and in which (regional) contexts. As entrance points for working with local governments, the EUD should look at possibilities to support local government associations, business councils at the municipal level and infrastructure projects implemented in collaboration with local governments and implementing organisations or development agencies – some experiences in this regard were already realised shaping a body of knowledge the EU can build on.

Attention to local governments is also needed because the EU did not include a specific local government thematic programme in the NDICI-GE, contrary to the DCI which had a civil society/local government budget line. As such, the need to support local governments can easily drop out of sight.

5.2.7 Recommendation 9: Cross-cutting issues

The EU should keep promoting conflict sensitivity, gender, youth and human rights as cross-cutting issues and pay more attention to legal, political, cultural and economic processes that can have long-term effects on gender relations. The EU should also explore opportunities to better mainstream youth and human rights and to more explicitly formulated conflict sensitivity and do-no-harm approaches.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 6.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entities: ECHO

Findings show that the EU carefully observed the integration of cross-cutting issues across programmes and projects, though to different degrees of attention and intensity. Gender was most considered though the EU

should learn from some positive examples within its portfolios where transformative approaches were adopted and, while recognising the space for gender-related change is relatively narrow, promote more ambitious goals across its interventions. A stronger focus on women's political participation could also be relevant, especially in Somaliland where progress remains extremely limited. Monitoring and reporting requirements should be strengthened in this regard. The importance of human rights was well noted but was the least mainstreamed cross-cutting issue across macro-areas. It was mostly addressed via dedicated projects on security, RoL and CSO support, implemented by INGOs and local NGOs. The EU should more carefully examine the extent to which human rights can be better mainstreamed across programmes via a structured approach, especially in light of human rights being seen as an added value to the EU's engagement on Somalia. Youth, as a cross-cutting issue, was included in several interventions, especially in the education sector and to some extent the productive sectors. The EU should undertake a more careful examination of possibilities to integrate youth when an intervention is designed, to ensure young people are included meaningfully, in ways that reflect their needs and potential without assuming they necessarily share the same challenges and vulnerabilities as women. Concerning intersectionality, in line with headquarters' new GAP III guidance, attention should be given to this issue, for example on intersectional gender considerations. Conflict sensitivity is often implicitly applied by implementing organisations but approaches on how conflict sensitivity is assessed, and influences implementation are difficult to trace in project documents and in monitoring reports. The EU should be more attentive to this issue and critically examine how conflict sensitivity is explicitly considered when an intervention is designed and how it is implemented (for example by including standard questions in project documents, monitoring activities, reporting formats, and ensuring the conflict/context analysis is updated, regularly available and used). Too often, conflict sensitivity is taken for granted. The EU's commitments with regard to conflict sensitivity, as stated in the EU's Council conclusions related to the comprehensive and integrated approach, the legal basis on the NDICI-GE and operational guidance for fragile countries need to be better observed.

5.3 Effects of the EU's cooperation: Sector-specific recommendations:

5.3.1 Recommendation 10: Macro-area I – Statebuilding and RoL

The EU should further support statebuilding via constitutional reform and via interventions to strengthen the rule of law, with some adaptations.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 7.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD

The difficult political situation in the country cannot be ignored, which makes further promoting fundamental reforms of Somalia's statebuilding process imperative. The EU therefore should:

- continue to promote constitutional reform at the macro-level and help to bridge the divide between FGS and FMS, e.g., via projects or activities which bring different actors together;
- while support to the executive, including the institutional strengthening of its organs, is of paramount importance, the need to support legislators with sufficient funding should not be underestimated. With the new President and government in place, the EU should pay renewed attention to lawmakers.
- further promote justice sector reform which is by nature very complex, and which has so far been met with mixed results. But in view of its importance for statebuilding, support for justice reforms is indispensable;
- build on promising interventions that improve access to justice at the local level while recognising Somalia's traditional legal and justice system, the Xeer, and how to connect with it. Such approaches should be scaled up and efforts should be made to support in particular those which can be maintained without EU funding after project termination;
- further support human rights, especially with initiatives in the police and detention sectors where human rights violations are widespread;
- overall, as highlighted under Recommendation 8, more attention should be given to the strengthening of bottom-up development processes in support of civil society capacity development, the promotion of Somalia's social contract and local governance.

5.3.2 Recommendation 11: Macro-area I – Peace and security

The EU should build on its significant investment in this macro-area to further place itself as a strategic actor engaging with Somali and international stakeholders with a common and clearer approach.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 7.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entities: EUSR, EUTM, EUCAP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Over the years, the EU moved from a predominant funding role in support of peace and security towards a strategic partner for Somalia. Building on this evolution, it would benefit from:

- agreed (common) leadership amongst the EU family (including CSDP missions/operation) which reflects its increased integrated approach to the security and defence sector and the variety of funding mechanisms made available. The security-development nexus should guide, to the larger extent possible, EU's wider investment in the sector, including through capacity building assistance to military actors in support of development and security for development ('CBDSD');
- as part of the security-development nexus guidance, be aware of the implications of moving more towards securitised approaches and the risks of underestimating the need for peacebuilding, mediation and reconciliation. This also applies for Somaliland and its ongoing territorial disputes with Puntland. Together with Somali partners, opportunities for dialogue with violent groups, including Al-Shabaab, should be analysed and supported;
- for the sake of clarity and improved effectiveness and efficiency, the development of an EU approach on how to address P/CVE in Somalia, including linkages to the wider region that could be further funded under NDICI-GE Thematic Programme on Peace, Stability and Conflict Prevention. The approach should clearly outline where and how the EUD wants to engage in P/CVE and any related fields, such as the reintegration of former extremists as well as questions in relation to freedom of expression;
- updated and clearer guidelines and coordination mechanisms related to civil-military cooperation and stabilisation approaches with national and international partners. The EU would also benefit from FPI focal point's permanent presence in Somalia, as it would contribute to further strengthen its role as a key external stabilisation actor in the country.

5.3.3 Recommendation 12: Macro-area II - PFM & Education

The EU should build on the successes already achieved in the PFM and education sectors by remaining engaged and focusing on the sustainability of interventions and outcomes.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 7.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entities: ECHO

The EU should build on the successes already achieved in the PFM and education sectors and consider the following:

- in education move away from the 'emergency mode' of funding through INGOs and as recommended in more recent reviews focus on sustainability by moving towards more direct funding modalities that build ownership and capacity in education institutions;
- continue budget support to leverage support for political and sectoral change and ensure the EU can further contribute to policy dialogue when it comes to macro-fiscal issues as well as critical reforms for statebuilding in the areas of PFM, Disaster Risk Management and financial accountability (see also conclusion 3);
- remain engaged in the PFM sector particularly in terms of TA and policy dialogue and consider strengthening engagement in the future if resources allow;
- to enhance trust between state institutions, the EU should advocate more vocally for FGS fiscal transfers from the FGS to FMS in the education sector and to enlarge direct transfers to the Somaliland authorities for the education sector.

5.3.4 Recommendation 13: Macro-area III - Resilience & Productive sectors

The EU should make the most of its portfolio to improve food and nutrition security, to mainstream these objectives in its programming and to further build the evidence of its impact across the HDP continuum of action. This approach should be developed and implemented in the framework of a systemic approach delineated by the EU Green Deal and related Farm to Fork Strategy.

This recommendation is linked to conclusion 7.

Primary follow-up by: EEAS, DG INTPA, FPI, EUD. Other concerned entities: ECHO

The EU provided critical support to enhance resilience and economic development but, despite significant investments made, its portfolio presents limited achievements in terms of food and nutrition security. This is of particular concern as, during the period reviewed, the gains made across its large portfolio were constantly jeopardised by structural and conjunctural crises which have particularly impacted the most vulnerable groups including smallholders and IDPs. Against this background:

- EUD priorities for the 2021-2027 period should focus on sustainable and nutrition sensitive agri-food systems in the framework of the EU Green Deal and Farm to Fork Strategy whereby the recommendations of the recently completed EU Assessment on Sustainable Agriculture Food Systems should be taken note of for programming;
- the EU should further build the evidence of the impact of its support towards improved food and nutrition security through its engagement in policy dialogue in the framework of the HDP nexus, its commitment to foster sectoral governance, and its investments in institutional and individual capacity strengthening;

- in this regard, a better monitoring of the EU contribution to food and nutrition security objectives should be applied more systematically, e.g., by integrating relevant food and nutrition security indicators in the design of future programming;
- nutrition-sensitive interventions can be effective pathways to improve nutrition. The EU should further build on the efforts made by the Government and its partners and implement a nutrition-sensitive approach incorporating explicit nutrition objectives and indicators;
- this approach should be developed following a food system lens that is to be mainstreamed across sectors such as agriculture/ livestock/ fisheries; education; infrastructures; water/ sanitation/ hygiene; and resilience - using shock responsive social transfers schemes to guide the implementation of programmes improving food security and nutrition outcomes.

5.4 Strategic Outlook

5.4.1 Recommendation 14: A strong EU in Somalia

While there are many needs and many demands for assistance from a range of stakeholders in Somalia, the EU – in exchange with EU MS - should carefully consider its ambitions versus its available capacities on the ground. Given its current aspirations, the focus should be on mobilising sufficient international cooperation funding and development finance investments, to create an even stronger EU-footprint in support of Somalia's priorities. An enhanced engagement of EU MS at the sector level should also be explored.

This recommendation is linked to conclusions 1 to 8.

Primary follow-up by: EU Council (in particular Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands), EEAS; DG INTPA, EUD, FPI. Other concerned entities: ECHO, EUSR, EUTM, EUCAP, EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Given the many needs of Somalia and continuously changing dynamics in the country, region, and changing geopolitical dynamics, it is recommended that the EU clarifies priorities with EU MS based on the EU's comparative advantages. Seven broad issues are pointed out which should frame the strategic outlook of the EU's engagement in Somalia during the next years.

- **Focus and target:** The EU has a comparative advantage to engage on reforms at the macro level if underpinned by a strategic approach. This is evident from the engagements under macro-areas I and II and needs to be capitalised on. Experiences and results highlighted from macro-economic reform/ PFM (budget support included), the education sector and constitutional reform were elaborately presented above. Progress from the EU's comprehensive integrated approach to the security sector was noted, though it is recommended to focus more on improving the interaction and collaboration with the CSDP missions.
- **Stronger focus on bottom-up development:** Recognising that the EU does not have a strong comparative advantage to engage in many small-scale interventions bottom-up, it is recommended that the EU reinforces its search, testing and assessment of implementing partners and/or alliances, also local partners from the NGO sector and the private sector, to manage interventions in support of local governance and the building of a social contract.
- **Keeping an eye on the 'must-do's':** The call for a stronger focusing and targeting should not be understood as a recommendation for disengagement from areas which are indispensable to support in order to promote statebuilding and peacebuilding. Among these are the justice sector/RoL, the FGS/FMS relations (linked to the constitutional reform) and local governments – all are areas which require a long-term commitment and an understanding that these are fundamental, though difficult to resolve statebuilding domains.
- **Towards a more strategic engagement with the region:** It is recommended to reinforce efforts for engaging more strategically with the region by mapping out how different regional funding opportunities can be more streamlined, managed and thereby better used in line with the EU's Horn of Africa Strategy (2021) and the updated EU Council Conclusions for Somalia, or any other strategic document guiding the EU and EU MS future involvement in Somalia.
- **Strengthening joint action with EU MS:** To address issues related to the recurrent food crises in Somalia, the Somalia Green Deal TEI and the Farm to Fork Strategy provide for a good funding framework for sustainable and resilient food systems to address the food and nutrition crises more structurally together with EU MS. Potentially new TEIs (the TEI 2: Governance, Peace and Security – Reconciling Somalia, mentioned in the MIP 2021-2027) constitute entry points to deepen the collaboration with EU MS in a domain where the EU as whole can make a difference. Beyond TEIs, the EU should discuss with EU MS options to enhance their engagement at sector level, in particular for areas where EU MS are potentially better placed to provide support.
- **Recognising opportunities:** Viewing ahead, Somalia should not only be looked at as a state with huge challenges but also one with opportunities for investments and the private sector. It is recommended to further support the use of development finance by leveraging risk-sharing mechanisms such as guarantees and blended finance, via the Guarantee Fund for External Action (GFEA) and EFSD+. In this regard, it is

also recommended to strengthen the coordination between donors, development agencies and DFIs, whereby donors and development agencies share their knowledge and expertise of the local context, help build a more conducive business environment and investment climate, and support the identification and preparation of projects geared towards transformative and sustainable impacts. This will facilitate DFI engagements, which often lack presence on the ground and the capacities to build project pipelines.

- **The need for high spending will prevail:** Supporting Somalia and maintaining operations at a high and effective level have been expensive during the evaluation period and will remain so if the recommendations of this evaluation are followed. Judging the relevance of supporting Somalia needs to go beyond the domain of international development cooperation, include wider geopolitical considerations and be accompanied by a willingness to keep spending high and to spend strategically.

All these issues need substantial resources, also reflecting the geopolitical relevance the EU attributes to Somalia. If the EUD is to do more and loaded with potential additional demands from EU headquarters and EU MS, the human resources for the EU's work in Somalia need to be increased.

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